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Abstract
The research question focuses on three areas. First, what is the most appropriate model
and estimation method for studying portfolio optimisation under tail risk with an aim
towards managerial incentives. Second, how outcomes differ for investors who take jumps
into account compared to those who do not. Third, how managerial incentives in the
form of fees and compensation structures create a conflict of interest between investors
and funds in the presence of jumps, leading to a need for policy suggestions. To answer
those questions the thesis builds up from a CARA single-state model to an SV model
to an SVCJ model with jumps in returns and volatility, leverage and heteroskedasticity.
The model and its SV only counterpart is estimated via MCMC. A closed-form solution
for the portfolio weights is derived and used in subsequent simulations. The results are
that the investor always has an incentive to knowingly ignore tail risk in terms of wealth
but never in terms of utility, the manager has an incentive in the short- and mid-run to
undertake excess risk but not in the long-run, the criteria for the incentive horizon are
risk aversion and how investor wealth moves between funds, and policy suggestions are
made based on those grounds.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research question
The research question can be summarised as follows. The overarching question is how
managerial incentives in the form of fees and compensation structures create a conflict of
interest between investors and funds in the presence of jumps and lead to a motivation
for the manager to knowingly undertake excess risk and aim for higher compensation.
This theme generates two secondary, yet important, questions. The first one is what is
the most appropriate model and estimation method for studying portfolio optimisation
under tails with an aim towards managerial incentives. The second one is how outcomes
differ for investors who take jumps into account compared to those who do not.
1.2 General direction of the thesis
The path the thesis selects in order to answer the main question is to show that a certain
amount of technical complexity is essential and necessary, and is not introduced for its own
sake or as a means to impress. The first set of empirical results comes from an attempt
to identify the effect of jumps on a CARA investor with a one-period horizon. When that
proved to be inadequate, the next attempt focused on the effect of heteroskedasticity and
volatility clustering as a way to match a series and generate sufficient tails. This method
was also unsuccessful and thus established the need to expand on a continuous time
framework that replicates many stylized facts on volatility and returns simultaneously.
Model complexity unavoidably called for estimation complexity, since standard maximum
likelihood methods were unsuitable or inaccurate. The underlying idea of a Markov
switch in the first empirical attempt evolved to MCMC Bayesian estimation in the later
1
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stages and also underlines a wide body of literature dealing with continuous time Markov
processes in one form or another.
Although the main contribution of the thesis is not technical, the process necessarily
engages with technical deficiencies and improvements. In that front, a new way to tackle
a feature of existing solutions is proposed, which leads to a more tractable solution for
the model at hand. This translates into a buy-and-hold strategy under the probability of
a disaster during the investment period. This paves the way for the manager and investor
simulations of the last chapter, where jumps are identified as a generator of diverging
motives. Further intuition is added by using a mechanism for investor reactions when
the fund they have invested in underperforms. At this stage the thesis has put all the
necessary components in place and can focus on investor and managerial incentives over
time and across different compensation schemes.
The need to build up is essential also because the route highlights the issues that
appear in the final results. The inability of the one-period optimiser to distinguish jumps
is reminiscent of the manager’s incentive to ignore jumps in the short-term, reasoning
that the shock will not take place ”on average”. Neither one will take them into account.
The failure of stochastic volatility to deal with outliers shows the limits of extracting
information and the power of exogenous events or ”flash crashes”. The reasoning behind
the selection of one model or another highlights the technical limitations and means
that must, ultimately, serve the ends. The red thread that connects the chapters of the
thesis culminates into a result that leads to clear policy suggestions on how to deal with
excess risk taking. The suggestions rely on both the empirical and the theoretical and
are solidly founded in the thesis.
1.3 Importance of the research question
The importance of the question is highlighted by the answer itself. The investor and the
manager are found to have diverging incentives in the short- and mid-term, while the
incentive for the manager dissipates for long horizons. Although the preferences of the
investor and the manager are identical, the fact that they draw utility from different
amounts (portfolio wealth and managerial fees respectively) creates a moral hazard issue.
The source of the divergence is not the level of managerial compensation but the degree of
risk aversion and how investors react to positive or negative relative returns. If investors
react the same to good or bad results, the incentive is greater for the manager than
when they react more viciously to negative than positive results, because more investors
2
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abandon the losing fund and, thus reduce its wealth and consequently the base upon
which managerial fees are calculated.
One of the main components of the answer is the isolation and use of jumps as the
source of risk which generates those incentives. This is achieved by estimating and
comparing a stochastic volatility model without jumps and a stochastic volatility model
with jumps in both the return and the volatility process. This particular method of
employing and replicating jumps is justified in detail, and the origins of this justification
can be detected in Weitzman (2009a), Barro (2006), Martin (2012), Wachter (2013),
Julliard and Ghosh (2012) and Jondeau and Rockinger (2012) among others. The basic
idea is that an increased probability of jumps, or fat tails in a distribution, leads to
an investor being willing to pay an infinite amount today in order to secure against a
future catastrophic event. Since observations on tails are rare, their actual shape and
the estimation of the related parameters is a matter for debate, leading to very high
sensitivity in parameters and model selection. In a financial context, the equity premium
puzzle and its possible solutions provide fertile ground for the discussion. Jumps are
found to provide an improvement in model accuracy and partially explain certain features
of financial markets, but at the same time they are not a panacea and there is still
debate about their proper representation. The thesis starts from a very basic setup and
builds upwards, since extreme events are notably absent from standard optimisation and
decision making methods. This denotes a need to enrich and expand a simple method,
as well as select the proper model.
A second component is a set of portfolio allocations and strategies that allow for
direct comparisons between cases. This is achieved by deriving a closed-form solution for
optimal weights. It is shown that the employment of each model leads to significantly
different allocations, which are found to be time invariant. Despite the extensive technical
literature and research that focuses on portfolio allocation and model fitting, the aspect
of moral hazard and investor/ manager choices is absent from the literature. Notably,
the factors that affect and lead to the final results are both technical and conceptual.
Risk aversion (a parameter of great importance in any model) has an effect at least as
important as the reaction and perception of investors to losses and profits. Therefore,
the importance of the research question lies not only in conducting a fitting exercise but
identifying a wider set of elements that need to be taken into consideration, and consist
the environment in which jumps do have a strong effect.
3

Chapter 2
Literature review
The literature review can be separated in four main areas. The first part discusses a
number of key papers that outline the origins and importance of the research question,
and provide a guidance to the gaps in the literature that will be addressed by the PhD.
The second part discusses the equity premium puzzle and its expansions, as well as
portfolio optimisation under extreme events. The third part focuses on jumps-related
literature, with a brief reference to other methods of modeling and incorporating tail
risk. The fourth part is technical and will discuss finance and mathematics literature
exclusively with regards to estimation. The technical part can be found in the third
chapter where the estimation methodology is explained, with some additional papers in
the fourth chapter.
2.1 Essential literature
The foundation of the research question is two-fold and can be traced in environmental
economics and asset pricing or portfolio management. The basis of the former is
Weitzman’s ”Dismal Theorem”, which states that tail thickness causes the investor to
discount future catastrophic events at a very high rate, even for moderate risk aversion
(Weitzman (2009a), Weitzman (2009b), Weitzman (2009c)). The result is that an investor
is willing to pay a virtually infinite amount of money today to secure against a long-term
disaster of very low probability. The argument is based upon the selection of a utility
function and/or a probability distribution function that unavoidably imposes restrictions
on how tail risk is perceived, estimated and evaluated, and how different structural
assumptions may lead to exploding results under very fat tails. Unperceived or exogenous
contemporary changes in parameters may lead to ill specified models and outcomes. The
5
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essence is that uncertainties are linked, their effects are greater than the sum of their
parts and attempts to limit those effects by restricting parameter calibration do not (and
perhaps cannot) address the issue. Since such restrictions or limitations are very rarely
justified a priori, the result is an individual that is infinitely risk averse. The “dismal
theorem” states that societies are willing to pay infinite wealth in order to hedge against
great unexpected disasters (dominance effect). From a portfolio management point of
view, an investor operating in such a world may reverse the argument and be willing to
accept a less-than-infinite premium being burdened less in insurance terms), essentially
betting that the disaster will not take place during his lifetime.
The discussion expands to areas beyond the scope of the research question, but a
certain string of literature that carries on to this day offers insight. Nordhaus (2009)
formulates a reply focusing on the paradigm and contextual limitations of the Theorem,
highlighting the use of CRRA utility functions, parameter hypersensitivity, combination
of factors needed and very fat-tailed distributions as prerequisites for the argument to
hold. Weitzman (2009c) argues that the very same uncertainty pointed out by Nordhaus is
the same feature that causes Cost-Benefit Analysis to be such a precarious and imprecise
alternative, despite its central position in modern economic and environmental analysis.
Keen structural research and constant reassessment of models may relieve pressure on
extreme outcomes, but the sheer complexity of the task is so great that it is unlikely to
achieve something better than an approximation without eliminating tail risk and effects.
The debate expands on the specifics of environmental research. It is important,
however, to note some contributions with clear parallels to portfolio optimisation and long-
term discounting. Karp (2009) notes that discounting should be seen as hyperbolic, not
constant, therefore climate policy should be seen as an intergenerational, not intertemporal
optimisation game, and that ”the likelihood of intra-generational conflict arising from
optimal climate policy may be exaggerated under two circumstances: (i) if we fail
to recognize that we can internalize climate damages by changing the composition of
investment between man-made and natural capital, or (ii) if we fail to recognize that the
correct business as-usual baseline involves investment decisions that internalize neither
future nor current damages”. Nordhaus (2012) focuses on policy implementation and finds
no evidence that outcomes based on the tails of the distribution have indeed dominated
smoother, more normal movements. However, he emphasises on the usefulness of the
Dismal Theorem as a word of caution against cases of high uncertainty, the catastrophic
events they imply and the differences between frameworks. Horowitz and Lange (2014)
introduce available technological and policy options to deal with climate change, in the
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elementary form of a term that generates a sure unit of consumption in the future using a
unit of today’s consumption as input. When future output is not certain, the range of risk
aversion that generates the same results as Weitzman’s is narrower. Cost-Benefit Analysis
must, therefore, employ not just a stochastic discount factor but a joint probability
between consumption and investment. Under that structure, society is rarely willing to
proceed into the infinite exchange between present and future consumption implied by
the Dismal Theorem.
The entire debate around the Dismal Theorem is underlined by (no) policy imple-
mentation, the potential effects and the appropriate course of action. This very limited
selection of papers is used to highlight the tangents with the economic and financial
concepts of allocation between generations, long-term discounting and the importance
of selecting a suitable discount factor, correctly assessing the magnitude and frequency
(shape of tails) of extreme events and how to cover against disasters. As it will become
apparent later on, the discussion is reminiscent of the parallel debate in finance about
the use and nature of jumps and calibration/ estimation problems. The importance of
tail risk and the message of the Theorem is that downside risk and catastrophic losses
(with catastrophe in need of a definition) are certainly non-negligible.
Although tail thickness in asset prices has been observed since Mandelbrot (1963),
it is only in the last decades that it has received extensive modeling attention and has
been used as a tool to address a number of empirical issues. The second foundation
can be identified in the Equity Premium Puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)) and its
mirror image, the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle (Weil (1989)). Both papers will be discussed in
detail in the next part, but as a very brief introduction the former records the failure
of existing asset pricing models to capture the gap between stocks and bonds returns
(estimated at roughly 6% at the time) and the latter shows that if a model is estimated
by using historical stocks returns as benchmark, the result is a risk- free rate much
higher than the one observed. The conclusion underlined the significant limitations of
the standard models in the literature, and a reconciliation was proposed by Rietz (1988).
The inclusion of an additional disastrous state in the Mehra and Prescott setup could
be able to generate excessive equity premia. This additional state was, in essence, the
introduction of a fatter tail in the returns distribution contrary to the staple normal
distribution. However, as Mehra and Prescott (1988) note, the solution falls short in a
number of ways. The suggested disasters were of unprecedented magnitude (50%, 75%,
100% of GDP), risk aversion was very high, unanticipated inflation and its effect on
nominal and real bill rates was ignored and historical support was lacking. However,
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beyond this critique, a fundamental issue both sides faced was the smooth consumption
and GDP time series used as data. It is a well-observed fact that such series cannot
generate enough variance and volatility for jumps to be generated and estimated in a
sensible matter, leading to a need for implausible assumptions and findings.
The argument of Rietz was brought to the forefront by Barro (2006), who addresses
the Equity Premium Puzzle again but tries to adjust for the arbitrary values of Rietz. A
model that includes jumps is calibrated according to historical data on disaster frequency
and size, using a time additive power utility function and a random walk process with drift
and stationary variance for consumption (or future equity claims) where jumps are i.i.d.
The dividend return rate is set equal to the equity return rate. The data is annualised,
which adds up the multi-year effect of a disaster and treats it as instantaneous, leading
to an increased equity premium. The asset process is the simplest form that can include
jumps and the Lucas framework puts the model in the same category as the Mehra and
Prescott approach. The results show that jumps can improve on the equity premium
puzzle estimations and provide a potential explanation. Gabaix (2012) follows the Barro
line of reasoning by moving on to a set of puzzles in Macro-Finance and expands to a time
variable probability of disasters, contrary to the constant calibration of the above. He
expands the framework to incorporate time variability in disaster probability and Epstein
- Zin preferences instead of power utility. The findings on ten puzzles in finance support
the idea that including disaster risk improves the results in many cases. However, the
model is calibrated, not estimated, and certain features of asset prices are not included
due to its parsimonious nature. An important comment is the effect of time variability
and how a (constant or stochastic) probability of disaster can be calibrated properly.
The discussion expands slightly on political measures of disaster risk and disaster risk
measured by tail behaviour. Both these factors have a part in the literature review, with
the latter receiving particular attention in the technical section.
Julliard and Ghosh (2012) contradict Barro’s solution on the basis of the C-CAPM
rejection under empirical likelihood, loss of information due to annualised data, the fact
that disasters should occur much more often and the execution of two estimations with
international data that cannot generate neither disasters of sufficient magnitude nor
equity premia. A distribution that would rationalize the equity premium puzzle should
have a fatter left tail and be skewed to the left (assigning higher probabilities to disasters
and implying low consumption and low stock returns). It is true that the paper records
a number of reverse-engineering failures. On the other hand, the data manipulation
and fitting in these methods seems to be extensive. In addition, the intuition behind
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mean-variance optimization methods such as the CAPM is quite standard, since it ignores
higher moments and additional measures, so jump information is likely not included in
the covariance matrix no matter the data set or the assets selected. The basic intuition
behind the data set, however, and how disaster data should be treated (annualized or not)
is valid and a matter of consideration. In that context it could be said that the equity
premium is not necessarily generated by a fear for disasters but from a fear for recessions.
However, if disasters are considered as exogenous/ unpredictable while recessions as
tractable from observing fundamentals, a question arises about both investor behaviour in
the bonds and stock markets respectively, as well as illusion issues. Agent heterogeneity
might not be enough of an explanation.
Some additional space needs to be dedicated to Barro and Ursu´a (2008) as well as
the critique and commentary by Blanchard and Constantinides (2008), since it contains
the dataset in question which has been used in subsequent research. The paper expands
on the Barro (2006) results and data but keeps the same model. The critique focuses
on the inability of the Lucas framework to cater for such a research (Blanchard) since
the process includes a very precise, even counterfactual, calibration of data. This ”peak
to trough” calibration is applied on the first year of the disaster, not the last, and is
multiplied by the first year rate of return (Constantinides) ending up in an amplification
of the disaster effects and a double-counting of the total effect.
Wachter (2013) uses time variability in disaster risk as well, causing the equity
premium to follow the same pattern. Epstein - Zin preferences are used to disentangle
time preference and risk aversion and thus a well known limitation of the power utility
function is avoided (a high price-dividend ratio implies high excess returns). There are
two uncorrelated stochastic processes, one for the asset price and one for the arrival
intensity, with a single source of risk. The constant mean and variance of the former means
that during normal periods without jumps volatility is constant, but the occurrence
of a jump adds an additional time varying term on the equity premium. However
variance is not explicitly modelled, with the standard deviation term in the process being
constant. Compared to the other papers of this section, the model and methodology for
deriving optimal portfolia is the closest to the one adopted in the thesis but the aims are
vastly different. The focus is on time-varying equity premia, dividend yields, matching
stylised facts and generating sufficient volatility, under the very limiting assumption
of constant volatility in an attempt to isolate the effects of jumps and their stochastic
arrival intensity. The model is again calibrated by using Barro (2006) and Barro and
Ursu´a (2008) parameters. Its importance lies on being a complete example of the scope
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and structure of models with jumps, the existence of closed form solutions subject to the
setup, its successes and limitations.
Martin (2012) focuses on an issue highlighted by all of the above papers, particularly
Weitzman (2009a): the effect of calibration and parameter sensitivity. The introduction
of jumps in any form imposes tail thickness and in essence calls for the calibration or
estimation of a probability area where very few observations are found. From a statistical
point of view, an assumption on the shape of the distribution (if a known fat-tailed
distribution is assumed) or the way tails are thickened (by a Poisson or Levy jump
process) may or may not be justified, with both outcomes being on uncertain grounds.
Untractable tail degeneration or the effect of fat tails on the hump of the distribution
(both issues discussed in great detail in Kemp (2011)) are existing issues that may lead
to erroneous results and have no clear solution, since the selection of a distribution or a
process immediately imposes underlying assumptions on the interpretation of the data
at hand and the nature of the phenomena in question. Martin (2012) uses Epstein - Zin
preferences, like Wachter (2013) and an i.i.d consumption growth process, like Barro
(2006) but focuses on the resulting distribution and higher moments. Contradicting
Nordhaus (2012) and his environmental framework and data, Martin finds strong evidence
that tails have a significant impact on asset prices when the focus is on stocks prices
and that parameter sensitivity is huge. Therefore, slight deviations can have a great
impact on results and model validity. A final aspect of using tailed instead of (log)normal
distributions is the latent information that can be extracted by studying higher moments.
The starting point of Jondeau and Rockinger (2006),Jondeau and Rockinger (2009),
Jondeau and Rockinger (2012) is the fact that mean-variance optimisation a la Markowitz
under Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility functions becomes more unreliable the
more the asset distribution deviates from normality, and skewness/ kurtosis become more
apparent. Stochastic higher moments add to the complexity but apparently contain
additional economic importance, leading to decision making by using distribution timing
as well as market and volatility timing: predictions of the underlying features of the
returns distribution and its overall shape (skewness and kurtosis) opposed to predictions
based on expected returns (mean) and expected volatility. The paper offers an example
of how a GARCH-DCC model structure with unexpected returns innovations coming
from an asymmetric, fat-tailed skewed t distribution can be used in extreme events
analysis. Two debatable points are the assumption of constant expected returns, to
allow focus on the higher moments, and the sample period, which might not contain
a sufficient number of jumps. Although jumps are not explicitly modelled, the tail
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thickness is an accurate representation. The GARCH structure of the covariance matrix
also allows for volatility clustering and dynamic correlations. The maximisation cases are
a joint normal distribution (corresponding to mean-variance optimisation), a Skewed-t
distribution (forecasting both the time-varying covariance matrix and the conditional
distribution of asset returns), and a benchmark case of mean-variance strategy with
constant weights estimated through sample moments throughout the period, and the
results are clearly in favour of the latter. The joint normal case is estimated by a standard
two-step GARCH-DCC process, while for the t case the parameters in the first and
second moments must be estimated jointly with those in the joint distribution. For that
purpose a Michaud (1998) resampling methodology is used. The comparison reveals that
bad news affect volatility more than good news and large negative shocks are followed
by a decrease in kurtosis, while positive shocks are followed by increased kurtosis and
volatility timing provides an increase in utility.
Foster and Young (2012) discuss the reliability of downside risk tests in portfolio
returns, when the manager has the option to use derivatives or leverage in order to cover
highly risky positions. They test whether compound excess returns have been generated
by a martingale process with zero conditional expectation or have a non-positive and
positive at some points expectation (they are the result of a superior strategy). The
intuition places accidental returns against returns of leveraged positions through options
that cover downside excess risk. The test does not use assumptions about distributions
and is strategy-proof. However, this may lead to quite lax confidence intervals, which
accounts for unobserved tail risk and attempts to improve confidence lead to implausibly
high positive returns. In other words, in a non-transparent world a manager needs to
exhibit an enormous size of returns in order to pass the proposed test and prove that he
is indeed skillful. More transparency and more information about tail risk would lower
that threshold. Two interesting observations is that the leveraged version of the test
demonstrates the least power loss when lognormality is assumed, while it is asymptotically
as strong as the t-test.
This diverse and contradicting literature manages to underline both the key themes
of the thesis and the areas of advancement as well as, via their absence, the gaps that
this research manages to cover. Weitzman (2009a) emphasises the profound effect rare
extreme events can have in decision making and recourse (portfolio) allocation, and the
challenges they pose in selecting appropriate instruments. Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006)
bring this line of reasoning in the contemporary context of mean-variance optimisation
in an attempt to improve theoretical deficiencies, and despite their shortcomings they
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show that rare events can provide an explanation. Julliard and Ghosh (2012) note the
importance of selecting a dataset with appropriate properties and plausible calibration
values (jump frequency in particular). Wachter (2013) moves away from assuming
that jumps arrive at a constant rate and provides a modelling improvement, that has
been supplemented with other structures. Another important theme is when and how
time variability in jump frequency matters and what features of asset prices are (not)
included by selecting a certain structure. Although the selected model fits the need for a
time varying equity premium, it may be misleading for other purposes. Martin (2012)
highlights the great effect of uncertainty in estimation which is inherent in tail studies due
to the low number of observations, which translates into imprecise estimates. Jondeau
and Rockinger (2012) put portfolio optimisation to the forefront with and without fat
tails, reporting a significant improvement over the mean-variance optimiser, although
in a higher moments framework. It must be noted how the selection of a particular
distribution contradicts both Weitzman’s and Martin’s intuition on the effects of such
a choice. Finally, Foster and Young (2012) is the only paper that refers to managerial
incentives, despite the vast literature in all the above areas. It also provides a statistical
test to identify managerial behaviour that entails excess risk, a key theme in the thesis.
What has not been pursued, and in fact has seen very little attention, is the effect
of managerial incentives on portfolio allocation. In all the models presented above,
there is no reference to the manager and how his incentives differ from those of the
investor. The manager is either absent or is treated as identical to the investor, in typical
methodological fashion, with the only technical paper to identify a disparity being Foster
and Young (2012). In the thesis the manager is treated as a different entity that receives
utility by a managerial fee structure contrary to the investor who is concerned about
utility derived from portfolio wealth. The mean-variance optimiser who uses a power
utility function and a normal distribution of returns is called ”naive” in the literature,
contrary to a better informed optimiser who takes jumps into account. The research will
reverse the convention and, following the Weitzman and Nordhaus debate, will argue
that instead of being naive, the investor (manager) knowingly ignores the probability
of rare events effectively betting that the chance of occurrence during the investment
horizon is negligible and can be ignored. By consequence, such an agent will knowingly
undertake higher risks in hope of higher returns, hoping that there will not be a disaster
as long as the investment is still active. This change of perspective and context will be
the base of expansions in all the aforementioned areas and lead to a series of novel results.
More than a retelling, the research will expand existing methodologies on new ground
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and see if the different incentives of managers and investors lead to a conflict of interest,
if the results can be attributed to technical reasons and make policy suggestions.
To conclude, the thesis will justify the selection of a specific model that includes
jumps based on the features it needs to contain, proceed into an estimation in order to
include a period as representative as possible, proceed to a closed- or semi-closed form
solution for portfolio weights for direct comparison between cases that will have value on
its own accord, and conduct a set of comparative simulations between an investor that
considers jumps in the optimal portfolio selection and one that does not. In addition,
managerial fees will also be included so that managerial incentives and utility can be
compared to those of the corresponding investor. The research question can, thus, be
summarised as follows. First, what is the most appropriate model and estimation method
for studying portfolio optimisation under tails with an aim towards managerial incentives.
Second, how outcomes differ for investors who take jumps into account compared to
those who do not. Third, how managerial incentives in the form of fees and compensation
structures create a conflict of interest between investors and funds in the presence of
jumps, leading to a need for policy suggestions.
2.2 The Equity Premium puzzle as an introduction
to jumps literature
The second part will analyse in detail the literature starting from the equity premium
puzzle and focuses on portfolio optimisation under different utility functions and asset
price distributions. The advantage of the equity premium puzzle as starting point is that
it encapsulates a great part of the problematique and the analytical challenges adressed
or still unresolved by potentially introducing jumps. The discussion will show how the
attempt to solve the puzzle has led to the inclusion of different sets of preferences and
assumptions on investor behaviour, and how tail risk (not only in the form of jumps but
also in higher moment analysis) has led to technical and theoretical advancements in
modelling and optimal portfolio solutions.
2.2.1 The Equity Premium Puzzle in more detail
The starting point is Mehra and Prescott (1985), where the Equity Premium Puzzle is
analysed in detail as the product of the inability of the mainstream framework of CRRA
utility functions and/or normality to generate empirically verifiable equity premia. The
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focus is the historically persistent higher yield of stocks over bonds in the US which was
not accounted for by standard models under plausible calibrations of the risk aversion
parameter and was estimated at 6% at that time. The illustration of this inability came
through a representative agent economy with constant elasticity of substitution, time
additive expected utility preferences and complete markets. More specifically, the model
employed an Arrow - Debreux frictionless economy with a Lucas consumption model
and CRRA utility while output followed an ergodic Markov process. The conclusion
was that the observed return rates could not be replicated in such a limiting setup and,
consequently, parameterisation in the literature and/or model assumptions were out of
place.
Around this focal point many authors have argued around a variety of topics which
are closely related, if not central, to the thesis. Coherent summaries of the debate and
assessments of contemporary results can be found in Kocherlakota (1996), Mehra and
Prescott (2003), Van Ewijk et al. (2012) and Constantinides (2002), which identify the
main axes of research: improving the assumptions of identical agents (homogeneous
preferences), complete markets (perfect insurance), violations of normality (as discussed in
the previous section) and no transaction costs. The assumptions, methods and analytical
successes and failures the following papers report are relevant in the more specialised
area of disaster risk. The first issue to be discussed is advances in the type of preferences
and utility functions, market/ agent types and investor behaviour in the standard model.
Weil (1989) showed that disentangling elasticity of substitution from the risk aversion
parameter through Kreps-Porteus preferences, thus smoothing consumption over states
and over time, does not provide better results and, moreover, a second puzzle named
the risk-free rate puzzle emerges: the risk-free rates generated are too high compared
to the real ones. When these processes are connected, either the risk free rate or the
equity premium can be replicated but not simultaneously. When they are independent
they can be arbitrarily replicated but with very high risk aversion. In the first case the
equity premium predicted by the model is too low compared to empirical values (equity
premium puzzle) while in the second the risk-free rate is too high (risk-free rate puzzle).
Epstein and Zin (1991) are less successful in their attempt to answer the puzzle through
Epstein – Zin preferences (very similar to Kreps - Porteus), since they still have the
equity premium puzzle appearing and their results are only marginally accepted. Duffie
and Epstein (1992) expand the recursive utility model to continuous time and produce a
stochastic differential formulation, which is able to produce a Bellman optimal solution.
Although in this setup it is possible to distinguish between different types of utility
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function, when the decision criterion is not expected utility this distinction is no longer
possible (e.g. between a certainty equivalent based on expected utility and smooth local
expected utility). The papers are theoretical but form the basis for the type of solutions
to be used in stochastic models for optimal weights.
Constantinides (2002) is in favour of relaxing the assumptions of the basic model but
still maintains the need to remain in a rational paradigm, while Detemple (2014) provides
an expansive and comprehensive review on portfolio selection literature. Habit formation
in consumption in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), where changes in consumption have
low (high) effect when consumption is high (low) and where negative states appear as
consumption shocks, yields better results compared to focusing on time (in)consistency
as above. The authors use the term “fat tail” to describe the skewed distribution of the
surplus consumption ratio, which is an explicit way to bring forward a deviation from
normality. However, the host of positive results can be attributed to reverse engineering.
Technically, it is very fortunate that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is multiplied
by a very small quantity and therefore its size has very little effect on the risk-free rate.
Also, average risk aversion over time can be high with high variation but the risk-free rate
remains low and stable. Heterogeneous consumers and incomplete securities markets are
another promising assumption that reappears later. In Constantinides and Duffie (1996)
investors have the same preferences but different initial endowments and they suffer from
idiosyncratic employment shocks that are very difficult to hedge, especially when they are
inaccurately represented through a log-normal distribution. Lack of heterogeneity would
lead to an over- or underestimation of the subjective discount rate and the risk aversion
coefficient. This finding is related to the counter-cyclicality of the equity premium, since
in periods with high job insecurity people are less willing to invest in stocks as they are
a poor substitute for income loss.
Freeman (2004) focuses on market incompleteness as a solution to the puzzle. Unin-
surable risk present in times of contraction, an idea similar to downside risk/ loss aversion
faced by an investor facing tail risk, plays a considerable role in explaining the price
when a disaster state is introduced, contrary to the unrealistic parameters and results
in the standard Mehra and Prescott setup. Jacobs et al. (2013) also discuss market
incompleteness and note how its inclusion lowers the risk aversion necessary to generate
estimates of the equity premium closer to empirical values. However the data sets are
incomplete or suffer from inaccuracies. Gourio (2008) introduces time variability in
disaster risk combined with Epstein - Zin and CRRA preferences and discrete time model,
thus differentiating from Wachter (2013). Disaster risk is i.i.d and the state variable of
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the equity premium is independent of dividend and consumption growth. While CRRA
utility fails to match empirical stock returns, Epstein - Zin preferences match the pattern
but are imprecise in the magnitude of estimation.
Additional contributions focused mainly on the points mentioned above and reported
varying results. Bach and Møller (2011) follow Constantinides and Duffie (1996) but
divide consumers into asset holders and non-asset holders under a non-constant risk
free rate. They estimate for each group separately and for the aggregate, finding a
coefficient of risk aversion close to 8 for asset holders and problematic fit for the risk free
yields when testing for non-asset holders. Compared with the aggregate, the results for
asset holders are better, implying better information for this group. The explanation
given is the high volatility of consumption for asset groups that allows for a lower
CRRA. Guvenen (2009) uses a similar model in which non-stockholders do not consume
wealth (empirically wealth is very unevenly distributed between the two categories) but
receive stochastic labour income (inelastic and elastic markets) and wish to smooth
consumption through the bond market. In negative events, stockholders practically
pay non-stockholders countercyclically. The result is that differentiation (low EIS of
non-stockholders) generates high countercyclical volatility and equity premia because
of the high skewness of the non-stockholders utility curve, which translates to very
low IES. Auer (2011) finds evidence of the risk aversion coefficient being higher than
normally assumed. He conducts cross-checks between the habit formation model and
the standard power utility model (both estimated via GMM) benchmarking through
the Hansen - Jagannathan nonparametric method using German investment funds as
a benchmark. The models, under all circumstances, demonstrate high risk aversion
but cannot be rejected. It is interesting to see how the coefficient for Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) is even higher than the original model. As a critical comment, Carroll
(2001) provides a technical, estimation-based critique and arguments against the use of
(log-linear) Euler consumption functions and their second-order Taylor approximations,
stating that micro data are inadequate in the estimation of risk aversion and the close
link between consumption and predictable income growth leads to false test rejections.
2.2.2 Deviations from normality and jumps
The second issue is how deviations from normality were gradually introduced in the equity
premium discussion as an improvement of the standard model. This, in essence, includes
introducing jumps and non-normal distributions. The calibration of jump frequency,
or equivalently a certain type of jumps modelling, is directly related to the essential
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behaviour and feature the model is supposed to replicate, bringing jump factors to the
forefront. There is an ongoing debate on what consists a jump, not just in terms of
magnitude but also in terms of source and reaction. The modelling approach is covered
by a line of mathematical and finance literature focusing on the types of processes and
their properties, which will be covered extensively later on. The calibration approach
brings forward the elements of definition and data mining.
Guidolin and Timmermann (2008) take an international point of view by bringing
skewed and kurtotic distributions of returns in international portfolia when home bias
is present. The analysis uses the ICAPM model but with emphasis on higher moments
under bull and bear regimes and time variability. Fat tails are also present and investors
are found to show an aversion towards them (kurtosis) but a preference towards positive
skewness. Although such a perspective is beyond the scope of the thesis, the paper is a
good example on how tails affect decision making and the severe limitations of ignoring fat
tails either by assuming normality or by limiting optimal solutions to the mean-variance
criterion. Kole et al. (2006) also focus on international decision making under crises, but
their setup is fundamentally different. Instead of treating jumps as one-off events, they
consider crises to be systemic, lingering events that change the state of the economy. In
a continuous time Markov switching model that resembles a jump-diffusion model (with
the difference being in the structure of the jump, which is not a Poisson of generally Levy
process) closed-form solutions for portfolio weights are derived. The paper finds strong
crisis persistence and major differences between the crisis awareness and crisis ignorance
states. The latter is an idea that will be explored in the thesis but in a much different
context and from a completely different angle. Finally, a major drawback is the use of
monthly data for a period of 30 years, a choice in stark contrast with the continuous
time framework that drastically limits the number of observations making the results
rather questionable. Azevedo et al. (2014) perform a similar exercise in a deterministic
finite investment horizon. Maheu et al. (2013) find further evidence on the existence of
a ”skewness premium” and the relationship between time-varying disaster risk and the
equity premium, in a GARCH setup with a third-order Taylor approximation for the
utility function.
Liu et al. (2004) look for a way to increase consumption volatility in the Mehra -
Prescott model with a method close to the main string of the literature. They use a
jump – diffusion process for the share of dividends in consumption as well as a different
process for consumption itself. The risk premium consists of the standard consumption
effect, the effect of a stock price jump and the correlation between the dividend share
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and consumption times risk aversion. However there is a number of debatable points:
dividends are assumed to be regular and equal to a constant payout ratio times aggregate
corporate earnings, consumption shocks are set to a yearly 10% which is consistent
only with Great Depression values. The authors assume countercyclical behaviour of
dividends but report empirical evidence of strong procyclicality of the corporate fraction,
and dividends as variable are generally considered to have minor effects.
Harvey et al. (2010), as in Jondeau and Rockinger (2012), use the Michaud Bayesian
resampling technique in a framework of higher moments and parameter uncertainty, but
they highlight the loss of utility stemming from that process that results in a sub-optimal
results in terms of expected utility according to Jensen’s inequality. Their proposed
alternative is a Bayesian model that relies upon a distribution that is the product of a
multivariate normal pdf and a multivariate normal cdf. The estimation process is MCMC
(the method of choice of the thesis) and another MCMC step optimises the expected
utilities resulting from the distribution drawings. Since expected utilities are a function
of the weights, optimal weights are also simulated. The weaknesses of the paper are
the very limited and selective data set and the lack of any out-of-sampling testing other
that the Odds ratio to determine the better model. As a side note, Harvey et al. (2008)
discuss the Michaud technique in greater detail.
From a technical point of view, a basic reason for the poor-to-modest results is the
fact that consumption time series have too low variance to generate either high risky
asset returns or low risk-free rates. Since these models estimate consumption Euler
equations, the independent variable is simply incapable of generating the desired results.
The conclusion of this body of literature is that there can be no proper treatment of the
behaviour of asset prices, at least in the context of explaining the equity premium puzzle,
in such a smooth framework that relies on overly restrictive assumptions on market
homogeneity, intertemporal elasticity of substitution, risk aversion and using consumption
as the underlying variable. Of particular importance is the failure to consistently improve
results when the CRRA class of functions is abandoned, which shows that, despite its
well-documented limitations, power utility still has merit as an interpretative tool. Yet,
some of these models managed to point later research to a more fruitful direction.
This underlines the importance of jumps as explanatory factor. On the other hand,
the inclusion of tails and/ or the study of higher moments produces consistently improved
results. Up to this point it has become apparent how the focus has shifted from the equity
premium puzzle to the advantages and potential provided by alternative utility functions
and, more importantly, tail thickness. The advantage of using Epstein - Zin preferences
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are not as conclusive as those of higher moments and disaster risk. As mentioned above,
the use of power utility is still relevant and addresses the research question properly.
Also, the major issue of proper modelling and parametrisation of tail risk has become
obvious and will be discussed in detail in the next part, where a large body of continuous
time jump-diffusion literature will establish the selection of the model. A final remark
is that managerial incentives are still absent, despite the rich and fruitful work on the
elements that affect investor behaviour.
2.2.3 Further relevant considerations about jumps
An important element of the discussion is the nature of jumps and how qualitative,
behavioural or political considerations can be linked to disaster risk. An important
contribution comes from Berkman et al. (2011). They use an international political
crisis database to assign probabilities for disasters, with an aim towards time-variation
in disasters. A crisis is defined as ”a perceived change in the probability of a threat that
results in the start or end of an international political crisis [...] likely to be closely aligned
with the news events to which investors might react.” The paper highlights a number
of important facts, among which are: the number of actors/factors in an international
crisis is 5 of larger in half the cases (crisis spreading - contagion), there is correlation
between consumption crises and involvement in international crises (with the effects
being much stronger in the case of wars), stock market volatility is affected by global
political insecurity (in agreement with Wachter (2013)). The chance of being involved in
a crisis is 1 every 15 years - not very far away from the 6 - 10 years demand of Julliard
and Gosh.
The methodology is regressions and GARCH with dummy variables and the findings
are generally in agreement with time-varying volatility models. The paper fails to
connect future market returns and crisis risk, but it does find a correlation between
the earnings–price ratio and the dividend yield. However potential validity issues are
not avoided. It is not discussed how a political crisis translates into an economic/
consumption/ stock market crisis, and a theoretical tool to expand from the international
to the national level (if one accepts that there are crises without international elements)
is not provided. In a nutshell, it can be difficult to establish a measurable relationship
between the political and the economic domain, and this is probably why the authors stay
at a level of mere inference. This is the most complete study of its kind with quantitative
applications.
Gabaix et al. (2013) provides a small summary of the literature that focuses on
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specific periods, finding strong ties between war related and political risk and asset prices
a link between political risk and the volatility and level of asset prices. The disaster
hypothesis is, therefore, relevant and extreme event risk can be theorised further both
conceptually and technically. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) introduce the concept of myopic
loss aversion and find a positive relationship between evaluation frequency in a period and
risk aversion. Observed risk premia are consistent with yearly evaluations, in particular
those of pension fund allocations (60% stocks – 40% bonds) and management (since they
must produce positive results they prefer a more “certain” but sub-optimal allocation
within a time frame of 2 – 5 years rather than an “optimal” allocation in favour of stocks
that will pay off in the distant future but may be harmed by shocks).
Jagd and Madsen (2009) expand on those findings by introducing capital gains/losses.
They find that prospective value curves for real long bond returns (contrary to short
bonds) are extraordinarily low (this amounts to inflation bias, myopic loss aversion or
government regulations). This, however, does not explain why people buy long duration
bonds (possible explanations: hedging other material or immaterial assets, transaction/
time costs of rerolling bonds), a result that is partially explained in Sangvinatsos and
Wachter (2005). This behavioural - based approach is at the same time a comment on
how more technical, traditionally based literature has stayed away from linking disaster
risk and managerial incentives.
2.3 Jump diffusion models in the literature
This section consists the technical part of the literature review. It will discuss in detail
jump-diffusion literature and the form of solutions for optimal portfolio weights. The
topics are the specific characteristics and aims of jumps-related literature, particularly
jumps- diffusion, its evolution over time and how its different features are tied to the
PhD. The papers used from a purely technical contribution will be discussed in the
appropriate chapters of the thesis but will be briefly mentioned here as well. The aim is
to provide sufficient technical background to justify the methods selected and classify
the research questions along with the answers provided.
In short, jump - diffusion models are a flexible way to introduce fat tails without the
limitations of a particular distribution with known pdf. The implementation of different
types of jumps with different theoretical and mathematical properties is straightforward.
A state-space model allows for heteroskedasticity and different factors of risk, multiple
asset frameworks and higher moment analysis. The correlation between the ”hidden”
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volatility process and the asset price process gives rise to the leverage effect, while
identical, independent or correlated jump factors are straightforward to model and
estimate by either calibrating the jumps process or changing it altogether. Volatility
clustering is also represented. In continuous time, normal periods are represented by a
Brownian motion with drift while jumps can be binary (Poisson-type) occurrences of a
certain magnitude or follow a more general specification (e.g. Levy). The versatility of
those models allows for many different parametrisations (constant or time varying arrival
intensity, correlated sources of risk, multi-asset portfolia, volatility premia in options,
short-selling etc) which may or may not lead to closed-form solutions. The nature of
the research question calls for a closed or, at the very least, a tractable semi-closed
solution, therefore it becomes imperative to study portfolio optimisation across this
specific literature. Typically, such a solution comes as an intertemporal optimisation
problem and includes a Bellman equation (also referred as HJB or Hamilton - Jacobi -
Bellman). For an overview, Runggaldier (2003) and Meinerding (2012) are suitable.
2.3.1 Jump diffusion specifications and their properties
The first topic to be discussed is the different jump-diffusion specifications and the
consequences of selecting one or the other. A useful introductory resource is Chernov
et al. (2003), which contains a thorough presentation and performance comparison among
different variations of affine jump-diffusion models. The Stochastic Volatility Jump -
Diffusion (SVCJ) class of models is found to dominate all other options, a result upon
which Eraker et al. (2003) add that jump independence in returns and volatility (assumes
two independent sources of risk) provides only a marginal improvement at the cost of
model complexity. The paper serves as a guide for specifications found scattered across
the literature, including pure volatility models without jumps (the Heston volatility
model with constant mean and square-root standard deviation - or not), an Ornstein -
Uhlenbeck process for the mean, and multiple processes for volatility.
Affine jump - diffusion models include, among others, the above specifications with a
Poisson jump in returns only and a hidden square-root volatility process, an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process with jumps in both volatility and prices and log-linear variations.
Jump parameters, particularly the mean, may or may not be constrained to zero, while
the Poisson arrival rate λ is constant and may or may not be common in price and
volatility jumps. It must be noted that, especially in formulations with square roots for
volatility like the Heston and the Eraker et al. (2003) models, the hidden process depicts
variance, not standard deviation, despite being often called ”the volatility process”. The
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square root of the variance is used as standard deviation in the asset price process, hence
the characterisation ”square-root”. This terminology will be used throughout the thesis.
With these specifications in mind it is now easier to keep track of the multitude of
models used, each with its own properties and disadvantages. The important differences
are about constant/ stochastic mean and volatility in the diffusion process, with the latter
being of particular importance, processes for jump arrival intensity (constant Poisson
parameter, stochastic, following a Cox process etc) and the link between volatility and
price jumps (only in one process, independent, correllated, simultaneous etc) and some
additional embellishments. Belaygorod et al. (2014) note that affine jump - diffusion
models with jumps only in returns in the style of Bates (2000) are the best in terms of
estimation and fit flexibility. Otherwise the cost of model complexity makes the process
inefficient and forecasting problematic when MCMC is used. That cost in efficiency does
exist and will be discussed in the methodology section, but the importance of volatility
jumps remains and has been emphasised by further literature.
2.3.2 Jumps as a tool, their research scope and interpretative
power
A closely related topic is estimation challenges and identifying the effect of jumps. The
goal is to highlight estimation deficiencies, how jumps alter results on volatility and
equity premia and how those issues relate to the nature of the data. The main themes are
suitability but also financial implications. The use of jumps affects much more than just
the fit of a model and touches directly upon equity premia, volatility, portfolio allocations
and a host of other topics. Methodological suitability brings forth the unavoidable
interplay between the model and the research question. Therefore, the aim of this section
is to guide through the jumps literature and see how certain methods have been applied
in different contexts and what their results are. A further issue is appropriate estimation,
which will be discussed first.
Aıt-Sahalia (2004) isolates the effect of jumps from that of the diffusion process. This
allows for independent pricing of various premia and can be expanded from Poisson to
Cauchy and Levy processes corresponding to a large number of small jumps. Volatility is
not modelled and estimation is via GMM and Maximum Likelihood. The distinction of the
diffusion component from the jump component had no effect on the estimation of variance
under ML, a result that holds under other processes as well. The explanation provided is
that the more jumps implied in the process the closer it can be approximated by the
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Brownian motion and thus its effect can be picked up. However, this highlights more a
problem in the (GMM) ML estimation of such models rather than a conclusive argument,
and in addition volatility is treated as constant. Such a parametric result contradicts
findings in parametric equity premium literature because it essentially concludes that the
parameters and therefore premia will be similar with present and absent jumps. Along
similar lines, Li et al. (2006) report better fitting results for Levy-type jumps rather than
Poisson jumps, but that paper will be discussed in great depth later on.
Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2009) and Aıt-Sahalia and Matthys (2015) expand to portfolio
selection under jumps. In the former they perform an orthogonal decomposition of jumps
and diffusion and provide a closed-form solution and a discussion of the position such
solutions imply. However volatilities still remain constant and the solution is, therefore,
a variation of the well-known Merton portfolio. In the latter they report closed-form
robust optimal portfolio solutions for a model with Levy jumps and constant volatility
and semi-closed solutions for Poisson jumps, and note that when jumps are symmetric
around zero, deviations in the mean play a greater role than in the jump sizes. When
jumps are only negative misspecification problems arise, while under a Poisson process
the overall sensitivity of the solution is decreased as a higher compensation is already
included in expected return. The results highlight the need for both a more complex
setup as well as improved estimation techniques.
Methods like those used in Chernov et al. (2003), Chacko and Viceira (2003) or Pan
(2002), who focus on parameter estimation on different variations of jump models, come
with important limitations and deficiencies. Besides the apparent need to include the
recent financial crisis in the dataset, GMM and ML techniques in continuous time have
given way to MCMC and GARCH estimation, with good reason (which will be discussed
further in the thesis, but the findings of Aıt-Sahalia (2004) provide sufficient intuition).
The need to include the recent crisis goes deeper than simply including additional data
with more or more frequent jumps.
Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), in line with aforementioned literature, show that equity
and variance risk premia largely include compensation for tail risk and that such worries
are time-varying. The effect of jumps on total variance in a model only a returns process
with jumps can be up to 7%, biased downwards (Huang and Tauchen (2005)). Bandi and
Reno` (2016) see jumps in both volatility and prices as a way to explain sudden surge in
volatility, as in Eraker et al. (2003), and look at the implications for price and volatility
premia. The key assumption here is co-dependence of jumps in volatility and jumps in
prices, a relationship that is under debate and largely depends on whether options or
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price data are used. The established ways of modelling jumps (either independent or
simultaneous, but without the in-between option), modelling tails and filtering volatility
under low frequency returns data may be potential reasons for the failure to ”relate
volatility measures unaffected by risk premia to sudden price changes”. They find that
when co-jumps take place there is a very strong leverage effect that depends solely upon
the price dynamics. Rodrigues and Schlag (2009) disassemble the index data commonly
used as the risky asset and focus on jumps of individual stocks compared to those of
S&P500. The index jumps do not coincide with jumps in the majority of stocks. Also,
many individual returns turn negative, which could mean that a factor that drives jumps
in the index may lie in the correlations. Individual volatility is greater and the leverage
effect is smaller compared to that of the index. Through principal component analysis a
multitude of individual volatility factor is found, with at least one being a significant
common factor that could be interpreted as market drive. Another question that arises
when jumps are used as an interpretative tool is if jumps actually exist in the data or
they are the result of data frequency. Limiting the discussion to indices with sufficient
quantity of observations over time and for very high frequency intraday data, the price
path may be smooth enough to attribute all sudden movements to volatility and thus
rare events might have no explanatory power, or be so rare that they become truly
one-off events. On the other hand, for very long periods of low frequency, jumps may
also not manifest. For high frequency data like those used in Wang et al. (2000),it is
common to observe constant returns for a period, a sudden jump at a different level and
constant returns until another jump takes place. Whether regime switching or jumps is a
more appropriate approach to model such behaviour is a matter for debate. Nevertheless,
when an index is traded continuously such movements are more smooth, and reducing
discretisation usually smoothens the series (minute or second data are much smoother
than millisecond data). Intuitively, when jumps are very frequent they can correspond
to high volatility just as well. For the purposes of the argument, since the thesis uses
index data, the early statement holds.
Bollerslev et al. (2008) use high frequency data and a test based on cross-covariance
to study the phenomenon based on a selection of stocks individually and combined in an
index. As in the previous paper, the index jumped less often than individual stocks due
to diversification of idiosyncratic risk and jumps being largely unrelated. In the case of
co-jumps, however, there is strong evidence of timing as stocks tend to move together
at the time of daily announcements. Therefore, the same patterns in the ultra-high
frequency and the daily frequency levels are reported. The thesis will also discuss, albeit
24
2.3. JUMP DIFFUSION MODELS IN THE LITERATURE
suggesting caution, the relationship between daily and higher frequencies. On the same
subject, Moreno et al. (2011) use a short noise function in the jump process to account
for the effect of unexpected news on the parameters. This stochastic process is related
to the jump time of a Poisson jump and acts as a decay function when a jump takes
place. The diffusive mean and standard deviation are constant. A link between the short
noise function and autocorrelation in the data is identified, a finding that is in favour of
jumps having a lingering effect on prices. Another way to implement jump persistence
comes from Todorov (2011) who models volatility as a function of previous jumps, a
method stemming from Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2001). Instead of a separate,
additive jump (Poisson) term, the time-varying parameters (in this case different variance
factors) are modelled as moving average functions of past jumps without a specified jump
component in the space or the state process. In contrast, a common ARMA process for
the state variables (variances σ1,2) is modelled based on a Poisson measure and which
is later scaled in the price process to attribute to diffusive volatility (small movements)
and ”jumps” (large volatility movements). By ”switching off” component 1 or 2 allows
movement between different models. The paper reports an overall improvement of model
performance based on salient price features.
Cartea and Karyampas (2016) also use the number of jumps as a variable for volatility
combined with high frequency data. Although that type of data will be of interest only
in terms of discretisation bias and whether jumps truly exist or are a perceived illusion
due to differences in data frequency, the finding that they have meaning in the context
of a Poisson large jump or an ”infinite-jump” Levy process using minute-by-minute
log-returns is indicative of their widespread application. The number of jumps is shown
to have more explanatory power for daily volatility than other commonly used factors
and play an important role in its overall level. It also increases forecasting performance
for AR models and disseminates information not captured in the VIX index. Ba¨uerle and
Rieder (2007) also address the issue of a hidden stochastic Markov process for jumps and
provide a optimal solutions for a jump-diffusion model with constant mean and volatility
in prices (and therefore quite limiting). It can be seen as a model similar to Wachter
(2013), in which the investor cannot observe any information about a jump but knows
they exist. Jeanblanc et al. (2010) pursue the same idea in a multi-asset model with
stochastic (not modelled) mean and standard deviation where the unobservable Poisson
process is also a learning process, and find similar solutions.
Jump-diffusion models have also been used to study the effect of market structure
and investor features. Bellamy (2001) uses a jump diffusion model with a jump-diffusion
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process for the asset price without stated expressions for the mean and the standard
deviation. Market incompleteness is introduced as discontinuity in prices due to the
Poisson jumps, so the result expands on the standard Merton solution and can be seen as
a preamble of the optimal weight solutions in this part and the thesis. nun use different
information in a jump diffusion model with insiders and outsiders. An insider has better
information than the outsider on the occurence of a future event, an idea that is expressed
by a wider filtered probability space or, more intuitively, flow of future information.
Under looser assumptions than the main string of the literature, they derive optimality
conditions for the market where both insiders and outsiders participate. Epstein and
Ji (2013) focus on ambiguity (model uncertainty) aversion for both the drift and the
volatility of the process. The mathematical background of the paper deviates much from
the existing framework, but very briefly the assumption of a single measure defines null
events is dropped, making it impossible to apply the Girsanov theorem.
Feunou et al. (2012) focus on downside risk volatility, where investors welcome
positive jumps only worry about crashes. Strong evidence of downside risk is found,
there is a positive relationship between that risk and the conditional mode of returns,
skewness can be priced and, finally evidence of time variation in structural parameters of
disappointment aversion preferences is found. Liu and Loewenstein (2007) discuss the
effect of proportional transactions costs when the risky asset follows a jump-diffusion
process with constant drift and volatility. The optimal strategy is for the weight on the
risky asset to lie between two boundaries. When a jump forces the portfolio to violate
a boundary, the investor will revert to the nearest weight allowed and the transaction
cost increases. An increase in transaction costs may increase trading frequency while
jumps have a great negative impact on the amount of the risky asset and frequency. Das
and Uppal (2004) use a multivariate setup, international data and method of moments
estimation systemic risk reduces only slightly the gains from international diversification
implied by the standard portfolio models.
2.3.3 Time variability in jump frequency
The choice of time-varying or constant arrival intensity for jumps underlines a large
part of the literature and deserves a separate section. Although some of the papers
cited s positive results for certain specifications, it is important to identify when and
where time-varying disaster risk poses an advantage rather than a hindrance, and what
are the consequences of such a choice. As Eraker et al. (2003) mention, in an SVCJ
setup there is evidence of misspecification for stochastic arrival intensity. In addition,
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the modelling approaches of Liu et al. (2003) or Eraker (2004) are problematic in their
own way. An attempt to replicate the results of Eraker (2004) failed due to unresolved
software errors. It must be stressed that, contrary to the Pan (2002) parameters in
options, who have become very popular in the literature, the Eraker (2004) parameters
have been ignored. Belaygorod et al. (2014) provide a formulation almost identical to
Liu et al. (2004) and Eraker (2004) that includes volatility and jump premia in the drift
(mean) but there is a key difference: the stochastic arrival intensity is constant instead
of λVt, so their parameters do not correspond exactly. Also, the Cox process for the
jump arrival intensity was adopted by Liu et al. (2003) for reasons of reverse-engineering
and convenience in the solution for weights. As a specification, it only provides a linear
link between volatility and jump frequency. In addition, the implied parameters are very
similar to the constant case. For time variation to have real merit in that framework, a
different process like a Hawkes process needs to be employed contrary to those commonly
found.
A crucial point is that the vast majority of the papers reporting successes under time-
varying arrival intensity (e.g. Ba¨uerle and Rieder (2007), Wachter (2013) among others)
do so without modelling volatility. Setting estimation and misspecification problems
aside, the improvement attributes to stochastic arrival intensity can also be attributed in
a more intuitive way to stochastic volatility. A greater or smaller number (frequency)
of jumps in asset prices can be naturally tied to volatility following a stochastic path
and the leverage effect. This line of reasoning is supported by the marginal improvement
under stochastic λ for Poisson processes, the general lack of estimation for the Liu et al.
(2003) specification (Pan (2002) estimates are still used) and the almost identical results
between correlated and independent co-jumps.
2.3.4 Further extensions, comparisons and practical
applications
The last points for discussion are similarities to existing literature either in the research
question or in empirics. Although it is very clear that the ground covered by the thesis is
novel and the research questions have not been addressed before, there is existing work
that is adjacent to some elements. These are applications in certain markets, uses of
similar concepts and modelling improvements. An example is studies in pension funds
and how they allocate their assets. Pension funds are long-term investments with very
specific goals and conservative nature, so they are a potential area of application for the
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outcomes of the thesis.
Menoncin (2005) introduces an investor that wants to maximise the expected utility
of terminal wealth under the usual conditions. Two new exogenous variables that express
notions from outside the financial market are introduced. They are described as ” two
sets of variables that do not affect the asset prices but directly affect the level (exogenous
level variables) and the growth ratio of the investor’s wealth (exogenous ratio variables)”.
The interest lies in the interpretation rather than the methodology, which uses what is
in essence an SV model. Those variables are introduced not in the asset processes but
directly on the wealth process and can be labour income (level variable), exchange rate,
inflation (ratio variables) and, most importantly, entry and exit of policy holders in a
pension fund or indemnity payments in an insurance company. This bears a resemblance
to investors leaving an entering a fund, an idea that is used in the thesis when managerial
incentives are introduced.
However the similarities end here. The structure of the model is entirely different, the
solution in Menoncin (2005) is approximate while in the thesis is as close to closed-form
as possible, expected utility of wealth is optimised under a much different process and the
research question is, ultimately, of a much different kind. This paper uses an alternative,
technical way to introduce a notion that is utilised in the thesis in a much more practical
manner and in a different context. However, as far as investor incentives are concerned,
it poses a fruitful question that can be combined with active versus passive investment
strategies, and which one performs best.
Staying on the relevant topic of pension funds and how such conservative investments
can hedge against rare events, Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2012) study the
asset allocation of defined corporate benefit pension plans. Since wages are linked with
benefits, a jump-diffusion model applying to the former also affects the latter. An
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is solved for optimal strategies and contributions, and
linear relationships between the optimal supplementary cost and the optimal investment
strategy, and between this strategy and the optimal fund are found. They also find that
”it is possible to select the technical rate of interest such that the optimal contribution
does not depend on the parameters of the benefit process, getting a spread amortization
and the stability and security of the plan in the long term”. Ngwira and Gerrard (2007)
also consider a defined benefit scheme with a jump-diffusion process for the risky asset,
and find that the optimisation results hold for both constant and stochastic benefits. A
main result is that the jump size has a positive relationship with the allocation of the
risk-free asset and a negative relationship with the risky asset.
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The Eraker et al. (2003) SVCJ model, with contemporaneous jumps in volatility
and returns and leverage effect, is the method of choice for the thesis and belongs to
the class of affine models. It is now useful to debate those models with their non-affine
counterparts and highlight some strengths and weaknesses. Ignatieva et al. (2015) verifies
the now trivial factor that models with jumps outperform models without jumps. The
paper also compares non-affine specifications to affine ones. The differentiation lies in
the variance process, where the drift, the standard deviation or both are polynomials
of different types, and therefore by using a general specification it is straightforward to
switch certain parameters off and move between models. The derivation process for the
MCMC posteriors is explained in sufficient detail and can be of further use, since the
technique has become popular in this literature. Although the results validate a slight
supremacy of non-affine specifications, the disadvantages become instantly obvious.
As mentioned above, the trade-off between model and estimation performance is
enormous. The burn-in periods, estimation times and sampling methodologies are
unacceptably high and simply not worth the marginal improvement in fit. The added
model complexity of non-affine models is a detrimental factor, makes the process very
time consuming and computationally intractable (C++ coding is for most intents and
purposes out of scope) and very similar results can be achieved with more parsimonious
methods. The SVCJ specification in particular is found to dominate the performance of
the equivalent non-affine formulation. Another issue relevant to the aims of the PhD
is whether non-affine models can produce closed-form or at least tractable solutions
for portfolio weights. Affine specifications do, and are therefore suitable. Non-affine
specifications pose unnecessary complexities in that regard. Finally, the paper improves
upon the results of Ignatieva et al. (2009) which report a preference of jump affine
models over non-jump non-affine models, and in addition raise the issue of economically
unrealistic parameter estimation for the latter.
Chourdakis and Dotsis (2009) demonstrate the ability of non-affine models to capture
market timing. However they do not include leverage in their model and assume
continuous asset returns, a choice that biases the comparison across models. Also, the
improvement over affine models is small. In addition to the above literature that provides
optimal portfolio solutions for further purposes and under different assumptions, there
is a vast literature whose focus is the mathematical derivation and existence of such
solutions for each individual model. Kurmann (2009) and Guo and Xu (2004) provide
examples, He and Meng (2012) introduce Knightian uncertainty in asset prices, Hong
and Jin (2016) establish a multi-asset solution for an SVCJ variation, Jin and Zhang
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(2012) and Jin and Zhang (2013) decompose optimal portfolia and derive a solution
under investment constraints. Finally, Wu (2003), Wu (2013) are further examples in a
Markov setup.
2.4 Summary
The main challenges of the thesis can be aptly identified in each of the three parts. The
first part highlights the key literature and sets the three main questions of the PhD; i)
from the multitude of estimation and modelling methods, which one best fits the purpose
of studying managerial incentives; ii) how investors are affected by knowingly ignoring
jumps; iii) whether managers have an inventive to disregard jumps, given that excess risk
is tied to higher returns and manager compensations are related to portfolio performance.
Based on this literature, the literature review described the main considerations in further
detail.
The second part takes the viewpoint of utility, its embedded characteristics and how
tail risk challenges the standard way of reaching an optimal solution. The argument is in
favour of taking event risk into account, both in the face of increasing evidence and in
front of the practical issue of, first, treating assets as less risky than they really are, and
second, extracting information from time series that was previously inaccessible. Agent
actions and presuppositions also took a prominent role, since ultimately the contribution
of the thesis is not technical in nature but focuses on potential conflict of interest and a
motivation to knowingly undertake excess risk in exchange for higher returns. The term
”behavioural” has been deliberately left unused because there is no such pretext or any
radical deviations from the standard framework of rationality, the homo economicus and
complete markets. In such a setup it would be better to use the verb ”act” instead of
”behave” with regard to the agent to avoid any confusion with behavioural economics. The
aim here was to see how disaster risk led to advancements from the equity premium puzzle
point of view, how that intuition expanded to considerations about proper calibration,
jump frequency, the nature of data and how it can be an instrument to introduce or
expand considerations on investor behaviour and market structure, such as downside loss
aversion.
The third part focuses on the performance and features of different specifications of
jump-diffusion as well as portfolio optimisation, in an attempt to map a diverse field of
research and provide further intuition on the analytical and estimation challenges posed
in both parameter estimation and optimisation. In addition, the aim was to see the effect
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of different models in different contexts and establish a rationale that justifies the model
selected. The advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives were highlighted and
it was shown that in every single case a jumps setup would dominate a no jumps setup.
From that point on, the focus moved to balancing the tradeoffs between mathematical
and statistical complexity, desired features given the research question and a reasonable
representation of stylised facts. Another crucial element is the existence of closed-form
or at the very least tractable semi-closed form solutions for portfolio weights. Models
without the ability to produce such an intertemporal solution for the wealth function are
inappropriate, because the comparisons between investors and managers under different
parametrisations need to be as precise and replicable as possible. Also, the multitude
of models means a multitude of parameters in the literature under datasets of varying
indices, assets and lengths. Not all models have received the same attention and not all
estimation techniques perform well. It is a necessity to benchmark results with existing
literature, and a model that has not been thoroughly studied and parametrised could be
hazardous and misleading to use.
There is an unfortunate interplay between different formulations of jump models and
stated aims of papers. A prime example is the relationship between asset price volatility,
which is a component on the diffusive part, and jumps (size, type, rate) and depending
on the structure certain features may be attributed to either jumps or variance. Model
selection has an important role in positive or negative findings and conflicting papers,
while reverse engineering and preempting results ranges from the very subtle to the thinly
disguised. While that may sound as a triviality and acceptable parsimony of science,
it has widespread implications in this particular line of research due to the technical
difficulties in disseminating the properties of rare events exactly because of their rarity.
Moreover, certain types of models may be overcomplicated, misspecified or disregard
important effects like leverage.
The thesis achieves a solution for its selected class of models that is not closed-form
only because it is the product of a rational and an exponential function, and in that
respect it improves upon existing mathematical results. The major gap in the literature
is the managerial attitude on event risk. Only a handful of papers discuss either investor
or managerial incentives in the presence of jumps, and of those that do only Foster and
Young (2012) show an explicit methodological focus on excess risk undertaken by the
manager. Also, with one exception, there is no mention in the literature of fees at an
employee level. Traders are generally not present, only hedge/mutual fund managers and
fee structures for the entire fund. The literature on conflict of interest, misreporting and
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managerial incentives tied to compensation packages is long, but has not connected the
issue of rare events (jumps) to the motivations of a manager so far.
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Chapter 3
Isolating fat tails as factor
3.1 Research aims and methods
Chapters 3 and 4 have the dual role of framing the different technical areas of the thesis
and recording learning prowess. Chapter 3 shows why the isolated introduction of disaster
risk is not sufficient to explain differences in portfolio allocation, neither from a fitting
nor from a portfolio point of view. It establishes the need to move to a more complex
setup, by applying at a very basic level portfolio optimisation and simulations. The
learning goal was to demonstrate how simulations can be used to answer such a research
question and make the first step towards a more complex application. Also, preliminary
empirical results show that simply introducing fat tails in a parsimonious setup is no
panacea and an investor is practically unable to differentiate between different outcomes.
In more detail, the idea is as follows.
The stated goal is not to perform a fitting exercise and make a technical contribution
but study investor and managerial incentives. A reasonable argument is parsimony; why
proceed into a complicated continuous-time framework when fat tails can be introduced
directly by well-known distributions? In addition, since the focus is on tail risk, the mere
introduction of fat tails may cause the agents to discriminate between cases, reducing
the need for complexity. A comparison between an agent who takes jumps (fat tails)
into consideration and one who does not can be straightforward and it may be possible
to show that the agent is able to differentiate between the cases of different tail forms,
or even across states. This call for parsimony is tempting but shown to be woefully
inadequate.
The need in this chapter is to focus on the fundamental idea stated above in an
easy to follow framework with tractable mathematical formulations. In that spirit, the
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simplest type of investor is one with a CARA utility function who allocates his wealth
over an investment horizon to a risk-free asset of known, constant return and a risky asset
that follows a distribution. The investor makes an assumption about which distribution
is followed in reality, calculates optimal weights and then the real distribution is revealed,
the investment takes place and the effect on utility is measured. The distributions are
a Normal, a Gamma and an Inverse Gaussian representing a standard case and two
different cases of fatter tails. In addition, they were selected because of their known
probability density functions which is very helpful analytically, their ability to produce
(almost) closed-form solutions and their mathematical properties. Also, CARA utility
was selected over CRRA utility because it keeps the focus solely on the effect of tail risk,
not on the investor’s changing attitude towards it, plus the mathematical convenience
of working with a negative exponential utility function. In short, parsimony, simplicity,
tractability and clarity are the main motivators in model selection in order to isolate the
effect of extreme events as much as possible.
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility assigns a level of risk aversion that
is the same regardless of individual wealth. Since attitudes towards risk are irrelevant to
wealth (no wealth effects), an investor would treat an investment (its potential risk, losses
and effect in utility) in the same way regardless of having 10 or 10.000 pounds to invest.
In other words, such an investor would always be willing to pay the same amount in order
to avoid a fair bet (the investor would always risk the same amount as wealth increases).
The Arrow - Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is defined as RA(W ) = −U ′′(W )
U ′(W ) ,
which is constant and equal to γ for an exponential utility function. In contrast, Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility expresses risk aversion in terms of relative wealth.
The relative risk aversion coefficient is defined as RR(W ) = −W U ′′(W )
U ′(W ) . It follows that if
CRRA is constant for a utility function such as power utility, then CARA is decreasing
as wealth increases (as wealth increases, the investor is willing to risk more). For CRRA
functions, wealth effects appear - an investor will weigh risk according to its current
level of wealth. CARA represents reaction to absolute changes in wealth while CRRA to
proportional (percentage) changes in wealth. A CRRA investor would always risk the
same proportion of wealth as wealth increases.
The methodological foundations of the chapter rely on Markowitz-type optimisations.
For a complete treatise, Cochrane (2009) is a typical reference while for a more modern
approach Pennacchi (2008) provides a thorough presentation accompanied by a host of
variations. CARA utility functions are not as widely used as their CRRA counterparts,
but have their own place in the portfolio optimisation literature. The brief summary of
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literature does not intend to be exhaustive, and merely intends to show relevance of the
CARA assumption, that it is not obsolete but still used in research.
Vigna (2014) compares CARA and CRRA inefficiency under mean-variance opti-
misation. Palczewski et al. (2015) discuss CARA dynamic optimisation under under
state-dependent drift and transaction costs. Naive and less risk-averse investors incur
the most losses in utility, while reduced trading causes half of the total loss from trans-
action costs. Bodnar et al. (2013) compare three quadratic optimization problems (the
Markowitz mean–variance problem, the mean–variance utility function which, under
normal distributions, coincides with CARA utility, and the quadratic utility problem) and
their conditions for efficiency. The problems are found to be mathematically equivalent
but this equivalence does not hold from a stochastic point of view. They also derive the
probabilities that the estimated solutions of the Markowitz problem and the quadratic
utility problem are mean–variance efficient. de Palma and Prigent (2009) discuss the
investor choice under CARA and HARA utility among standardized portfolios which are
based on cash, bond and stock indexes. The choice relies on market performance and the
type of investor. For the utility functions envisaged, they calculate the losses from not
having access to a customized portfolio and show that these losses may be severe. Broadie
and Shen (2016) provides a continuous time multi-asset example, where CARA utility is
in a multi-asset setup where each asset follows a geometric Brownian motion. Becherer
(2003) distinguishes between tradable and non-tradable sources of risk for a rational
CARA investor. The hedging strategy is analysed in a general semi-martingale market
framework. The result is a computation scheme, valuation bounds, and a discussion on
diversification and information effects.
CARA and jumps have received less attention in the literature, partly because of the
appealing properties of CRRA and the built-in limitations of CARA. Aı¨t-Sahalia et al.
(2009) discusses CARA along with jumps in asset prices. Zhou (2009) combines CARA
utility with Levy jumps and derives closed-form solutions to the maximization problem
under the Martingale approach. Zou and Cadenillas (2014) derive explicit solutions for
an insurer’s investment and risk control strategies under HARA and CARA utility. The
agent wants to maximise expected utility of terminal wealth where the risk process is
modeled by a jump-diffusion process and is negatively correlated with the capital gains in
the financial markets. Liu (2004) and Jondeau and Rockinger (2006) use CARA utility in
a modern financial setup on portfolio allocation. CARA utility seems to be more popular
for insurance markets, and the examples where jumps are discussed in its context are
very scarce. Given the need for simplicity, it is prudent to focus on a specific argument
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and employ the simplest methods available. CARA utility neglects wealth effects but
allows for tractable closed-form solutions. In addition, the use of a Moment Generating
Function (MGF) instead of a stochastic process allows straightforward comparisons.
3.2 The CARA model and its variations
In greater detail, an investor with a CARA utility function allocates wealth between
a risky and a risk-free asset over a single period. The investor maximises utility and
determines how much wealth will be allocated in each asset. Returns are received ex
post in a Monte Carlo simulation that produces average terminal utilities across the
sample. The return of the risk-free asset is constant while the return of the risky asset
follows a Normal, a Gamma or an Inverse Gaussian distribution with the same mean
and variance in all cases. The most important property is the well-defined moment
generating functions of all distributions that allows for simple optimisation. The investor
selects a distribution to use for the derivation of portfolio weights in logical time, then
the investment begins where the real distribution of the risky asset is revealed and the
focus is on the difference in expected utility between the cases of a correct and a false
prediction. Therefore, two different cases will be discussed.
3.2.1 Single state optimisation
The investor faces a single state optimisation problem and is free to maximize under
whatever distribution he desires, but the risky asset may follow a different distribution.
More formally, the utility function is of the form
U(W ) = −e−aW
with wealth W and risk aversion coefficient α. Total initial wealth W0 is split between
the amount initially invested on the risky asset, WM0, and that on the risk-free asset,
Wf0. Trivially, terminal wealth is derived by substituting the 0 subscript with T. During
numerical calculations, rm stands for gross instead of net returns for simpler substitutions
and to avoid rm turning negative if it represented net returns, since that would cause
problems with some Moment Generating Functions (MGFs). Some of the moment
generating functions have support only in R+. A net return of −% falls outside that
support, while a gross return of 0,99 does not and is still usable.
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In terms of utility, for the single state case,
U(WT ) = −e−aWT = −e−aWfT−aWMT = −e−aWf0(1+rf )−aWM0rm
Since rf is a known constant and only rm is stochastic, taking the utility expectation
for time T yields
E[U(W )] = E[−e−aWf0(1+rf )−aWM0rm ] = −e−aWf0(1+rf )E[e−aWM0rm ] (2.1)
with the expectation being replaced by the moment generating function of each
distribution. The mean and the variance in each case are the same, while gross returns
rm = µ =
E(WMT )
WM0
. When rm stands for net returns, the equality can be written as
1 + rm = µ with the corresponding alterations in the formulas above. All parameters
have been calculated for gross returns, however for completeness and comparison the
second notation is also used in the formulas. The graphs for each distribution can be
found in the Appendix.
3.2.2 Optimal weights for each case
The next part describes the maximisation process for each single state case. In the normal
case, for known mean µ and standard deviation σ, the MGF is of the form eµ+
1
2
σ2 for
t=1, with scaling properties xN(µ, σ2) = N(xµ, x2σ2). The probability density function
(pdf) is of the general form f(x, µ, σ) = 1√
2piρσ2
exp( (x−µ)
2
2σ2
). The normal distribution is
a symmetric leptokyrtic distribution with all moments beyond the first two (mean and
variance) being zero. It assigns equal probabilities to positive and negative outcomes,
it contains more than 98% of the probability mass within a distance of three standard
deviations and, thus, is not very suitable for replicating extreme outcomes or outliers.
The optimal allocation of wealth is the first derivative of expected utility function w.r.t.
WM0. After plugging the MGF of a normal distribution in (2.1),
maxWM(−e−aWFT e−aWM0µ+ 12a2W 2M0σ2)
= maxWM(−e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM0)−aWM0µ+ 12a2W 2M0σ2)
= maxWM(−e−a(1+rf )W0−aWM0(µ−1−rf )+ 12a2W 2M0σ2)
And differentiating yields
∂
∂WM0
= −e(.)[a(1 + rf − µ) + a2σ2WM0] = 0⇔
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1 + rf − µ+ aσ2WM0 = 0⇔
WM0 =
µ− 1− rf
aσ2
=
1 + rM − 1− rf
aσ2
⇔
WM0 =
rM − rf
aσ2
(2.2)
which represents the monetary amount to be allocated on the risky asset.
For the Gamma case, the moment generating function is of the form (1 − θt)−k ,
where k is a shape parameter and θ is a scale parameter. The scaling properties are
xf(κ, θ) = f(xκ, θ) with f being the gamma probability density function. For the mean
and variance, µ = kθ = (1 + rM), σ
2 = kθ2. The form of the pdf used here is of the
general form f(x; k, θ) = 1
Γ(k)θk
xk−1exp−
x
θ . Its support is positive, it demonstrates a
very elongated right tail, although with proper calibration it can resemble a normal
distribution with low skewness and kyrtosis. However, the left tail is shorter and steeper
than the right tale for most parametrisations. Consequently, (2.1) becomes
E[U(W )] = −e−aWf0rfE[e−aWM0rm ] = −e−a(W0−WM0)(1+rf )(1 + aWM0θ)k
The first order condition is
∂E(U)
∂WM
= −e(.)a(1 + rf )(1 + aθWM0)−k − e(.)(−k)(1 + aθWM0)−1−kaθ = 0⇔
a(1 + rf )(1 + aθWM0) = kaθ ⇔ 1 + rf + aθWM0(1 + rf ) = kθ ⇔
WM0 =
kθ − (1 + rf )
aθ(1 + rf )
=
(1 + rM)− (1 + rf )
aθ(1 + rf )
Since
kθ
kθ2
=
µ
σ2
, θ =
σ2
µ
=
σ2
1 + rM
Substituting in the optimal weight yields
WM0 =
rM − rf
a
1+rf
1+rM
σ2
=
(1 + rM)(rM − rf )
aσ2(1 + rf )
(2.3)
For the Inverse Gaussian case, the moment generating function is of the form e(
λ
µ
)[1−
√
1− 2µ2t
λ
]
. Here, the scaling factor is -aWM0 and the properties are X ∼ IG(µ, λ) ⇒ tX ∼
IG(tµ, tλ). The mean and variance are µ and σ2 = µ
3
λ
. The pdf is f(x;µ, λ) =√
λ
2pix3
exp(−λ(x−µ)
2
2µ2x
). The Inverse Gaussian distribution has a similar shape to the
Gamma distribution but shares many similarities with the Normal distribution. That is
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the reason why, as λ increases, the Inverse Gaussian distribution approximates a Normal
distribution. Expression (2.1) then becomes
E(U(W )) = −e−a(W0−WM0 )(1+rf )+λµ−λµ
√
1+
2µ2aWM0
λ
The first order condition is
∂E(U)
∂WM
= −e(...)(a(1 + rf )− λ
µ
1
2
1√
1 + 2µ
2aWM0
λ
(
2µ2a
λ
) = 0⇔
(1+rf )− µ√
1 + 2µ
2aWM0
λ
= 0⇔ 1+2µ
2aWM0
λ
=
µ2
(1 + rf )2
⇔ 2aµ
2WM0
λ
=
µ2 − (1 + rf )2
(1 + rf )2
⇔
⇔ WM0 = λ
2aµ2
µ2 − (1 + rf )2
(1 + rf )2
Substituting the definitions for the mean and variance and simplifying,
WM0 =
µ
2aσ2
(1 + rm)
2 − (1 + rf )2
(1 + rf )2
=
1 + rm
2aσ2
(1 + rm)
2 − (1 + rf )2
(1 + rf )2
(2.4)
3.2.3 Connecting the weight formulas
It is helpful to collect expressions (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) of the optimal weights and see
how they are related.
For the Normal distribution, (2.2) is
WNM0 =
rM − rf
aσ2
For the Gamma distribution, plugging (2.2) into (2.3) yields
WGM0 =
(1 + rM)(rM − rf )
aσ2(1 + rf )
=
rM − rf
aσ2
1 + rM
1 + rf
= WNM0
1 + rM
1 + rf
For the Inverse Gaussian distribution, plugging (2.3) into (2.4) yields
W IGM0 =
1 + rm
2aσ2
(1 + rm)
2 − (1 + rf )2
(1 + rf )2
=
1 + rm
2aσ2
1 + 2rM + r
2
M − 1− 2rf − r2f
(1 + rf )2
=
1 + rm
2aσ2
r2M − r2f + 2(rm − rf )
(1 + rf )2
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=
1 + rm
2aσ2
(rM + rf )(rM − rf ) + 2(rM − rf )
(1 + rf )2
=
1 + rM
1 + rf
rM − rf
2aσ2
2 + rM + rf
1 + rf
= WGM0
2 + rM + rf
1 + rf
It is interesting to notice how all weights are scaled versions of each other. Since the
optimal allocations of wealth in each case have been derived and depend only upon the
return of the risky asset, they can be directly used in simulations.
3.3 The two-state Markov case
The setup is the same, with the same assumptions on utility and distributions, but the
optimisation question becomes a two-state Markov problem. A high probability “normal”
state and a low probability “disaster” state with lower mean but the same variance are
introduced and the agent is asked to optimise his utility.
The ”disastrous” state is characterised by considerably lower returns (distribution
means) in the risky asset compared to the ”good” high-probability state. In practice,
this is a very simple regime switching framework with the additional feature of fat tails
both in the good and the bad state. For simplicity, the variance between the two cases
is assumed to be the same. Dropping the m subscript for simplicity, this reduces to
assuming r1, r2 random variables for returns that follow Normal/ Gamma / Inverse
Gaussian distributions with the same variance σ but different means µ1, µ2. Expressions
for the conditional means are also given further below, since in order to maintain a
mean across states that is equal to the single state µ1, µ2 need to be slightly adjusted.
The probability between the two states is pi = 0,98 for 1, 1-pi=0,02 for 2 and the utility
function takes the form
U(W ) = −e−aW = −e−aW0rMT = −e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM )−aWMrM,i (2.5)
i takes values 1 or 2, according to the state of the world, and rf = 2%. Utility across
states is, therefore,
U(W ) = −pi ∗ e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM )−aWMr1 − (1− pi)e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM )−aWMr2
= −e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM )(pi ∗ e−aWmr1 + (1− pi)e−aWMr2)
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This is the terminal utility form used in the weight simulations. However, for the
weight formulas, it is more useful to use the Law of Iterated Expectations.
maxE(U)=E(U|µ1)pi+(1-pi)E(U|µ2)
∂(E(U))
∂WM
= 0⇔ pi[E(U |µ1)]′ + (1− pi)[E(U |µ2)]′ = 0⇔
(E(U |µ1))′
(E(U |µ2))′ =
pi − 1
pi
where the utility forms have already been given in the previous section.
3.3.1 Optimal weights
For the Normal case, the calculations are as follows.
E(U) = −e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM )−aµiWM+ 12a2W 2Mσ2 , i = 1, 2
∂E(U)
∂WM
− e(...)(a(1 + rf )− aµi + a2σ2WM), i = 1, 2
(E(U |µ1))′
(E(U |µ2))′ =
−e(.)(a(1 + rf )− aµ1 + a2σ2WM)
−e(..)(a(1 + rf )− aµ2 + a2σ2WM) =
pi − 1
pi
Working with the exponents, the identical terms are cancelled out and what remains is
−e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM )−aµ1WM+ 12a2W 2Mσ2
−e−a(1+rf )(W0−WM )−aµ2WM+ 12a2W 2Mσ2 = e
−aWM (µ1−µ2)
Concluding,
e−aWM (µ1−µ2)
(a(1 + rf )− aµ1 + a2σ2WM)
(a(1 + rf )− aµ2 + a2σ2WM) =
pi − 1
pi
and in terms of the random variables
e−aWM (r1−r2)
((1 + rf )− r1 + aσ2WM)
((1 + rf )− r2 + aσ2WM) =
pi − 1
pi
=
−0, 02
0, 98
(2.6)
For the Gamma case,
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E(U) = −e−a(W0−WM0)(1+rf )(1 + aWM0θi)−ki , i = 1, 2
And
(E(U |µ1))′
(E(U |µ2))′ =
−e(.)a(1 + rf )(1 + aWM0θ1)−k1 − e(.)(−k1)(1 + aWM0θ1)−k1−1aθ1
−e(..)a(1 + rf )(1 + aWM0θ2)−k2 − e(..)(−k2)(1 + aWM0θ2)−k2−1aθ2
=
−e(.)(1 + aWM0θ1)−k1−1((1 + rf )(1 + aWM0θ1)− k1θ1)
−e(..)(1 + aWM0θ2)−k2−1((1 + rf )(1 + aWM0θ2)− k2θ2) ⇔
(1 + aWM0θ1)
−k1−1((1 + rf )(1 + aWM0θ1)− µ1)
(1 + aWM0θ2)−k2−1((1 + rf )(1 + aWM0θ2)− µ2) =
pi − 1
pi
(2.7)
For the Inverse Gaussian case, for i = 1, 2
E(U) = −e−a(W0−WM0)(1+rf )e
λi
µi
[1−
√
1− 2µ
2
i
(−aWM0)
λi
]
= −e−a(W0−WM0)(1+rf )+
λi
µi
(1−
√
1+
2µ2
i
aWM0
λi
)
And differentiating yields
∂E(U)
∂WM
= −e(.)(a(1+rf )− λi
µi
1
2
√
1 +
2µ2i aWM0
λi
(
2µ2a
λi
)) = −e(.)(a(1+rf )− aµi√
1 +
2µ2i aWM0
λi
)
Finally
(E(U |µ1))′
(E(U |µ2))′ =
−e(.)(a(1 + rf )− aµ1√
1+
2µ21aWM0
λ1
)
−e(..)(a(1 + rf )− aµ2√
1+
2µ22aWM0
λ2
)
=
(1 + rf )− µ1√
1+
2µ21aWM0
λ1
)
(1 + rf )− µ2√
1+
2µ22aWM0
λ2
)
e(.)−(..) ⇔
(1 + rf )− µ1√
1+
2µ21aWM0
λ1
)
(1 + rf )− µ2√
1+
2µ22aWM0
λ2
)
∗ e
λi
µi
(1−
√
1+
2µ21aWM0
λ1
)−λ2
µ2
(1−
√
1+
2µ22aWM0
λ2
)
=
pi − 1
pi
(2.8)
42
3.4. SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS
It is obvious that there is no closed-form solution in these cases, since the product of an
exponential and a rational function appears. Nevertheless, the numerical solution from
the simulations proves to be sufficiently accurate.
3.4 Simulation setup and results
The coefficient values are presented in Table A.1, also accounting for the conditional mean
in the Markov case. The table is constructed around the realisation of the distribution
and must be read horizontally. An alternative way is to take a distribution and see which
one of the optimisers (the one using normal weights, the one using gamma weights or
the one using inverse gaussian weights) has fared better. The type of the distribution
is the same for both states but the investor does not know which one will be realised
eventually. SS denotes the single state case, α denotes the risk aversion parameter set
to 0.0001, µ, µi and σ, σi denote the means and standard deviations for the single and
Markov cases. In order to have a conditional mean equal between the two, the mean for
the bad state is calibrated, with the effect of pushing the mean of the good state slightly
higher. The change in standard deviation due to conditioning proves to be negligible
compared to the SS case, so the Markov standard deviation is kept the same. 100,000
returns were drawn from each distribution for the simulations, with the Markov joint
sample being split into 98,000 drawings from the good state and 2,000 drawings from the
bad state. That is the ratio that corresponds to the probability of each state. The means
(standard deviations) were 5%(16%), 8%(24%), 14%(32%) for the single or good state
and −15% for the Markov bad state, creating 9 different combinations for each case and
risk aversion parameter.
The weights used in each case are the closed form solutions (which correspond to the
simulation results) and therefore the table can also be read as cross-examining different
combinations of optimised weights and distributions across cases. The investor picks a
distribution to use prior to investment and calculates the appropriate amounts, and then
the real distribution is realised. The cases where the prediction was correct and the optimal
weights were used lie on the diagonal. Across all parameters, the difference in expected
terminal utility is practically non-existent and statistically insignificant. The simulations
were repeated many times for verification and inconsistencies were present, which are
interpreted statistically as overlapping confidence intervals and economically as the
outcomes being practically equivalent and interchangeable. The outcome that appeared
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the most times was the one recorded, however. Higher variance (which corresponds to a
higher realisation of extreme values) or level of risk aversion do not change the result.
The conclusion is that a difference between ex ante and ex post returns translated to
a different probability for abnormal returns does not have a tangible effect on investor
utility. However, even marginally, a correct prediction leads to a higher utility as shown
by the table values, and the difference can be significant. This result is in accordance
to previous literature, and it agrees with the theoretical assumption that the highest
average utility would be achieved when the assumed distribution is the same as the
occurring distribution. This outcome is sample dependent: the difference in a test of
means (or simply the certainty equivalent) is statistically insignificant and numerically
very small. For a tangible difference to take place, one must look beyond a one period
game. For the single period variation discussed here, the player that predicts correctly
does have a benefit in utility but that benefit is neither strong nor conclusive. Therefore,
there are other factors beyond fat tails that enhance extreme risk, such as stochastic
volatility, leverage or time variation in equity premia, jump occurrences etc.
Moving on to the Markov setup, the probability of a negative result is now more
pronounced. It is directly expressed by the low probability state and the tails of the
distributions. However the previous result still holds. Utility is slightly lower than in
the single state case but the probability of a jump has a significant effect on neither the
weights (they are somewhat lower in the two-state problem) nor the differences between
cases. This depicts a pattern very similar to the one above. The investor does not appear
to be able to distinguish between states (distributions) and even if he did he does not
have a tangible incentive to alter his behaviour. In other words the mere existence of a
different, thicker or longer, tail is not enough for a shift in portfolio weights very much.
Thus tail risk does not manifest in a single period choice model with or without state
uncertainty.
Another point of consideration is how a myopic investor that used the unconditional
parameters (weights) instead of the conditional ones would perform. The results proven
to be identical so they are omitted.
An additional question examined is how disaster timing affects terminal wealth during
multiple periods. Here the investor is assumed to have an investment horizon of 30
periods and his behaviour to be myopic: he is allowed to maximise only for the next
period. One of the 30 periods is supposed to be a disaster period, where the return is set
to 0,75. The period when this return is realised is, in turn, the 6th (an early disaster),
the 17th (in the middle) and the 28th (late). The return sample is the same in all three
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cases for comparison reasons. The result is that the earlier the jump occurs the higher
the negative impact on terminal wealth is, although the numerical difference is again
small. Due to the initial assumptions this is essentially a compounding problem but
even so a disaster effect still appears. The results are depicted in figures A.1 - A.3. It is
important to notice that the effect on terminal wealth is visible, yet each returns series
follows the same pattern. Even a very late jump is not enough to make the investor
worse off than a middling or early jump.
3.5 Conclusion
Of course, the setup is too limiting to provide safe conclusions. Constant risk aversion
is a questionable assumption since such an individual always allocates a constant sum
of wealth in each asset. In addition, wealth effects are non-existent due to the CARA
assumption. The investor has the same attitude towards risk no matter how much wealth
he has accumulated. - he will always pay the same amount in order to avoid taking a fair
gamble, regardless of his wealth. This is a counter-intuitive assumption, especially when
one considers that absolute risk aversion has merit when it is decreasing, not constant.
A natural expansion is introducing relative risk aversion followed by multiple periods.
This could lead to a well-known environment of intertemporal optimization but with the
introduction of a bonus structure.
Another limitation is the investment horizon. In a single-period setup, rare events
have a very small effect on expected utility, which is calculated ”on average”. The investor
can be fairly confident that a disastrous return will not be realised within the investment
period. Even if it does, as shown in figures A.1 -A.3, the CARA investor has time to
recover even if the jump takes place late in the investment (it must be noted again that
the weights used are the one-period weights, which remain constant for the duration
of the investment). With a simple buy-and-hold strategy where the same allocation is
selected each year, the investor will have time to make up for losses. The time of the
jump does not seem to matter in that context. The limitation of the setup makes for a
limiting and counter-intuitive result - while a resilient investor might be willing to make
up for early losses, an investor incurring losses late in his investment might be much less
tolerant.
The fact that both in the single state and the Markov state the investor is unable to
differentiate between outcomes calls for a more complicated setup. No level of average
expected returns (mean), risk (variance) or skewness/ kurtosis (distributional shape
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containing additional information) seems to be able to have a significant impact. In the
more promising Markov setup, which contains tails in both the good and the bad state,
the result is the same. The limitation here is not the preselected distributions but the
arbitrary frequencies and sizes of the bad outcome. The setup does not allow some finer
points to materialise, such as the effect of longer horizons or heteroskedasticity, in an
intertemporal framework. Unavoidably, everything is churned into an average terminal
utility indicator that eliminates any significant disaster risk.
The most important outcome is that disaster risk, either in the form of fat-tails or
different states, is not enough on its own to cause consideration to the investor. A jump
structure on its own is not enough to cause differentiation in investor decisions or give
rise to tangible distortions and losses under mean-variance optimisation, always ”on
average”. It is, thus, important to introduce a more complicated structure that takes into
account more stylised facts of asset returns, such as volatility clustering. The simulations
approach will be maintained both in inference (under Bayesian methods) and in the last
part of the thesis.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the result is also a nod to the limitations discussed in
the literature review when known tailed distributions are used. Although the Gamma
and Inverse Gaussian distributions have similar shapes and a skew to the right, the
Inverse Gaussian can have a very long tail. In order to achieve that, the peak of the
distribution must strangely be rather high, mid-to low segments need to be rather low and
the remaining mass creates a very long tail. The Gamma distribution, on the other hand,
can be seen as a nesting or parent distribution for the χ, t or even Poisson distributions
given the correct parametrisation. Lastly, the difference in the tails does not only imply
a change in the frequency of extreme returns but a change in ”normal” returns as well.
Since the integral of a pdf must always be 1, fatter tails imply lower humps in the
distribution, often combined with differences in skewness and kurtosis. This point will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, where higher kurtosis is related to the financial
crisis.
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Chapter 4
Estimation method and preliminary results
4.1 The model
In Chapter 3 the goal was to isolate fat tail effects in a simplistic, tractable setup of
mathematical convenience and apply optimisation solutions and simulations in order to
derive some preliminary results. Tail risk on its own was not enough to make a difference,
and also the use of prespecified known distributions may be inflexible and subject to
parametrisation considerations. This chapter will isolate the effect of stochastic volatility
instead and study to what extend such a model can replicate a price behaviour similar to
the one expected under jumps. In addition, the primary estimation method of the thesis
will be discussed along with the relevant literature and an introductory model will be
estimated. The aim is to replicate the results of a paper in order to show methodological
aptitude and a functional application of the method, to present the method in detail
and focus on the effect of stochastic volatility. A description and critique of the method
will be provided and its selection will be justified by comparing its advantages and
disadvantages to those of other options. The method is Markov Chain Monte Carlo, or
MCMC.
4.1.1 Introduction to Bayesian analysis
The central idea of Bayesian analysis, and Markov Chain Monte Carlo in particular,
can be best described by a pseudo-historical anecdote. Suppose a person is recovering
from an illness, with no company and little entertainment apart from a deck of cards.
That person also happens to be highly proficient in statistics. Since the recovery is
long, the patient keeps laying solitaires one after the other, sometimes solving the game
and others failing - but in the meantime he becomes so experienced that he very rarely
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makes a ”wrong” move, to the best of his knowledge and ability. At some point the
focus changes from solving a laid down solitaire to calculating the probability that this
particular solitaire (or any other random one) can be solved. In other words, what is the
probability of a combination of cards to occur that can lead to a solvable solitaire? In
more Bayesian terms, the goal was to calculate a very complicated conditional probability
(or probability density function) regarding the position of every one of the 52 cards in
the deck relative to the position of the other 51, and disseminate the probability of a
solution. Suffice to say, this problem was analytically untractable and impossible to solve,
like many similarly complex problems in statistics, physics and chemistry. However, the
patient realised he did not really have to solve the problem. He only had to attend the
outcome. In a Law of Large Numbers approach, and given his solitaire prowess that
prevented mistakes, he only had to keep on playing solitaire and count how many times
he got a solution. The probability of a certain outcome could be approximated given
certain conditions (in his case, no cheating) and a large enough number of repetitions
that would allow the number of occurrences to approximate the true value.
So a taxing mathematical problem becomes a repeated experiment that provides
the desired information a posteriori. The material for the discussion that follows relies
heavily on Gilks et al. (1995b) ”Markov Chain Monte Carlo in practice”, Lynch (2007)
”Introduction to Applied Bayesian Statistics for Social Scientists” and Robert and Casella
(2005) ”Monte Carlo Statistical Methods” along with Gilks and Wild (1992), Henneke
et al. (2006) and Gilks et al. (1995a). In order to avoid constant citations that would make
the text unreadable, these books and papers should be treated as constant references.
They provide an excellent discussion of MCMC from the very basics to elaborate topics.
In more formal terms, let D denote the data of a model and θ denote a vector of model
parameters and/or variables (for MCMC there is no conceptual difference between the
two, as they are treated as unknown quantities). The question asked is ”what parameter
values are most likely to have been generated (match) by the data set at hand”. We
define a prior distribution for θ which provides potential parameter values. The prior
and its calibration provides the source of potential values and is a way to impose existing
knowledge and perceptions on the parameter to be estimated. If for example a certain
range of values is expected, such as positive, then the prior can be truncated. Having
a completely uninformative prior is also a valid option, if there is no reason to impose
restrictions or conditions. Therefore, by using Bayes, the joint probability distribution
over all quantities of the model is P(D, θ) = P(D|θ)P(θ) and the distribution of θ
conditional on D (representing the question) is
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P (θ|D) = P (θ)P (D|θ)∫
P (θ)P (D|θ)dθ
P (θ|D) is called the posterior distribution of θ and the answer to the question is its
expectation. The denominator is the normalising constant and can remain undefined
since it simply scales the distribution, turning the equality to proportionality. This is the
often unknown distribution of the data, and integrating that term had been the main
analytical obstacle in Bayesian inference until the development of MCMC. P (θ) is the
prior distribution. P (D|θ) is the likelihood function for the data at hand, or some sort
of distributional form for a model.
The posterior expectation of a function f(θ) is
E[f(θ)|D] =
∫
f(θ)P (θ)P (D|θ)dθ∫
P (θ)P (D|θ)dθ
MCMC evaluates this by taking sample drawings Xt from the posterior distributions and
approximating this as E[f(X)] = 1
n
∑n
t=1 f(Xt).
Simplifying notation, let us assume that a vector X of random quantities (parameters
in this context, each following its own prior distribution, although in Bayesian inference
there is no coceptual difference between variables and parameters as they are both
unknown random quantities) follows a distribution pi(.). Then, E[f(X)] =
∫
f(x)pi(x)dx∫
pi(x)dx
.
It is important to note that the distribution of X is allowed to be known only up to the
normalization constant (which can be unknown), expressed here by the denominator.
This normalisation constant simply scales the distribution and leads to a proportionality.
If its general form is known (the quantity within the integral corresponds to a normal,
beta etc), this practically means that it is proportional to a familiar pdf of some kind,
allowing for direct (Gibbs) sampling of values. If it is not known, other methods such as
Metropolis - Hastings sampling need to be applied. The key elements now are ”approxi-
mation” and ”convergence”. A Markov chain of X is a process where the distribution
of Xt depends only on the previous value Xt−1. In order to have a meaningful average
above, this distribution must converge towards a stationary distribution which must be
also distribution pi(.) The way to achieve this match is to create an appropriate Markov
chain with three properties.
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1) irreducibility (the chain has a positive probability to reach every possible value - it
can go everywhere).
2) aperiodicity (the chain must not visit states in a pattern or order).
3) positive recurrence (a stationary distribution pi(.) exists such that if the initial value
of X is sampled from it then all subsequent Xs must be distributed according to pi).
When these conditions hold, the chain is called ergodic and converges to the target/
posterior distribution pi(.) . The drawings of the algorithm will eventually converge to the
drawings we would get from the posterior distribution (ergodic averages converge to their
expectations under the stationary distribution). It can be shown that for a sampler like
those discussed in this chapter these conditions always hold. Unfortunately it is a very
taxing, complicated and ultimately fruitless exercise that offers no additional intuition. It
is telling that, aside from theoretical research, such a check is never performed in applied
Bayesian estimation.
Regarding construction, an important but not necessary property is reversibility.
Loosely, this allows the chain to move back and forth in time seamlessly. The mathematical
requirements are for the chain to be positive recurrent with a stationary distribution pi
with transition probabilities piiPij = pijPji. If we move forwards across states (time) and
then backwards, then the transition probabilities P must be the same. In other words, if
we select two random spots in the chain the chance to reach one from the other is the
same. If we have many variables, this means that the order of updating them in each
iteration must not follow a pattern.
4.1.2 Gibbs and Metropolis-Hastings sampling
The next topic is the sampling methodology, or how to construct a chain where its
stationary distribution is exactly the posterior distribution in question. The main focus
of the discussion is on Gibbs, Metropolis - Hastings and Accept- Reject sampling because
these are the methods used in the PhD. However, to provide context, other methods will
also be discussed.
Gibbs sampling can be seen as a special case of Metropolis - Hastings and is employed
when the conditional distribution of a variable is known in form (or differently up to
the normalising quantity) and direct drawing is possible. Assuming more than one
variables, so that conditioning has meaning, the algorithm takes drawings of a variable
conditional on all other variables and updates the previous value. If in the previous
example θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θj), the algorithm can be summarised as
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1) Set initial values for all parameters, or θ0 = (θ01, θ
0
2, ..., θ
0
j ). Also, specify the order
of parameter updating and number of iterations (T).
2) For t < T , sample θt1 from p(θ
t
1|θt−12 , θt−13 , ..., θt−1j−1)
3) Sample θt2 from p(θ
t
2|θt1, θt−13 , ..., θt−1j−1)
4) Sample θt3 from p(θ
t
3|θt1, θt2, θt−14 ..., θt−1j−1)
5) Continue until j, so all θj have been updated.
6) Repeat for t+ 1 < T until T is reached.
This is where the usefulness of conjugate priors becomes apparent. In some cases, it
is possible to select a prior distribution such that the product of the prior distribution
and the likelihood function will yield the same type of posterior distribution as that of
the prior, or at least an identifiable functional form. For example, the product of two
normal distributions is a normal distribution, or the product of an exponential and a
normal distribution is also a normal distribution. Sampling from a pdf known up to the
normalising constant is possible and convenient, and allows for Gibbs sampling in the
manner above. Gibbs sampling is useful when sampling from the joint posterior of the
parameters is not feasible, but sampling from each individual conditional posterior (or
blocks of them) is. The methodology of conjugate priors and conditioning pdfs will be
shown in practice when the stochastic volatility model is introduced.
Metropolis - Hastings sampling is most useful when direct sampling is not feasible.
Assume state Xt as current and Xt+1 as next. We employ a candidate (proposal)
distribution q(.|Xt) of known, suitable form that provides proposal points for the chain
(values that could have come from the posterior, or simply Y = Xt+1). The form of this
proposal can be anything - it does not affect the posterior pi(.) at all. The candidate
point Y is accepted with probability α(X, Y ) =min (1, pi(Y )∗q(X|Y )
pi(X)∗q(Y |X)).
In more detail, the Metropolis-Hastings step essentially asks the question which value
is more likely to have come from the posterior distribution pi(.), the existing Xt or the
newly proposed Xt+1. To answer that, the ratio of the posteriors times the ratio of the
proposals, each evaluated at the existing and proposed values. However, the reversion
must be noted. If the fraction is split, then the ratio of the posteriors is loosely read
as ”candidate over existing” values, while the ratio of the proposals is read as ”existing
over candidate”. After α(X, Y ) is calculated, it is compared with a random drawing
from a U(0, 1) distribution representing the probability of acceptance. If U < α, the
candidate value is accepted. If U > α, the existing value is kept. If accepted, then
indeed Xt+1 takes the value Y and the chain moves. If rejected, Xt remains unchanged
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(or Xt = Xt+1) and the chain does not move. An important element is the shape of
the proposal distribution. Although its nature does not affect the result, a symmetric
proposal like a normal or a uniform distribution allows for q(.|.) to be simplified. This
makes the calculation of the probability even easier. As a word of caution, for numerical
reasons the calculation of ratios should be done using logarithms. If a symmetric proposal
such as a uniform or a (standard) normal is used, the method is called random-walk
Metropolis - Hastings. Finally, Metropolis - Hastings can be applied to both univariate
and multivariate distributions, contrary to inversion sampling, and does not require an
assumption on, or the construction of, a proposal like rejection sampling and its variants,
where an envelope function is required.
A formal way to illustrate the method can be described as
1) Set the initial value of parameter X0 and the number of iterations T. Also, select
a proposal density q(X t+1|X t) from which new candidate values Y are sampled.
2) For t < T , calculate α(X t, Y ) =min (1, pi(Y )∗q(X
t|Y )
pi(Xt)∗q(Y |Xt)) . If q is symmetric, then
α(X t, Y ) =min (1, pi(Y )
pi(Xt)
)
3) Sample U(0, 1). If U < α(X t, Y ) set X t+1 = Y . If U > α(X t, Y ) set X t+1 = X t
The selection of the proposal, like that of the priors, is a matter of consideration.
A ”bold” fat-tailed proposal generates extreme values more frequently, and therefore if
the actual shape of the posterior is not very close to the shape of the proposal it will
take less time to find the area of convergence. On the other hand, these sudden changes
and jumps in the chain may lead the algorithm to explore irrelevant areas. A more
conservative proposal will move more slowly but will show a high number of acceptances,
contrary to the more erratic behaviour of a bold proposal. Also, it might be the case
that after a number of iterations a recalibration of the proposal can improve efficiency.
A common case is in random walks, where the variance of a normal distribution can
be recalibrated after a number of iterations if the ratio of acceptances/rejections is
too high or too low. There is no given rule on the way (Koop et al 2007), but as a
general guide a flat increase (decrease) in variance can improve the ratio and lead to
faster convergence. On the issue of prior selection, conjugacy is a welcome property for
obvious reasons. When that is not feasible, random walks are a common choice due to
being symmetric and non-informative. If bivariate normal distributions are involved,
Inverse Wishart (equivalent to Inverse Gamma) priors and Jeffreys priors are com-
monly used to condition the variance term. The latter is of particular importance, as it
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is scale invariant, non-informative and is not affected by reparametrisation. It is defined as
pJ(θ) ∝ I(θ) 12
where X ∼ pi(x|θ) and I(θ) = −E( d2
dθ2
logpi(X|θ)) is the Fischer information matrix.
The Jeffreys prior may perform poorly in practice for multivariate cases but is very
useful for univariate ones. When applied, it breaks down to 1
σ2
(although Jeffreys proposes
using 1
σ
due to better convergence properties), and for multivariate normal densities it is
1/ Σ3/2 for the covariance matrix.
Accept - Reject (A-R), or Rejection Sampling, is similar to Metropolis - Hastings. The
difference is that if Y is rejected, Xt+1 does not take the value Y but new values for Y are
drawn until there is an acceptance. A prerequisite for that is for the proposal to always lie
above the posterior. This property can be represented as pi(θ) < M ∗ q(θ), or a constant
M acting as an upper bound for the ratio of the proposal and the posterior. In that
context, the final sample is ”exact” - all its elements have been filtered and are more likely
to have come from the posterior distribution. However there is a computational drawback.
If the chain gets stuck in an area where updating is rare, then the algorithm becomes
very slow and inefficient. Metropolis - Hastings will not hinder the entire algorithm
but will simply use the existing values, contrary to A-R. Another similar issue is that
the Accept - Reject performs worse in multi-dimensional cases, where the probability
of a rejection increases exponentially and M is large. The overall performance of the
algorithm depends greatly on know similar the proposal is to the posterior, or having
an M as close to 1 as possible. For multidimensional and multivariate distributions, or
abnormally shaped (very peaked, two-pronged etc) this can be very challenging and
render Rejection Sampling very inefficient.
Gilks and Wild (1992) improve upon this issue by proposed Adaptive Rejection
Sampling (ARS). Instead of using a predefined proposal that may be inaccurate at some
regions, they construct a piecewise proposal (in the paper a piecewise exponential but a
piecewise linear works as well) that acts as an envelope function and allows for direct
sampling. Each time there is a rejection for a proposed value, this value is used in order
to define a new piece in the proposal thus updating it and making it more similar to
the posterior. The process continues until there is an acceptance, in which case the
envelope function is constructed from the beginning in the next iteration. The pieces can
be defined both as tangents and as secants. The method works best for log densities and
can only be applied to concave functions. Gilks et al. (1995a) expand ARS to include
non-log-concave functions. For non-concave, the piecewise envelope may find itself below
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the posterior for a piece. To accommodate for such cases, a Metropolis - Hastings step
is applied when the ARS step accepts a proposed value Y. If h(Y ) = min(q(Y ), pi(Y )),
then the Metropolis - Hastings step is U < min(1, pi(Y )∗h(X
t)
pi(Xt)∗h(Y )) where X
t is the existing
value.
When the piecewise q(.) lies above the posterior, the algorithm works as before.
When it lies before, the extra step ensures that the existing, more preferable value
will be retained if a sub-par value is accepted in the ARS step. This methodology is
called Adaptive Rejection Metropolis Sampling (ARMS). Martino et al. (2012) point out
that in that process the parts below the posterior may never be updated, which means
that the envelope will never improve for those regions, and also that the initial use of
exponential pieces leads to great numerical problems. The proposed solution is to include
an additional accept-reject step when the Metropolis-Hastings step is completed, that
will determine if a support point will be added to the piecewise. Another method is to
consider past drawings in the construction of the proposal.
For reasons of completeness, it is useful to mention Independence sampling, Slice
sampling and Hamiltonian sampling. These are variants of the Metropolis and Metropolis
- Hasting algorithms that can be useful under certain circumstances, but go beyond the
scope of the thesis.
4.1.3 Reversibility and burn-in periods
Gibbs sampling provides a good basis to explain the importance of scanning during
one iteration of the algorithm. Three indicative strategies, that are also applied to M -
H, rejection sampling and hybrid algorithms, are Deterministic Scan (DSGS), Random
Permutation Scan (RPGS) and Random Scan (RSGS) (Johnson (2009) PhD Thesis). In
the first case, the order of updating is set: variable A will be updated first, then variable
B (using the updated value of A and the non-updated values of the other variables),
then C (using updates As and Bs etc) etc until all variables are updated. This form is
non-reversible. In the second case, all variables are updated during the iteration but at
random order. For example, among variables A, B and C, B is selected, then between
A and C, A is selected, and C is the last to be updated. This version is reversible
if the probability of selection is the same for all variables. Here it is 1/3 at first and
1/2 afterwards, with the remaining one being trivially 1, so reversibility holds. In the
third case, only one variable is selected for updating at random during one iteration.
This is also reversible. Rejection sampling and Metropolis - Hastings are reversible by
construction.
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One last technical matter is setting initial values and burn-in periods. In order to
initiate the algorithm some initial values must be set for the chain to begin, which must
not affect the final result of convergence. Unavoidably, some starting points are better
than others but there is no way of knowing. To avoid a bias, the first iterations (burn-in
period) are discarded so the effect of the starting points is neutralised when the averages
are calculated. Again, there is no rule on the length of the burn - in period.
4.1.4 Advantages, disadvantages and justification of method
selection
This section will discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of MCMC, both in
theory and in practice. In addition, MCMC will be compared to other methods and an
explanation will be provided on why it is more advantageous to be used in the context of
the thesis.
The first thing to note about MCMC is that, by construction, it is suitable to deal
with the simultaneous estimation of many parameters and variables. This makes it
particularly efficient when complicated models are involved, such as SVCJ. Because
Bayesian inference relies on quantifying and assessing probability and does not focus on
explicit parameter estimation, it is better suited to address highly complex models. Also,
despite the variations in sampling and other technical sides, the basis is always the Bayes
rule and how to move from a prior distribution to a posterior through likelihood. It is
not required to know the exact shape or form of the joint posterior, or impose exogenous
assumptions, but the problem can be broken down to individual bits estimated separately.
This is not an advantage shared by the General Method of Moments (GMM), Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) or GARCH estimation and makes MCMC very versatile.
In addition, MCMC is agnostic. It only requires the three properties of aperiodicity,
positive recurrence and irreducibility to hold, and it does not depend on the initial values
or the posteriors used. In fact, a proper algorithm always converges no matter what the
priors or the initial values are, and the chains will explore first and converge after even if
the true parameter values are used to initialise the process. That was the case (and a
performance test, among others) for the PhD. Third, in-depth knowledge of distributional
properties is not required apart from the form of the likelihood. The exact shape can be
unknown and the functional form can be multidimensional or very non-standard.
The problems of MCMC, particularly in the context of the PhD, are empirical. First,
although different priors are mathematically equivalent and will all lead to convergence
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as long as the fundamental conditions hold, in practice they may affect the speed of
convergence, overall performance and may even cause ”prior bias”, or limiting the chain
to a region. In many cases this will lead to a software crash because the parameters will
violate some condition somewhere, or to an erratic chain and the existence of a problem
will become obvious. If the problem is detected, one needs to simply use a different
prior and recondition. Second, in practice MCMC can be time-consuming. The long
burn-in periods in MCMC literature with jumps are indicative of the issue, because a
lot of iterations need to be discarded before it is safe to assume convergence. A poor
selection of priors (e.g. in a M - H step with many rejections) may result to slow mixing
of the chains, slow convergence or ”prior bias”, causing the algorithm to get stuck in a
region. An example is the problem of a ”two-pronged distribution” phenomenon where
only one peak is covered.Those problems can be addressed by selecting different priors or
implementing a Metropolis step and using ARMS, respectively. Discretization bias is
a concern but in the papers that do discuss it (most notably Eraker et al. (2003), it is
found to be negligible with high frequency data.
Some more technical issues are the slow mixing of the chain if the proposal is too
conservative or too bold, the production of correlated samples. The first issue is easily
solved by readjusting the proposal. The second issue can be dealt with sampling in
blocks or from joint posteriors. If there is reason to believe that two or more parameters
are correlated, it is possible to construct a bivariate or multivariate posterior for them
and sample in pairs or groups. This does not exclude prior conjugacy, as in many cases
multivariate conjugate priors can also be used (e.g. normal). From another point of view,
output is still expressed in ergodic averages, so in essence MCMC is an elaborate method
to estimate means and variances ”on average”. This average can have very low standard
deviation but it still is an estimate over an entire sample that may vary a lot, contain
structural breaks etc. Therefore, critique on the use of such parameters in forecasting
rare events cannot be avoided. However, both MCMC and SVCJ are better equipped to
address tail risk than other counterparts.
Despite all the advantages mentioned above, MCMC is still a numerical technique.
This makes estimation errors unavoidable, as in all methods, but in addition it is from
difficult to impossible to know how large that error is. The best guide is the standard
deviation of the realisations of the chain, but the equivalent of a t-test cannot be used.
Still, measures like the Odds ratio to compare between models are available.
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4.1.5 MCMC and Maximum Likelihood/ General Method of
Moments
Maximum Likelihood can, in a sense, include both GMM and GARCH estimation since
is it based on the idea of choosing parameters that maximise the likelihood function.
This assumes the existence of a true parameter value which is estimated according to a
confidence interval. On the opposite, Bayesian analysis does not discriminate between
variables and parameters, treating them as unknown quantities, threats them both as
random variables, and focuses on the uncertainty surrounding them. It calculates their
expectation based on probability, rather than trying to find an optimal value. The
difference between classical statistics and Bayesian inference can also be described as
follows. In statistics, ML for example, one is concerned with estimating a parameter
with as much precision as possible. In Bayesian inference, the uncertainty of a system is
expressed, inferred and measured by probability, given a set of observations. These is
not a hidden true value to be approximated, only an amount of uncertainty that can be
analysed through the prior - posterior path and the Bayes rule. In an even cruder way, it
relies on empirical observation of results (ex post) rather than a hidden distributional
law (ex ante). Where ML needs to maximise a very complicated, non-standard, high-
dimensional multivariate distribution (a task ranging from difficult to impossible), MCMC
only needs to condition that likelihood and approximate the posteriors of each parameter
Paap (2002) for a comprehensive discussion on the subject). This is both feasible and
faster.
In addition, the very nature of ML estimation assumes some underlying features for
the form of the likelihood, such as being differentiable and at least some moments to
exist. This becomes very obvious in the case of the General Method of Moments and the
Cauchy-Lorentz distribution (Student’s t with one degree of freedom). GMM cannot be
applied because that distribution simply does not have a mean. Because we are dealing
with unknown distributions of unknown shape and properties, the caveat of imposing
false underlying assumptions via the adoption of a methodology is always present, or
very simply put estimating things that are not there. The existence of (higher) moments
is a very strong assumption for finance, because one can be fairly certain on the existence
of the mean and somehow certain on the existence of variance, but for skewness and
kurtosis there is very little empirical evidence.
Another advantage of MCMC in jumps estimation is that if a possible parameter
value does not appear in the sample its ML estimation will be zero. That is not the case
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for MCMC, where the Bayesian estimator will reach zero only when forced by a prior. In
the case of rare observations, such as jumps, Maximum Likelihood can be problematic.
It is indicative that when ML is used along with jumps the model is fairly simple, e.g. as
in Aıt-Sahalia (2004) or Bates-like models with only one process. This is telling of the
practical limitations in application.
Finally, Bayesian analysis allows the introduction of beliefs via the priors, a feature
not shared by Maximum Likelihood. For a proper prior and sufficiently large sample,
ML and Bayesian estimators will converge. Also, in practice ML estimates are more
affected by noise in the data. Maximum likelihood does not allow for prior information
and its interpretation relies on having a tractable pdf and an idea about the distribution,
leading to conclusions on something that might not be there.
4.1.6 MCMC and GARCH
Compared to GARCH, MCMC has a series of advantages. In a nutshell, GARCH
maximises the likelihood function given a set of initial parameters and operates as a black
box: convergence to the true value cannot be monitored and is often dependent upon the
initial value of the parameters. For some parametrisations the GARCH estimator may
not converge at all or perform badly, while for others it might converge. MCMC on the
other hand is exactly the opposite. It is completely indifferent to the selection of initial
parameters and despite some being more reasonable than others the only difference is the
speed of convergence. In addition, the performance of the algorithm can be visualised
by plotting the chains. A realisation of the parameter Markov chains can reveal if the
chain has degenerated (e.g. create a ”funnel” due to increasing variance), sufficiently
explored its region and, most importantly, converged. A converged chain demonstrates
very low variance around a centre value and looks like a ”hairy catterpillar” rather than
a ”random walk”. That type of empirical validation is not possible when using GARCH,
which relies on a set of difficult to track tests and in addition may be subject to structural
issues (proper number of lags). A discussion on formal convergence diagnostics, along
with their potential failures, can be found in Cowles and Carlin (1996). A complete
and excellent discussion on MCMC techniques in ARMA-GARCH models is given by
Henneke et al. (2006). As a final note, when (G)ARCH models are not estimated by
MCMC, they often assume a Student’s t distribution as in Bollerslev (1987) or Jondeau
and Rockinger (2009, 2012). This highlights again the matter of imposing distributional
features, where MCMC along with jump-diffusion allows for a more independent, flexible
structure.
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4.2 Technical application - Stochastic Volatility
4.2.1 Derivation of posterior distributions
This section focuses on the paper to be replicated. It is Hautsch and Ou (2008), which
uses a simple Auto Regressive Stochastic Volatility (AR SV) model. The paper relies
heavily on Kim et al. (1998), one of the first papers to apply MCMC estimation in
SV models, but differentiates by using DAX, Dow Jones and the GBP/USD rate as
data instead of only the latter and for a much longer period. As a contribution, an
advancement in reversibility will be introduced. The order of parameter updating in
Hautsch and Ou (2008) is fixed and thus non-reversible. The MH steps are reversible
by construction. However there is no theoretical ground to impose a certain order (e.g.
why should the mean be updated before the mean revertion parameter?) despite purely
technical justifications. Therefore a Random Permutation Gibbs Scan (all parameters up-
dated in random order during each iteration) will be applied which will ensure reversibility.
The two equations describing the model are
yt = exp(ht/2)ut, ut ∼ N(0, 1) (4.1)
ht = µ+ φ(ht−1 − µ) + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0, σ2n) (4.2)
where yt is log returns at time t, ht is log volatility modelled by a stationary AR
process with parameter |φ| < 1. ut, ηt are error terms and the unconditional distribution
of ht is ht ∼ N(µ, σ
2
η
1−φ2 ). The returns formulation is the equivalent of the Heston
square-root volatility model without drift.
Setting θ = (µ, φ, σ2η) to denote a vector of all the parameters and h = (h1, ..., hT ), by
Bayes’ theorem we have
p(θ, h|y) ∝ p(y|θ, h) ∗ p(h|θ) ∗ p(θ)
with the LHS being the posterior distribution, which is proportional to the likelihood
function (first term) specified by (4.1), the conditional distribution of the volatility states
(second term specified by (4.2) and the prior distribution (third term).
Specifying prior distributions for the parameters, p(µ) = N(αµ, β
2
µ) , p(φ) = N(αφ, β
2
φ)
truncated between -1 and 1, and p(σ2η) = IG(ασ, βσ). The parameters of the priors
(hyper-parameters) are set by the researcher and the distributions are normal, normal
and inverse gamma. They all yield conjugate priors for the respective terms, and the
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inverse gamma (or Wishart) prior is a common option for conditioning variance. Their
values may be completely agnostic, denoting no particular knowledge of the values/ sign
of the parameters (e.g zero mean and huge variance) or may impose some prior belief on
the value of the parameter. In this case they are agnostic.
The conditional posteriors of each parameter are
p(µ|y, h, φ, σ2η) ∝ p(y|h, µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ p(h|µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ p(µ) (4.3)
p(φ|y, h, µ, σ2η) ∝ p(y|h, µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ p(h|µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ p(φ) (4.4)
p(σ2η|y, h, φ, µ) ∝ p(y|h, µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ p(h|µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ p(σ2η) (4.5)
The first RHS term is the full conditional likelihood which is a constant with respect
to the model parameters and can thus be omitted. The only variable that affects yt is ht,
so in the conditionals for the parameters µ, φ, ση p(y|h, µ, φ, σ2η) does not play any role.
h subsumes all information about the other parameters. We now focus on the second
term, which includes conditioning every element in the vector of vol.states according to
the other parameters. This yields
p(h|µ, φ, σ2η) = p(h1|µ, φ, σ2η)
∏T−1
t=1 p(ht+1|ht, µ, φ, σ2η)
The separation of p(h1|.) happens because for h1 there is no prior state ht−1 so the
unconditional mean and variance need to be used, instead of the conditional ones used for
all other t. Also, manipulating (2) yields ht ∼ N(µ+φ(ht−1−µ), σ2η). The posterior for µ
and φ are, therefore, the product of normal probability density functions. In what follows
the normalising constant (generally 1/
√
2piσ2) is omitted because it simply scales the re-
sults, and the focus is on the exponential part of the normal pdf. Restating, (4.3) becomes
p(µ|y, h, φ, σ2η) ∝ p(h|µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ p(µ) = p(h1|µ, φ, σ2η)
∏T−1
t=1 p(ht+1|ht, µ, φ, σ2η)p(µ)
= exp(− (h1 − µ)
2
2σ2η/(1− φ2)
)exp(−
∑T−1
t=1 (ht − µ− φ(ht−1 − µ))2
2σ2η
)exp(−(µ− αµ)
2
2β2µ
) (4.6)
In order to condition for µ and generally the parameter of interest, the only necessary
move is to eliminate all terms not containing µ in the exponential parts and generally
the formula. As an example, for the leftmost term in (4.6),
60
4.2. TECHNICAL APPLICATION - STOCHASTIC VOLATILITY
exp(−1
2
h1 − 2µh1 + µ2
σ2η/(1− φ2)
) = exp− 1
2
(µ2 − 2µh1)(1− φ2)
σ2η
= exp(−1
2
µ2(1− φ2)
σ2η
− 1
2
−2µh1(1− φ2)
σ2η
) (4.7)
This seemingly awkward way to write the equation will be helpful to understand the
manipulations that lead to a normal pdf later on. It is also illustrative of the process,
hence the unnecessary detail. With a similar algebraic treatment, the middle exponential
part of (4.6) becomes
exp(−
∑T−1
t=1 (ht − φht−1 − µ(1− φ))2
2σ2η
)
= exp(−1
2
µ2(1− φ)2(T − 1)−∑T−1t=1 2µ(1− φ)(ht − φht−1)
σ2η
) (4.8)
The point of interest is how the sum across T created the (T-1) multiplication with
the quadratic term. The sum applies only to volatilities, and since µ does not depend
upon time it will be multiplied by the length of the sum. The separation of the µ2 and
2µ terms can be omitted. The third term of (4.6), the prior, is simply
exp(−µ
2 − 2µαµ + α2µ
2β2µ
) = exp(−µ
2 − 2µαµ
2β2µ
) (4.9)
Collecting the results together, the posterior is proportional to the product of the
three exponential parts, so summing the powers in (4.7) - (4.9) and collecting terms leads
to
exp[−1
2
(
(T − 1)(1− φ)2
σ2η
+
1− φ2
σ2η
+
1
β2µ
)µ2
−1
2
(
h1(1− φ2)
σ2η
+
∑T−1
t=1 (1− φ)(ht − φht−1)
σ2η
+
αµ
β2µ
)(−2µ)]
= exp[−1
2
(Aµ2 − 2Bµ)] = exp[−A
2
(µ2 − 2B
A
µ)]
This formulation is almost the exponential part of a normal pdf. The variance is
1/A in the 2/A term while the B/A term is the mean if the square is completed in
the parenthesis. The square can be completed, seemingly out of nowhere, because the
additional (B/A)2 term needed does not contain µ so it does not affect the proportionality
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- it is simply a constant term than can be ignored. After completing the square, the
posterior can be written as
p(µ|y, h, φ, σ2η) ∝ exp(−
(µ−B/A)2
2A
)
so p(µ|y, h, φ, σ2η) ∝ N(B/A, 1/A)
These calculations are standard process when using normal distributions. In the same
manner, the posterior for φ is also shown to be a normal. The posterior for σ2η is of
slightly more interest. In a more succinct manner and substituting directly for (4.4),
p(σ2η|y, h, φ, µ) ∝ p(h1|µ, φ, σ2η) ∗
T−1∏
t=1
p(ht+1|ht, µ, φ, σ2η) ∗ IG(σ2η|ασ, βσ)
∝ ( 1√
2piσ2η
)T exp(−(h1 − µ)
2(1− φ2)
2σ2η
−
∑T−1
t=1 (ht − µ− φ(ht−1 − µ)2)
2σ2η
)
∗ β
ασ
σ
Γ(ασ)
1
(σ2η)
ασ+1
exp(−βσ
σ2η
)
Because σ2η appears in the denominator, no terms are excluded in the exponential
parts and it also appears in the root quantity to the left. The T power appears from the
product of the normal distributions. Ignoring all the constants and the gamma function
and collecting terms,
p(σ2η|y, h, φ, µ) ∝
(
1
σ2η
)T/2(
1
σ2η
)ασ+1exp(−2βσ + (h1 − µ)
2(1− φ2) +∑T−1t=1 (ht − µ− φ(ht−1 − µ)2)
2σ2η
)⇔
p(σ2η|y, h, φ, µ) ∝ (
1
σ2η
)Dexp− C
σ2η
(4.10)
which is proportional to an inverse gamma function with parameters IG(D,C). The
derivation also illustrates the reason why an inverse gamma function is needed to produce
a conjugate prior.
To sum up,after substituting the prior distributions in the conditional posteriors, we
create conjugate priors proportional to the priors but with different parameters specified
as follows.
p(σ2η|y, h, φ, µ) ∝ IG(αˆσ, βˆσ)
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p(φ|y, h, µ, σ2η) ∝ N(αˆφ, βˆφ), truncated between -1 and 1
p(µ|y, h, φ, σ2η) ∝ N(αˆµ, βˆµ)
with the corresponding formulas for each parameter being
αˆσ = ασ +
T
2
βˆσ = βσ +
1
2
{
T−1∑
t=1
(ht+1 − µ− φ(ht − µ))2 + (h1 + µ)2(1− φ2)}
αˆφ = βˆ
2
φ{
∑T−1
t=1 (ht+1 − µ)(ht − µ)
σ2η
+
αφ
βφ
}
βˆ2φ = {
∑T−1
t=1 (ht − µ)2 − (h1 − µ)2
σ2η
+
1
β2φ
}−1
αˆµ = βˆ
2
µ{
h1(1− φ2) + (1− φ)
∑T−1
t=1 (ht+1 − φ ∗ ht)
σ2η
+
αµ
β2µ
}
βˆ2µ = {
1− φ2 + (T − 1)(1− φ)2
σ2η
+
1
β2µ
}−1
Each posterior can be sampled directly and each drawing will be conditional upon
the values at hand of all the other parameters. As the chains progress, the values of each
parameter will start concentrating around an average area, ”limiting” each other. The
time and speed of convergence does not have to be the same for all.
On the contrary, the full conditional posterior for ht is non-standard and we can not
obtain any direct drawings. For this step, an Accept - Reject step must be implemented.
From Bayes’ theorem we get
p(ht|y, h−t, θ) ∝ p(yt|ht, θ) ∗ p(ht|h−t, θ) = 1√
2piexp(ht)
exp(− y
2
t
2exp(ht)
) ∗ p(ht|h−t, θ)
= f ∗(yt, ht, θ) ∗ p(ht|h−t, θ) (4.11)
where we see that this posterior does not belong to a known family of pdfs (h−t
denotes all elements of h excluding the currently selected ht). In order to progress, we
need a suitable proposal distribution - we can derive one through a Taylor approximation
on (4.11). Here, formula (4.1) is also used because ht appears in it. The whole point is
how to construct an appropriate envelope function. We notice that the AR model has
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a Markov structure where the current observation depends upon the previous and the
forthcoming one in the chain, so
p(ht|h−t, θ) = p(ht|ht+1, ht−1, θ) = pN(ht|αt, β2) (4.12)
where αt = µ +
φ(ht−1−µ)+ht+1−µ
1+φ2
and β2 =
σ2η
1+φ2
are the parameters of the normal
density function pN(.|.).
This result comes from taking two successive values ht, ht+1 from (4.2). After tedious
algebra that follows earlier methodology (excluding all terms not containing ht), it is
shown that
p(ht|h−t, θ) ∝ exp(−1
2
(ht − (µ(1 + φ) + φht−1))2
σ2η
)exp(−1
2
(ht+1 − (µ(1 + φ) + φht))2
σ2η
)
which corresponds to (4.12). As a reminder, the errors in (4.2) are normal.
In practical terms, for each repetition there is a ”cursoring” across all elements of
vector h that draws a new vector of h, with h1 drawn from its unconditional distribution.
The Accept - Reject step uses exp(−ht) being bounded by a linear function in ht so we
expand (4.11) around αt to get
logf ∗(yt, ht, θ) ≤ −1
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
ht − y
2
t
2
exp(−αt)(1 + αt − ht) = logg∗(yt, ht, θ)
Since p(ht|h−t, θ) = pN(ht|αt, β2) it follows that
p(ht|h−t, θ) ∗ f ∗(yt, ht, θ) ≤ pN(ht|αt, β2) ∗ g∗(yt, ht, θ)
after removing the logs, so the RHS can be written as k ∗ pN (α∗t , β2) with k constant.
The parameters are α∗t = αt +
β2
2
(y2t exp(−αt)− 1), β2= the same as before. This means
that up to a constant k the RHS is bound by pN(α
∗
t , β
2) which is the proposal envelope
distribution.
4.2.2 Sampling methodologies
The algorithm for sampling each parameter is as follows
1) set initial values h(0), µ(0), φ(0), σ
2(0)
η
2) For a number of steps s = 1,...,S , sample each parameter conditional upon the
value of all the other parameters in the previous step, or if they have already been
updated from the current step. In Hautsch and Ou (2008) this happens in a set sequence:
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first sample vector h, then σ2η, then φ, then µ. More formally,
*Sample h
(s)
t from p(ht|y, h(s)t−1, h(s−1)t+1 , µ(s−1), φ(s−1), σ2(s−1)η )
*Sample σ
2(s)
η from p(σ2η|y, h(s), µ(s−1), φ(s−1))
*Sample φ(s) from p(φ|y, h(s), σ2(s)η , µ(s−1))
*Sample µ(s) from p(µ|y, h(s), φ(s), σ2(s)η )
The introduced alteration is updating h, σ2η, φ and µ in random order during the step.
This makes the algorithm reversible. µ, φ and σ are sampled directly (Gibbs sampling)
while the Accept - Reject algorithm for ht is
for t=1,...,T
1) Draw candidate h∗t from pN(ht|α∗t , β2)
2) Draw U from uniform distribution U[0,1]
3) If U <=
f∗(yt,h∗t ,θ)
g∗(yt,h∗t ,θ)
set ht = h
∗
t otherwise return to 1 and take a new drawing of h.
4) Repeat until acceptance.
The total number of runs is 10.000, of which the first 5.000 are discarded as burn-in
period. Volatility states are computed according to
hht =
1
G
∑g=G
g=1 exp
h
(g)
t
2
current where G is the remaining repetitions after discarding the burn-in and g the
realisation of the chain.
4.2.3 Alterations and expansions
A number of expansions and alterations are introduced, for various reasons.
1) Data set issues
Hautsch and Ou (2008) use daily log returns of three indices (DAX, Dow Jones,
GBP/ USD FX rate) from 1-1-1991 to 21-3-2007. Only the Dow Jones series was used
for replication. They report summary statistics and a sample size of 4.231 observations.
Using the DJINDUS series from Datastream, the number of observations between these
two dates is 4.232, with the very first log return for 1-1-1991 being zero and a non-trading
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day (and naturally excluded). However, all other trading days have not been excluded
from the 4.231-sized sample. After doing so, the actual number of trading days for that
period is 4.079. In practice this does not affect the results, because all log returns are
very close to zero and similar to arithmetic returns, since daily data is used. The sample
statistics and results are only slightly affected because log returns are very close to zero
by construction. The corrected values are as reported. In addition, a sample between 3-1-
2005 and 23-7-2015 which includes the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was used. The data set
comes from Datastream (tagged DJINDUS, 2656 observations excl. non-trading days) and
includes daily log-returns. Comparative statistics of the samples are reported in Table B.2.
2) Change of Metropolis step
Although Hautsch and Ou (2008) set up an Accept - Reject step, during the replica-
tion it proved to be problematic. When Accept - Reject sampling was used, the code
would get stuck very early (70 - 200 repetitions), meaning that there no values could be
drawn from a posterior given the most recent parameter values and distributional forms.
The problematic step was the volatility Accept - Reject. The mathematical derivation
is completely accurate but the implementation appears to be less than perfect. When
the Metropolis - Hastings step was employed instead, the results of the paper could be
fully replicated and are stated here. The proposal and posterior are exactly the same as
discussed above, with the only difference being in step 3 which becomes
3) If U <=
f∗(yt,h∗t ,θ)
g∗(yt,h∗t ,θ)
set ht = h
∗
t otherwise keep existing value.
To find the reason for this discrepancy the authors were contacted. Access was given
to the original code but, unfortunately, it was written in C++ and had very few comments.
After reverse-engineering it, it became apparent that the step was coded as logU = f
∗
g∗ .
Since 0 < U < 1, logU < 0 and obviously all drawings are accepted. There was no part
of the code where f ∗ or g∗ were specified or turned into logarithms. There was also
no part of the code where anything else was defined or turned into logarithm either.
Mechanically, this error most likely causes all drawings to be accepted and therefore the
chain does not get ”stuck”. This is a very cautious result, due to lack of proficiency in
C++. It is very difficult to follow the entire process so there is always the possibility of
misinterpreting something. However, since the mathematical derivation is correct, the
aim of demonstrating the construction of a proposal and how an Accept-Reject step
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works is achieved.
3) Reversibility
As already discussed, the algorithm was changed to reversible from non-reversible.
Also, a mistake in the Taylor expansion for logf was corrected. It contained an additional
erroneous exp(ht) term in Hautsch and Ou (2008) but is correctly stated in Kim et al.
(1998).
4.3 Results and conclusion
The expansions are 1) the application of a Metropolis - Hastings step instead of an
acceptance - rejection step 2) turning the algorithm from deterministic to reversible 3)
running an additional simulation with more recent data and more violent movements
in returns. The step change along with reversibility still produce results very close to
the original paper, showing that the more flexible method is still efficient. There is no
theoretical ground to impose one order of updating or another. Intuitively, the agent
conducting this repeated experiment has no reason to update the mean before volatility
etc. The success of reversibility shows that an artificial construct is not needed, and that
a reversible structure is equally effective.
In addition, convergence is largely achieved after 70 - 200 repetitions. This was a
useful observation since for a full replication with 25.000 repetitions the duration would
be more than 30 hours, which imposed time restrictions. This was conducted only once,
to verify that everything worked as intended, and all other operations were conducted
with 10.000 repetitions of which 5.000 were burn-in period. As seen from the realisations
of the chains, the loss of accuracy was practically non-existent. This is not the case for
ση which is the slowest to converge and remains somehow inaccurate, quite possibly due
to the low number of iterations. Even that, however, does not deviate enormously.
There are two elements for replication. The first one is the table of parameters,
and the second one the comparison between smoothed volatility states and absolute
log returns. Table B.1 shows almost exact replication of the paper results, excluding
the mean of σ which is slightly higher. Still, the values obtained by the corrected and
non-corrected data are almost the same, while its SDs are identical for all cases. Unit
root behaviour is also verified. Comparing the 1991 - 2007 and the 2005 - 2015 period,
the mean of returns is the same but with a higher standard deviation, while σ is also
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higher and more volatile as one would expect. The most important finding is that the
model is still able to identify volatility clustering with precision, even during a period
with severe jumps. This is demonstrated by Figures B.3, B.4 and B.5 where smoothed
volatility estimates closely mimic absolute log-returns.
The main aim of the chapter is to demonstrate technical aptitude and validate the
application of an estimation process via replication. It is useful to discuss the estimation
results in further detail, although they are almost identical to the base paper. Unavoidably,
the conclusions are similar with the exception of standard deviation and kurtosis. The
value of φ (0.9876) shows high persistence for the autoregressive process. This is almost
a unit root, implying that the process is getting close to being non-stationary. This is
a common finding for returns series and is also connected to volatility clustering and
stochastic volatility (heteroskedasticity), like in the model at hand. Equation (4.2) can
be rewritten as
ht = (1− φ)µ+ φht−1 + ηt
where, after substituting the numerical values of the replication, the first term is
negative and equal to -0.119. The standard deviations of all parameters are very small
and almost identical to the original estimates. The difference is in σ, whose value is
0.127236 at the replication compared to the original 0.087. The standard deviation
of both estimates is 0.01, so they are both accurate. Both under the original and the
corrected sample, the replication of σ is virtually the same. The most important change
is in the Accept - Reject step. If that was indeed the reason for the discrepancy, then all
other parameters would be inaccurate to some extent. This is not the case, and there
are two more elements in favour of the replication outcome contrary to the original value.
The first is the coding deficiencies discussed above, which cast doubts on the validity of
the original results. The second is the comparable values of the corrected sample and
the 2005 - 2015 sample. This shows that the code operates consistently and accurately.
The 2005 - 2015 sample tests parameter accuracy for a very volatile period, such
as the financial crisis. The parameter estimates are almost identical to those of the
corrected sample but with much higher standard deviations. This is to be expected, since
the model is ill equipped to deal with so sudden movements in prices and estimation is
unavoidably less accurate. Nevertheless, the impact is limited to the standard deviations
of µ and φ. σ is up at 0.1751 from 0.1276, which shows an attempt to accomodate for the
large returns movements. Its standard deviation is also higher but still comparable to
the original set. The reason for these increases is depicted in Figure B.5 in the Appendix.
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Although volatility is able to track absolute returns rather closely, it is unable to track
outliers such as those observed to the left and right of the main masses on the returns
graph. This is a strong visual representation to introduce jumps and account for those
movements, because they cannot be replicated by an SV setup and volatility clustering
has its limitations. Smoothed volatility states cannot represent such high deviations. To
a lesser extent, this behaviour can be observed in figures B.3 and B.4 for the original and
corrected samples. Absolute or squared returns can be seen as a reasonable proxy for
volatility, but if the data set is known to contain outliers it is a very precarious choice.
The fact that the model is unable to capture the distributional properties of returns
is also evident in kurtosis. Its formula can be derived directly by using the second and
fourth moments of (4.1), which yields
Kurt(yt) =
E(y4t )
E(y2t )
2
= 3exp(σ2h) = 3exp(
σ2η
1− φ2 )
Using the authors’ parameters for Dow Jones, estimated kurtosis is found to be 4.3884
compared to 8.276 calculated by the sample. The estimates of the corrected sample
give kurtosis of 5.78506 compared to 7.99061 in the sample. This is expected given the
different ση. Kurtosis for the 2005 - 2015 sample is, according to estimated parameters,
8.02188. As expected, in the higher volatility period the difference between kurtosis
as calculated by the data (14.1445) and kurtosis implied by the model is even higher.
A stochastic volatility model is ill suited to replicate this phenomenon, especially in
more unstable periods. This highlights the need to include jumps in both the returns
and the volatility process. Also, despite the improvenent by clearing the sample, the
sample kurtosis remains higher than the estimated kurtosis in all cases. This is another
element in favour of the replication parameters, since the resulting kurtosis is closer to
that of the sample. Hautsch and Ou (2008) provide a Jarque-Bera test and a QQ plot
which show the inability of the model to account for excess kurtosis. This applies to the
replication parameters as well, since they are very similar. Finally, the explanation for
the high kurtosis in the 2005 - 2015 period is the much fatter tails and the high number
of extreme returns in the set. While the SV model is able to account for that increase to
some extent, it falls very short on adequately dealing with kurtosis. The value in Table
B.2 is 14.1445 while in Table B.1 it is 8.022, while the corresponding values for σ are
0.175 and 0.127 respectively. This shows that higher variance for the error term is not
sufficient to capture such effects. Clearly, jumps need to be explicitly introduced in an
SV setup to adequately capture the nature and effect of jumps and improve model fit.
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After cleaning the 1991 - 2007 data, the results were practically left unaltered. Daily
log-returns are typically numbers very close to zero so the change had a noticeable but
marginal effect on results. When comparing the two different periods, the increase in
the standard deviation of parameters is clear. This demonstrates the difficulty of the
model to capture both outliers and volatility dynamics, as seen in parameter parsimony.
According to the paper, the normal innovations in the volatility process are not sufficient
for capturing such behaviour. The model is completely unable to account for excess
kurtosis and jumps. This highlights the importance of introducing jumps and that
stochastic volatility on its own is not enough in a AR / GARCH framework. Even an
elementary jump structure will improve model fit, as discussed earlier in the literature
and shown here.
Nevertheless the main goal, which was replication and expansion, was achieved. The
method was successfully replicated and analysed, the intuition and results were found to
hold over both samples and the parameters of the paper were estimated with sufficient
accuracy. This was an important step due to the complexity of MCMC inference. It
is always good practice to start from a basic model with few parameters and build up,
because in that way both efficiency and tractability are improved and possible problems
can be corrected at an early stage. If, for example, a Metropolis-type step is not efficient
of has a low rate of acceptance, it is unlikely that its performance will increase when more
parameters are introduced and a better solution must be found. From a learning point
of view, the code used in this chapter provides the basis for the code of the SVCJ model,
with correlation between the volatility and returns processes, additional parameters and
jumps in both volatility and returns. From a contribution point of view, the inability of
the SV framework to accommodate tail risk sufficiently was established. Excess kurtosis
was detected in both a ”calm” and a ”tumultuous” period, and in addition outliers were
completely ignored. This poses enough justification for an expansion towards including
jumps. Admittedly, the derivation included a lot of detail. The intention was to avoid
similar explanations during the much more complicated conditioning of the SVCJ model
in the next chapter.
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Model estimation and optimal portfolio weights
5.1 The model
5.1.1 Basic set-up
In the previous two chapters it was established that neither jumps nor heteroskedasticity
are sufficient on their own to capture extreme event risk. An investor faced with
uncertainty about tail risk does not see a difference in terms of average terminal utility
and is therefore not concerned. Stochastic volatility is not able to fully capture the
stylised facts of asset price movements or the distribution of returns and is consistently
outperformed by even the simplest models with jumps. A combination of the two,
however, is promising and has produced significant literature in both portfolio selection
and model fitting. This section will introduce and discuss the main model of the thesis,
its parameter estimation via MCMC and their comparison to existing literature, and the
derivation of the optimal portfolio solution in detail. A comparison between previous
estimation results and other types of solutions is a key part of this section, as the first
large extension of the thesis relate on the existence of a closed-form solution for this class
of models. In addition, the discussion of a corpus of literature will take place on a strict
base of usefulness. before it is formally presented and discussed. The simplest form of
a jump model is a Brownian motion for returns, with or without drift, with constant
standard deviation plus a Poisson jump with constant parameter. From chapters 3 and
4, jumps and volatility clustering need to be introduced. This immediately introduces a
stochastic process for volatility, which should be mean-reverting. Additionally, correlation
between returns and volatility can be introduced in order to allow for leverage effects.
This leads to the Heston square volatility model. The introduction of jumps gives different
types of stochastic volatility models: jumps only in returns, jumps only in volatility,
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independent jumps in both, simultaneous jumps in both (SVJ models). The performance
and use of this general class of models has been discussed in chapter 2. The leverage effect
and stochastic volatility are crucial, while jumps in both processes tackle discontinuities
in variance and ”spikes” observed, among others, by Bates (2000) and are a meaningful
enhancement. In terms of performance, it improves as we move from the SV to the
SVJ model with returns only jumps to an SVJ version with double jumps. The need
is to select a model that combines flexibility, a good performance record and a level of
complexity that allows multiple features (especially those discussed above) to be captured
simultaneously. The model that fits the prerequisites is the Stochastic Volatility model
with Correlated Jumps (SVCJ). It is arguably the best performing affine jump-diffusion
model with a large number of research applications. Proof of that lies in the literature
review, and some of the papers estimating the model are discussed later in this chapter.
5.1.2 The SVCJ model
The model of choice is the Eraker et al (2003) continuous time SVCJ model (EJP)
dYt = µdt+
√
Vt−dW Yt + ξ
Y
t dNt (5.1)
dVt = (κθ − κVt−)dt+ σV
√
Vt−dW Vt + ξ
V
t dNt (5.2)
dYt is log returns where Yt is the log price, Vt is volatility and Vt− the left limit of
Vt (the point in time closest to it). dW
Y
t , dW
W
t are Brownian motions with correlation
ρ, dNt is a Poisson process with constant arrival intensity λ that is common in the two
processes, µ is diffusive mean returns and is constant, ξYt , ξ
Y
t are jump sizes of returns and
volatility with correlation ρj . σV is the ”volatility of volatility” parameter or the standard
deviation of Vt, κ is the speed of mean reversion for Vt and θ is the diffusive long-run
volatility mean. The shorthands α = κθ, β = −κ are also used in some formulations. The
returns jumps follow a normal distribution N(µY + ρjξV , σ
2
Y ) and the volatility jumps
follow an exponential distribution exp(µV ) which guarantees positivity of volatility.
5.1.3 The SV model without jumps
The no jumps case is the Heston square-root stochastic volatility model
dYt = µdt+
√
Vt−dW Yt (5.3)
dVt = κ(θ − Vt−)dt+ σV
√
Vt−dW Vt (5.4)
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where the diffusion term in the volatility process has been factored purely for illustra-
tion purposes. In order for the models to be estimated, an Euler discretisation needs to
be applied. The discretised versions are stated in the Appendix. Euler discretisation is
a standard mathematical process and will not be described in full here, since the final
form is stated in every cited paper that performs MCMC estimation of an SVCJ model.
For completeness, a sufficient description can be found in Johannes and Polson (2009).
Trivially, the Brownian motions correspond to drawings from Y,Vt ∼ N(0, 1) while the
Poisson process is discretised to a Bernoulli where the occurrence of a jump J ∼ Ber(λ)
times its magnitude ξY,Vt .
5.1.4 Further discussion of features and advantages
The main advantages of the model are its ability to nest many different variations, its
ability to capture leverage effects (the negative relationship between returns and volatility)
by assuming correlation, and its popularity that allows for a more widespread comparison
of performance and parameters. Any affine formulation can be nested in the SVCJ model
by removing correlations, jumps or assuming separate λY , λV for independent jumps.
Stochastic equity premia or arrival intensities can also be introduced by modelling µ
and λ with a stochastic process. Additional equity premium terms can be introduced
linearly in the mean of the returns process. It is important to stress that µ is the average
return of the diffusive part and does not take the effect of jumps into account. Briefly, if
one assumes a risk-free rate r, then µ is the sum of r and an arbitrary risk premium, or
diffusive equity premium EP. A ”volatility premium” term ηVt appears in some variations
but both Eraker et al and authors literature find it to be negligible for equity returns,
and is very often relaxed. A ”jumps premium” can be included as µY λ (or µY λVt in
further specifications), and in the EJP variation the drift would be µ− r − µY λ, where
µY is estimated to be negative. The topic will be discussed in further detail in the
Appendix, but for now it is important to identify how the drift terms correspond to
different quantities. The EJP model is well documented and arguably the best performing
of its class. It performs as well as SVIJ (independent jumps) and on par with non-affine
models as discussed in the literature review.
The first paper to present and estimate the model via MCMC was Eraker et al.
(2003). Johannes and Polson (2009) provide a full theoretical and applied discussion of
MCMC applications for a variety of models and is a standard reference. Other papers
include, but are not limited to, Raggi (2004), Asgharian and Bengtsson (2006), Li et al.
(2006), Brooks and Prokopczuk (2013), Witzany (2013). Their common trait is that
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they both estimate the model as well as derive the posteriors, and they often provide
expansions and comparisons across different frameworks. Witzany (2013) expands to a
bivariate specification, Li et al. (2006) compare with an infinite-jump Levy process among
others, Asgharian and Bengtsson (2006) look into contagion of jumps in international
markets, Brooks and Prokopczuk (2013) discuss jumps in commodity markets. Each
author has his own preferences in sampling and setting priors, which leads to different
posterior distributions. The reasons for that are, apart from personal convenience, the
computational efficiency of the algorithm (directly related to coding and the software at
hand) and the avoidance of numerical errors and precision issues.
Such examples are joint normal posteriors for (ξY , ξV ) or (κ, θ), sampling (α, β) and
transforming back to the initial model. The most important alternative concerns the
parameters (ρ, σ2). In this form, the model leads to Metropolis - Hastings sampling
because no conjugate priors can be derived. If the volatility error term in (5.2) is rewritten
as Vt = ρ ∗ Yt +
√
1− ρ2 ∗ ζt, where ζ is a random normal variable independent of Yt ,
and ω = σ2V (1− ρ2) and φ = σV ∗ ρ are defined, then conjugate priors exist (an inverse
gamma and a normal, respectively) and direct Gibbs sampling of ω and φ is possible.
Trivially, ρ = φ
σV
, σ2V = ω + φ
2. This is a standard statistical transformation and is used
in this content by Jacquier et al. (2004), among others.
None of the complete set of posteriors available elsewhere fully fits the thesis because
some are simply unnecessary, some cause software issues and some can be simplified.
All posterior distributions have been derived from first principles and the full process
can be found in the Appendix of the chapter. Briefly, conjugate priors have been
used for all variables and parameters except Vt, which is unavoidably non-standard,
all quantities are sampled individually (no joint sampling or multivariate distributions)
and the transformations used are for α, β, ω, φ as described above. For completeness,
posteriors for joint sampling and Metropolis - Hastings steps are provided, explaining
why they were not applied.
5.2 Estimation and discussion
5.2.1 The algorithm and the data
The algorithm is as follows
1) Set initial values for all parameters τ = (µ, α, β, ω, ρj, φ, µY , µV , σ
2
Y , λ) and vector
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Vt, number of iterations M and burn-in period of G.
For iteration m between 1 and M,
2) Sample p(τ
(m)
i |τ (m−1)−i , V (m−1)t , ξV,(m−1)t , ξV,(m−1)t , Jt),
τ ∼ (N,N,N, IG,N,N,N,Exp, IG,Beta) where i denotes the ith parameter in τ .
3) Sample p(J
(m)
t |V (m−1)t , V (m−1)t−1 , ..., τm) ∼ Bernoulli
4) Sample p(ξ
Y,(m)
t |V (m−1)t , V (m−1)t−1 , ..., τm) ∼ N
5) Sample p(ξV,(m)|V (m−1)t , V (m−1)t−1 , ..., τm) ∼ N
6) Sample p(V (m)|tV
(m−1)
t , V
(m−1)
t−1 , ..., τ
m) with random walk Metropolis Hastings
The data consists of 9132 daily percentage log-returns ((logSt − logSt−1) ∗ 100) of
S&P from 2-1-1980 till 29-3-2016. Compared to other literature, the dataset has the
advantage of including the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 and the following relatively more
tranquil period, which nevertheless features a number of shocks. Descriptive statistics and
estimation results are provided in Tables C.3 and C.1. The results are presented together
with parameters from Eraker et al. (2003), which do not include the crisis and is close
to Li et al. (2006), and Brooks and Prokopczuk (2013) which do. In addition, a shorter
estimation focusing on the crisis and its aftermath is conducted. The parameters are
presented in daily percentages and annual decimals. The methodology for annualisation
is described in the Appendix of Branger and Hansis (2015) and is mentioned here in
brief. Broadie et al. (2007), who also perform a similar exercise, do not provide a full
description. All datasets are S&P daily log-returns of different but comparable length.
Convergence and the realisation of the chains is reported in Figure 2. Tne number of
repetitions M is 90.000, the burn-in period G is 45.000 and convergence is completed
after about 12.000 repetitions.
5.2.2 Estimation results
Complete results can be found in Table C.1 of the Appendix.
The first observation addresses the nature of the time series and how the inclusion
of the crisis affects estimation accuracy. Most of the literature avoids taking the crisis
into account, considering it too distorting. For the SVCJ model, the parameters for
λ, κ, θ show that the model has the tendency to trade jump frequency for volatility. The
volatility related parameters are higher when the crisis is included but jump frequency
drops. On an annual basis 1.66 jumps are expected each year for the pre-crisis period
but only 1 to 1.4 jumps when the crisis is included. θ, on the other hand, increases from
0.0135 annually to roughly 0.02. For the crisis-only period, between 2007 and 2016, the
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same pattern is identified with 1.3 jumps per year but a θ of 0.0343. This shows that
the model does not necessarily need high jump frequency or size to match volatility -
it is perfectly capable of doing so with increased volatility parameters. The feature is
particularly fitting when many small- and medium-size jumps are present in a period,
but does not bode well when the aim is the perfect fit of the data at hand. Since the
latter is not the goal of the thesis and the parameters are comparable to the rest of the
literature, the point will not be explored further and Li et al. (2006) will be cited, who
discuss how jumps can be better captured by Levy processes.
The standard deviations are very low and similar across the papers, showing that
the crisis does not significantly affect accuracy. The reason for that is the inclusion
of a sufficiently long period before and after 2007-2009. Even if the pre-2007 period
is considered too calm, the post-2009 period is volatile enough to ensure an adequate
number of sizable jumps. This establishes that extreme price movements are not overly
rare in the sample. Another remark is about the correlation of jump sizes, ρJ . This
parameter is notoriously difficult to capture due to the rarity of jumps, and previous
estimates are very inaccurate as shown in the table. The result of the thesis is a value of
zero with very low standard deviation. This allows for the assumption to be dropped (e.g.
Broadie et al. (2007) do so on estimation difficulty grounds). Although the literature
tends to follow this path, the thesis provides a tangible reason to do so other than
estimation difficulty and potential overfitting. The leverage effect proves to be significant,
with an ρ value of −0.67, and as expected the jump sizes and returns jump variance
demonstrate high standard deviations. This is understandable due to the rarity of jumps
and their much different magnitude, leading to a relative lack of precision. Still, however,
the range is satisfactory. The negative sign of the returns jump follows the literature and
the Compared to the SV parameters, the SVCJ delivers a higher diffusive mean but lower
volatility related estimates. This is in agreement with the intuition that jumps, especially
small and medium sized, can be captured to a very limited extent by SV models due to
an increase in estimated volatility. Where the model fails is for large movements and
outliers which are captured by the SVCJ model.
5.2.3 Discretisation bias and validity - jumps in very long,
low frequency data sets
A lingering question is whether the improvement by including jumps is factual rather
than an arithmetic phenomenon. The main counter-argument comes from studies that
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employ high-frequency data, where by construction the time series is very smooth and
sudden returns and volatility spikes are more rare. From that point of view, what is
perceived as jumps is just a result of daily discretisation. This interpretation lack rigour,
however, because estimation with high-frequency data can not cover a time frame as
wide as with daily data due to sheer computational constraints. On the other hand, with
a low frequency and greater differences in returns, jumps might be irrelevant because
their effect can be attributed to volatility.
An often disregarded caveat in continuous time research is discretisation bias. In
order to estimate such a model an Euler discretisation is unavoidable, which gives rise
to some degree of distortion. Eraker et al. (2003) are referenced, if not for any other
reason, at least for stating that for daily data the discretisation bias in their model
is negligible. However, beyond that point, almost no further discussion exists on how
estimation, particularly Bayesian, is affected. A thorough discussion on data issues in
the estimation of continuous time models can be found in Bergstrom (1988), while a
first treatment of the issue in Bartlett (1946). Bartlett (1946) focuses on estimating
continuous time parameters from discreet time data states. In essence, he highlights that
the parameter bias does not shrink along with the observation (discretisation) period but
will always be present when his method is followed, and in addition there is no way to get
non-biased estimates on a second order SDE from the first two sample autocorrelation
coefficients. The important feature is the always present discretisation bias, which Eraker
et al. (2003) mention as negligible for daily data and which all subsequent literature takes
as granted. Apart from the great difficulties of the task at hand, Bergstrom (1988) refers
to the interplay between the restrictions of the discrete distribution of the data and the
continuity of the model. For regression methods, the bias was found to be of the same
order of smallness as the square of the unit observation period. A method to outweigh
that effect was to take into account the a priori restrictions, whose effect covers the bias.
This discussion does not cover Bayesian inference but aims to highlight an often
overlooked statistical issue. Under the assumption that the relationship between bias
and frequency holds, low-frequency estimations are not advisable and, even then, they
will not be free of bias. The thesis will rely on the Eraker et al. (2003) result but raise
a point that should be explored further and could have important implications for SV
and SVCJ models, especially under ultra-high frequency and big data estimation. The
second point raised, that of the stability of the optimal portfolios derived by such models,
is discussed in detail in Korn and Kraft (2004) and is a signal for caution. Another
significant resource on the same topic is Tunaru (2017) that analyses a list of empirical
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and theoretical caveats in model risk and continuous time finance.
Expanding the EJP statement, however, implies that for weekly or monthly frequencies
it is not. In addition, the question is posed whether using logarithmic instead of arithmetic
returns will lead to discrepancies or, in other words, if the month-to-month return varies
so much in percentage terms that log returns are erroneous. While the danger is identified,
the choice is daily logarithmic returns in order to keep consistency with other results.
From another point of view, the economic interpretation of the data, the market and the
parameters is debatable. The US economy and the S&P index have changed dramatically
over the period and coming up with uniform, average parameters poses validity issues.
The results using monthly data must be read with caution and must be read only as a
fitting exercise fueled by equal parts of curiosity and defense, as they may be technically
unreliable and scientifically misleading. The point is to show that a λ parameter is still
relevant.
To counter this critique, a dataset of 1745 monthly returns for S&P500 was used
in estimation, covering the full length of the index life time. Robert Shiller’s web page
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm) provides the data, which cover the period
between January 1872 and May 2017. The standard deviation of the parameters is
significantly larger, which is to be expected given the nature of the data. The results
are presented in Table C.3. The annualised arrival rate is 0.20 with a very low standard
deviation and amounts to one jump every 5 years. This is in accord with empirical
evidence and a plausible estimate. It should not, however, be directly compared to the
annualised values of the other estimates since monthly estimations are vastly different in
magnitude than daily ones. The jump size mean is -10% with a standard deviation of 2.2
and the standard deviations are also significantly smaler than the SV case. Therefore,
even with low frequency data, jumps still have an important role to play both in terms
of arrival rate and in terms of magnitude.
5.3 Optimal portfolio weights
5.3.1 Utility and stochastic processes
The next step after model estimation is calculating the portfolio weights selected by an
investor. The two types of investors are one that takes jumps into account and optimises
using the SVCJ model to replicate the behaviour of the risky asset and one that chooses to
ignore them by using the SV model. Each investor allocates wealth to one risk-free asset
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with a constant annual return of 2% and one risky asset represented by the SVCJ model.
The investment horizon extends up to 30 years, and for that reason parameters used
in the optimisation process are annual decimals instead of daily percentage parameters.
That also allows for easy comparison with literature that focuses on portfolio optimisation
rather than model performance, since the parameters there are usually annual. Finally,
the investor has a power utility function U(W ) = W
1−γ
1−γ .
The first thing needed is the wealth process. For wealth W , return of the risky asset
Yt and asset weight φ denoting the percentage of wealth allocated to the risky asset, in
general
Wt = Wt−1(1− φ)r + φWt−1Yt (5.5)
and stochastically, after substituting Yt by its process,
dWt
Wt
= (1− φ)rdt+ φµdt+ φ
√
VtdZ
Y
t + φE(ξ
Y
t )dNt (5.6)
where dZt denotes the Brownian motion to differentiate from the wealth notation and
dNt is the Poisson process. The diffusive mean µ is equal to the risk-free rate plus any
risk premium captured by the model, or µ = r + EP . This allows for substitution in
(5.6), leading to
dWt
Wt
= (r − φr + φr + φEP )dt+ φ
√
VtdZ
Y
t + φE(ξ
Y
t )dNt
= (r + φEP )dt+ φ
√
VtdZ
Y
t + φE(ξ
Y
t )dNt
or
dWt = (r + φEP )Wtdt+ φWt
√
VtdZ
Y
t + φWtE(ξ
Y
t )dNt (5.7)
and volatility still following (5.2)
dVt = κ(θ − Vt−)dt+ σV
√
Vt−dW Vt
5.3.2 The Bellman equation and optimal weights
Equations (5.7) and (5.2) create a two-dimensional state-space model, as before, only
this time the goal is to solve for optimal weights. This requires the construction of a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Although it is a well-known result in the literature,
the derivation and full solution will be presented in order to highlight a difference with
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existing formulas which will lead to the first technical contribution of the thesis.
An indirect utility function F of unknown form is assumed. The goal is to solve
0 = Ft +maxφ[L(F )] (5.8)
where L(F ) comes from applying an n-dimensional Ito’s lemma on the correllated
stochastic processes of wealth and volatility (see this chapter’s Appendix) and is
L(F ) = (r+φEP )WFW +
1
2
φ2W 2V FWW +κ(θ−V )FV + 12σ2V V FV V +σV φWV ρFWV +
λE[F (W (1 + φE(ξY )), V + E(ξV ), t)− F ]
The next step is to assume a functional form for F. The solution method is to
conjecture and then verify that F (Wt, Vt, t) is of a certain form, namely
F (Wt, Vt, t) =
W 1−γ
1− γ exp(A(t) +B(t)V )
where A(t), B(t) depend only upon t but not W and V.
The optimal weight φ is the solution to the following system.
φ =
EP
γV
+
ρσVB(t)
γ
+
λE(ξY )(1− φE(ξY ))−γ
γV
exp(B(t)E(ξV )) (5.9)
where B(t) solves the differential equation
B′(t)− 1
2
γφ2(1− γ) + 1
2
σ2VB
2(t) + (σV φρ(1− γ)− κ)B(t) = 0 (5.10)
with initial conditions
A(T ) = 0, B(T ) = 0
The full solution can be found in this chapter’s Appendix. The solution for the SV
model follows the same pattern and is
φ =
EP
γV
+
ρσVB(t)
γ
(5.11)
under the same differential equation (5.10) and conditions as above.
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5.3.3 The weight result relative to the literature
It is now necessary to discuss how this solution is different from other known results and
why it was necessary to derive it from the beginning. The same methodology is described
in Liu et al. (2003) for a variation of the SVCJ model. They parametrise by adapting
the Pan (2002) values for stocks and options. In fact the model is widely used in the
options related literature, while papers using equity data rely on the EJP model.
dSt
St
= (r + ηVt − µλVt)dt+
√
VtdW
Y
t + Ξ
Y
t dNt (5.12)
dVt = (α
′ − β′Vt − κ′λVt)dt+ σV
√
VtdW
V
t + Ξ
V
t dNt (5.13)
where St is the price, not the return or the log price as previously, and Vt is volatility,
r is the constant risk-free rate, ηVt is the volatility premium which is insignificant for
stock prices (Eraker et al. (2003)), ΞS,V are jump sizes with means µ and κ respectively,
stochastic arrival intensity is λVt of Poisson process N, µλVt is returns jump premium
and κ′λVt is the volatility jump premium.
The most important difference is the use of a stochastic arrival intensity that is
linearly related to volatility. The process for the Poisson parameter is a Cox process
of the general form λ = λ0 + λ1Vt. Setting λ0 = 0 leads to the specification in (5.12)
and (5.13) while setting λ1 = 0 leads to the EJP specification of constant rate in (5.1)
and (5.2). A less important difference is the inclusion of the volatility premium, which
has some importance for options, and the correction in the mean for the jump premium
µλVt. The drift of the diffusion thus includes one additional term that compensates for
jumps. Since these changes are introduced linearly, the solution is not greatly affected.
The solution for φ is
φ =
η − µλ
γ
+
ρσVB(t)
γ
+
λE(ξY )(1− φE(ξY ))−γ
γ
exp(B(t)E(ξV )) (5.14)
where B(t) solves the differential equation
B′(t)− 1
2
γφ2(1− γ) + 1
2
σ2VB
2(t) + (σV φρ(1− γ)− κλ− β)B(t)
+(η − µλ)(1− γ)φ+ λE(ξY )(1− φE(ξY ))−γexp(B(t)E(ξV )) = 0 (5.15)
with initial conditions
A(T ) = 0, B(T ) = 0
The reason why stochastic arrival intensity and a Cox process were selected is because
they allow the time-varying V terms to be eliminated from the denominators. An
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additional term λVt appears in the numerators of each fraction which leads to (5.14) and
(5.15). The ODE for B(t) is not a Riccati equation and can only be solved numerically.
Setting λ1 = 0 on the other hand (or equivalently defining the arrival rate as λ) turns
the ODE for B(t) into a Riccati equation which can be solved in closed form Branger
and Hansis (2015). However, in the EJP model V can not be eliminated: the absence of
the jump premium in the drift excludes λVt from appearing and the last jumps related
term is multiplied by λ only.
The Liu et al model comes with a set of drawbacks. The selection of a Cox process
does, indeed, produce a numerical solution for portfolio weights and provides a time
variable jump arrival intensity. Nevertheless, estimations of that model in the literature
prove to be extremely rare. Apart from the GMM estimation of Pan (2002), the only
other paper to the knowledge of the thesis that provides parameters for that exact model
is Eraker (2004) using MCMC estimation largely taken from Eraker et al. (2003). In
all the following literature (Branger, Brag, Schneider Hansis etc) the Pan parameters
are the only one used (based on a dataset ending in 1999), with the Eraker parameters
not only having been ignored but also having never been updated. During the PhD an
attempt was made to adapt the code to fit to its stochastic arrival intensity counterpart
and estimate it, but after 100− 200 repetitions the software would crash due to memory
overload issues. On the contrary, the EJP model has been estimated multiple times in
different markets and over different periods, thus providing a verified and tested history
of application and results. In addition, the parameters in Eraker et al. (2003) and Broadie
et al. (2007) have been calibrated in numerous cases (e.g Branger and Hansis (2012,
2015)) to fit the Liu et al. model when needed. At the very least, this demonstrates a
difficulty in getting parameter estimates via MCMC for the stochastic arrival intensity
variation of SVCJ and, given the need to take the financial crisis into account, existing
estimates are inadequate.
A second consideration is the Cox process itself. Even in the early jumps literature
there was evidence for misspecification under stochastic arrival intensity with only
marginal improvements in accuracy at the cost of complexity (Bates (2000)). The main
advancements took place with a constant λ and where time variability was introduced
the model tended to be simpler (e.g constant volatility, as in Wachter (2013). These
remarks highlight analytical and estimation based issues. Also, the (seemingly positive)
relationship between jump frequency and volatility may be intuitive but not necessarily
linear. It is included int he Liu et a model because it leads to a tractable solution for
portfolio weights combined with an ODE for a numerical solution, which translates into
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reverse-engineering convenience. No further argument is offered. Other processes that
can provide similar, or more intuitive, structures are infinite-jump Levy processes, who
are better at capturing small jumps Li et al. (2006) or Hawkes processes (Ficˇura and
Witzany (2015)), who introduce a self-exciting (-feeding) component. The latter is also
related to persistent jumps whose effects dissipate over time. Cox processes are still
instantaneous, are able to attribute a higher jump probability when volatility is higher
but pose estimation difficulties and,most importantly, do not perform better than models
with constant arrival intensity.
5.3.4 Characteristics, properties and values of the EJP
solution
This section discusses the key features of the portfolio weight. The weights are time
invariant, are derived by annualised log parameters and to reach a closed form solution a
substitution is required.
Two important observations about the optimal solution defined by (5.9) and (5.10)
are, first, that the optimal weight is expressed in log terms and, second, that the V term
in the denominator is stochastic. On the first remark, the ”log” parameters are estimated
by log returns leading to ”log” weights. This is the reason why there are no Ito terms
in the expressions that contain the drift parameters. The estimation issues discussed
in the previous section eliminate the option of using arithmetic returns, and therefore
the only alternatives are either to apply Ito’s lemma and turn the ”log” parameters to
their arithmetic counterparts or use the parameters and weights as they are, calculate
portfolio total log returns at a later stage and apply an exponential part to remove the
logarithm. Here, the second method is used due to its simplicity and intuition, especially
since the actual equity premia are of no interest. For completeness, the Ito terms increase
both SVCJ and SV weights while keeping their difference the same. Since the results are
shown to depend on the difference of the weights rather their absolute values, using log
or arithmetic processes is of no particular consequence.
In order to circumvent the second issue and derive a proper solution, the thesis follows
the approach in Branger and Hansis (2012), where the EJP and Broadie et al. (2007)
parameters are adapted from the EJP to the Liu et al formulation. This is achieved
first by annualisation, and second by setting Vt equal to its long-run average. That can
be V = θ + µV λ/κ, for the annualised parameters. This allows the elimination of the
denominator terms and leads to a tractable closed-form solution under constant arrival
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intensity. It must be emphasised that Branger and Hansis (2012) use that substitution to
transform the estimated value of λ in (5.1− 5.2) into a value that would correspond to
(5.11−5.12). The idea, and novelty, to use V instead of Vt in the optimal weights solution
was conceived independently and, in the process, that application was discovered which
now acts as a more solid methodological foundation. A set of simulations showed that the
long-run value is a reasonable approximation for V. It also agrees with similar long-run
volatilities used and estimated in the cited literature. Finally, the same literature does
not mention any distortion from the approximation when portfolio weights or equity
premia are discussed. The tests of the thesis were not exhaustive but suggest that using
long-run volatility is realistic.
As an example, for γ = 5 and the SVCJ model, EP = 0.0858 − 0.02 = 0.0658,
V = 0.027 and EP
V
= 2.52. All calculations are done with annualised parameters and
decimals are rounded, so slight differences are to be expected. The calculation of the
diffusive equity premium follows Liu et al. (2003), where the parameter values are
substituted directly into the differential equations for the solution (in essence EP/V
corresponds to η − µλ, following the Liu notation). As discussed above, the Ito term
0, 5Vt in the equity premium does not appear (Branger and Hansis (2012) and Broadie
et al. (2007) for a more detailed discussion on an arithmetic returns - prices - specified
process with options data, where parameters estimated under log prices (returns) are
transformed to their arithmetic returns (flat prices) counterparts, hence an Ito term
appears). Here, EP contains a number of separate terms in other specifications and
expresses a generic premium in log returns terms. There are also marginal differences if
EP is first calculated on the daily parameters and then annualised.
Now that the first two characteristics have been discussed, the straightforward
formula for φ calls for substituting (5.14) in (5.15), which has a closed-form solution.
Unfortunately, the exponential bit remains impossible to circumvent. The resulting
expression is very complicated and does not provide additional intuition, but is the
closest to a closed-form solution this model can have. The only obstacle is a product of
a real and an exponential part that cannot be solved algebraically. However, this is only
a minor failure and the solution presented here is, for all intends and purposes, a closed
form solution.
A very important feature is the fact that the solution is time invariant. The investment
horizon T does not affect the optimal weight at any level, as shown by the plots. It
does not appear in the formulas and it is only used in the terminal conditions B(T)=0,
A(T)=0. Moreover, with horizons spanning from 5 to 9000 the weights were exactly
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the same until a direct vertical drop to 0 when t reaches T in the solution plot. The
results are in line with intuition and demonstrate a clearly more conservative stance
of the investor operating under the SVCJ model (the ”jumps investor”) compared to
the investor operating under the SV model (the ”no jumps investor”). This is the first
time in the thesis that a clear difference between thin (normal) and fat tails emerges,
which validates the needs for a sufficiently complex setup in order to capture the effect
for investors. The stylised facts at play are heteroskedasticity, volatility clustering, rapid
mean reversion of volatility, fat tails and leverage effect. For risk aversion γ = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
the gap keeps expanding even when φ is allowed to be above 1. The strategy is obviously
buy-and-hold, since the numerical value of φ does not change over time and portfolio
rebalancing is not modelled, allowed, considered or predicted. The pronounced differences
between the weights are the generator of the results in the next chapter.
Table C.4 and Figure C.1 in the Appendix present the numerical values for the thesis
and the weights implied by the Eraker et al. (2003) and Liu et al. (2003) parameters, as
well as a plot of the differential equation solution. Additional replications are presented
in Table C.5 of the Appendix. These include combined results of Table 1 in Branger
and Hansis (2012) and Table 1 in Branger and Hansis (2015) focusing on the different
parameters among the EJP and the LLP version (the common parameters are in Table
C.1). In addition, numerical values for average volatility, implied risk-free rates and
equity premia and a numerical mistake are reported. Average volatility is reported in
Branger and Hansis (2012) to be 0.0154, while the value used to calculate λ in Branger
and Hansis (2015) is correct and equal to 0.023. The latter value is easily calculated by
using the annualised parameters provided in the same tables. Another slight discrepancy
is the risk free rate (4− 4.5%), which can only be inferred, and the equity risk premium
(7.32% - 6%). These differences partially explain the erroneous value of average volatility.
Another reason is the inclusion of additional terms of the true and risk-neutral measures
in the formula for average volatility. However, the information given is inadequate and
does not explain the discrepancy between the two papers that use identical models and
parameter values.
The need to switch from daily to annual parameters is also practical. Even when
summary statistics are discussed, the literature tends to perform some sort of annual-
isation. It is therefore needed to allow for easy comparison across papers and make
the reading of results easier. Since the investment horizons will be rather large, annual
parameters are more informative in that context. A reporting case is for θ, which is
turned into
√
252 ∗ θ in Eraker et al. (2003) or Li et al. (2006) etc and then compared
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to that of the sample. Broadie et al. (2007) note a brief but incomplete methodology
as ”scaling some of the parameters by multiplying κ and λ by 252,
√
252 ∗ θ/100 gives
the mean volatility and
√
252 ∗ µV /100 gives the mean jump in volatility”. Branger and
Hansis (2015) provide the clearest treatment of the subject in the Appendix, where they
turn the daily percentage (log) elements first into decimals and then into annual values.
They work directly on the process, dividing dlogSt and dVt by 100 and 100
2 and then
multiplying by 252 and
√
252 respectively. The resulting transformations are 252
100
µ, 252κ,
252
1002
θ, 252
100
σV ,
1
100
µY ,
252
1002
µV ,
1
100
σY , 252λ,
100
252
ρJ , ρ is not altered. The parameters are
turned from daily percentages to annual decimals.
Solutions of the SVCJ model across the same lines can be found in the literature,
but the solution proposed here is the first one that does not resolve to a numerical
approximation. To be more precise, the solution is not completely closed only in the
respect that it contains both real and exponential components in a manner that can not
be fully resolved. Still, it is the closest one can get. As a further example in addition to
the aforementioned papers, Ruan et al. (2013) provide a solution for equity premia, not
portfolio weights, for the SVCJ model with constant arrival intensity and discuss clearly
when there is a closed-form solution of this system, when a numerical approximation is
needed, how the Bellmann equation is derived and/ or Taylor approximated. In the case
of the thesis, the numerical value for the portfolio weight comes from a Solve operation
in Mathematica.
5.4 Summary of results
It is useful to provide a final overview of the results in this chapter. The first result is the
very precise estimate of ρj in the MCMC estimation, which allows for the assumption of
correlated jump sizes to be relaxed. It is estimated to be practically zero with a standard
deviation of 0.003. The result holds for the 1872-2016 and the 2007-2016 periods as
well. All other known estimates of that parameter in the literature, a brief list of which
was given above, are burdened with very high standard deviation. The EJP estimate
of -0.6 has a standard deviation of 1, while the estimate of Brooks and Prokopzcyk is
also close to zero (0.05) but with a much higher standard deviation (0.20) It is the first
time such a precise estimate is given, which allows for the empirical practice of dropping
the parameter altogether to be justified. The other parameters are comparable to the
literature. Leverage effects, according to ρ (-0.6765), are very strong compared to EJP
(-0.4838) but comparable to -0.5811 of Brooks and Prokopzcyk. Jumps in returns , at
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almost −3%, are lower than the 1985 - 2010 estimate of −4.4% but almost double the
non-crisis estimate of EJP. It must be kept in mind that this average jump size is additive
to the diffusion part, and it is sufficient enough to generate negative daily movements up
to −12% or −15% during the simulations presented in the next chapter. As a numerical
example, if a jump of −3% takes place and the diffusive part equals a modest −2% then
the daily return is −5%. If the diffusive part equals 2% only a small negative ”jump” is
recorded.
The second major contribution is the solution for optimal portfolio weights, which is
almost in closed form. Until now the literature had to choose between a Cox process for
jumps, tied to outdated or adapted parameters, and a constant arrival intensity burdened
by approximate solutions but with a tractable record of parameter estimates. For all
intends and purposes, the suggested solution of substituting Vt with its long-run mean
was adopted before a similar approach was encountered in the literature. Branger and
Hansis (2012) use the idea in a different context and are interested only in adapting
the EJP parameters, not in portfolio weights. The context of the PhD is different and
expands the methodology one step before a complete solution (which is impossible, as
stated, because of the form of the formula for φ. To the best of the PhD’s knowledge,
this is the first time this method has been applied and therefore it may represent an
important contribution.
A third result is the clear difference between an investor that optimises his allocation
while taking jumps into account and an investor that ignores them. This is an evolution
from the previous chapters but hardly a surprising finding, apart from the magnitude.
The differences between the two cases are significant, persistent and divergent across a
range of reasonable degrees of risk aversion. It is also beyond any reasonable statistical
or numerical mistake and transformation, in the sense that a modest difference in equity
premia, volatility or parameter estimates will not be enough to reverse the observed
difference. The effect of the financial crisis and its inclusion in the sample can also be
detected when the SVCJ weights are compared to those derived from the EJP parameter.
The weights difference between the SV and SVCJ cases is more pronounced. A final
remark is the behaviour of the model when periods of high volatility and/ or frequent
jumps are introduced. The model tends to trade volatility with jump frequency, as
shown in the comparison across papers. In the pre-crisis period λ is higher than in the
(post-)crisis period while volatility parameters are lower. Jump sizes, on the other hand,
are significantly increased. This means that the model does not require a high arrival
intensity to generate small and medium sized jumps because volatility is sufficiently high
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for that. More vicious movements, however, are represented by both higher volatility
and higher jump means. The final point is the list of tables and results replicated (and
mistakes noted), which demonstrates correct application and technical aptitude.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has derived the parameters of the main model, compared the estimated
parameters with the literature and calculated a first set of estimates. The inclusion of the
financial crisis period was shown to push the volatility related parameters upwards and
jump frequency downwards, because the model can generate sufficient large movements
with fewer jumps on average. Jumps were also found to be greater. The most important
result was the zero estimate on jump size correlation,which enables the relaxation of the
assumption that volatility and returns jump sizes are related. This is the most accurate
estimation in the literature and provides justification for a practice used by other papers,
due to the extreme difficulty in estimating that parameter.
The most important contribution of the chapter is the derivation of a closed-form
solution for a class of models that, up to now, had only numerical solutions. A discussion
behind the mechanics of SVCJ variations showed that, for reverse-engineering purposes,
a stochastic jump frequency would lead to a convenient formula for portfolio weights.
For that reason, the Liu et al. (2004) specification is popular in jumps portfolia literature
despite the outdated parameters commonly used. The thesis provided an alternative
for the Eraker et al. (2003) formulation, leading to a closed-form Riccati equation and
optimal weights solution. This enabled the calculation of optimal, time-invariant portfolio
weights for the SVCJ and SV models that result in a buy-and-hold strategy and show a
clear preference for the SV investor for riskier positions. The higher the degree of risk
aversion the greater the distance between the two allocations and the amount of wealth
invested in the risky asset.
Further discussion dealt with the interpretation and importance of jumps in low-
frequency series. Parameter behaviour was comparable to that of daily frequency but with
somewhat lower accuracy, while jumps were found to be present at a 20% probability on
an annual basis. This shows that jumps can be a powerful interpretative tool regardless
of frequency, but great care must be taken when discretization bias is taken into account.
This paves the way for the next chapter, where investor and manager behaviour will
be discussed. The approach is similar to that of Chapter 3, where a set of simulations
was conducted based on a set of optimal weights. This chapter estimated the model
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that will generate the data, derived the optimal weighs and discussed their properties,
and established the clear differentiation and robustness of the results. Chapter 6 can
now proceed to the main contribution of the thesis. Stochastic models with jumps have
already been discussed in the literature, but it may be useful to justify the selected
variation
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Chapter 6
Investor and managerial incentives to ignore jumps
While the previous chapter laid the technical foundations of the thesis, the present
chapter presents the main findings. Chapter 5 provided the parameter estimates for the
investor and the optimal portfolio allocation he would select. It provided the mechanics
upon which this chapter will study investor and managerial incentives, the motives for
both actors and their relative performance. The derivation of a closed-form solution
for portfolio weights allows for an easy comparison between each case. Of particular
importance is the effect of the investment horizon on incentives, an element not discussed
in the literature
The emphasis is now on investor and managerial performance and incentives with
and without jumps, and to identify if there is a motive to do so in the long run. The new
element is the mutual or hedge fund manager. Contrary to the investor, who receives
utility from investment wealth, the fund manager receives utility from administration
and performance fees which rely on portfolio returns. An essential assumption is that the
data generating process contains jumps and that fact is known to both the manager and
the investor - they are free to select whether to take the jumps into consideration by using
the SVCJ weights in their portfolio allocation, or ignoring them and deliberately use the
SV weights. The thesis explores the case of potential moral hazard, where the manager
is motivated to undertake excess risk by ignoring jumps in order to attain higher fees.
This is in contrast to the stated goals of the investor, and the study of such attitude is
one of the main contributions in both portfolio optimisation and the hedge/ mutual fund
literature. As shown in the literature review, there is no explicit discussion on how jumps
affect investor and managerial incentives or how (if) they affect moral hazard issues
between the two. The final part of the thesis will isolate jumps as a factor and make a
contribution by answering that exact question. The type of managers to be discussed are
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mutual and hedge fund managers. Despite their differences, the investment activities they
partake are comparable and have a strong presence in bond and equity markets. Also,
despite the multiple trading strategies undertaken by hedge funds, it is still intuitive to
use a simple fund as example where an amount is invested in bonds and an amount in the
market portfolio under an index tracking or market neutral strategy. Another argument
is the fact that one cannot be more diversified than the market portfolio. Studying the
interplay between momentum or uncovered options trading and jumps risk is beyond the
scope of the thesis, although it is a relevant subject. What is of interest is the reward
structure of a hedge fund manager, and how an option-type compensation creates a set
of incentives directly related and affected by extreme event risk.
Managerial incentives are often absent while in the latter they do not include rare
events and jumps in asset prices. Two exceptions are liquidity risk (which, as Liu et al.
(2003) discuss, is equivalent to jump risk because both do not allow for an instant
recalibration of portfolia) and downside risk, which is discussed in a very different context.
The new background element in this section is the hedge and mutual fund literature.
The starting point of the thesis was portfolio optimisation, and in order to keep on that
trajectory the discussion of the literature will focus specifically on managerial incentives
and some technical considerations. In addition, the sole investor case is examined on
incentive grounds. The process is a simulation based on the SVCJ parameters and
optimal allocations of the previous chapter and the technical aspects are the definition of
the measure of win and the payoff structure of the fund manager. All these issues will be
discussed in detail.
6.1 Mutual and hedge funds literature review
6.1.1 Academic literature
The first thing to note is that there is no particular need to apply risk disregard at a
managerial level. Traders in a firm or in their separate divisions are perfectly capable of
supporting the argument. Unfortunately, the literature around trader compensation can
be summarised as follows: there is no literature. There is a vast and multifaceted literature
on manager compensation and incentives in other industries (services, manufacturing etc),
particularly CEO benefits, but with a notable difference. These schemes must be publicly
announced, which allows for close monitoring and large numbers of data available. On
the contrary, trader contracts are private agreements with varying structures and are
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very rarely discussed, announced or disclosed. In the hedge fund industry in particular,
the only information available to the public is the fee structure of the fund. Unavoidably,
the literature focuses on a fund manager, not at trader, level.
Two thorough resources are the hedge literature reviews by El Kalak et al. (2016a)
and El Kalak et al. (2016b), which focus specifically on managerial characteristics and risk
management styles. Because the papers provide a very clear and thorough classification
and listing of results, only a summary will be provided with focus on managerial incentives.
A clear break between optimistic early literature and pessimistic, cautious late research
can be found, where doubt is cast on the claim that higher performance is linked to
higher incentive fees. When a more complex set of incentives (deltas, watermarks etc) is
considered, a positive relationship is established. Reputation costs and self investment
in the fund can limit a manager’s risk appetite. Managerial discretion (high lock-ups,
fewer restrictions) is also found to be positively related to returns, while experience is
negatively correlated as is leads to more conservative investments. A key contribution
comes from Schwarz (2007) and Liang and Schwarz (2011), where it is noted that ”the
higher the investor outflow restrictions the lower is the closure likelihood and greater
performance loss over time. High pay-performance deltas are not strong enough to
prevent overinvestment. Management and incentive fees are correlated with lock-up
periods reducing the cross-sectional fee variation. Negative relationship between funds
of hedge fund performance and incentive fees. Large funds charge higher fees and are
more likely to raise fees level. Investors do not view fee levels as a signal of future fund
performance.”
Giannetti and Metzger (2015) highlight that exact difficulty by stating that ”this
is the first paper to explore the structure of compensation for non-executive employees
in the financial sector”. Contract information at a trader/ employee level is simply
not available. Similar information on at a managerial level is available at an empirical,
industry level. Given the circumstances, the literature review will make a brief reference
on tangent issues discussed in contemporary corporate-related papers and will then
proceed into a targeted discussion of hedge and mutual fund research. The two pillars are
managerial incentives and risk assessment, and it will be shown that there is ample space
for both a technical and a conceptual contribution. For CEO compensation, Frydman
and Jenter (2010) provide a comprehensive review.
Nikolov and Whited (2014) is a typical example of a study focusing on a manager
that is compensated by an equity share and a cash performance fee, a structure that
is not applicable to hedge fund managers. The focus on conflict between agents (the
93
CHAPTER 6. INVESTOR AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES TO IGNORE
JUMPS
investor and the CEO, or between management and ownership) is well documented in
the corporate literature where different payment fees are examined. These include flat
bonuses, share ownership, options, performance measures etc. Another fitting string of
literature is managerial compensation for risk taking. Leisen (2015) uses a continuous
time model (without jumps) to study a risk-averse manager who chooses the level of risk
(volatility) of a company share. The amount of risk undertaken is capped and the firm
has outstanding debt so the probability of default exists. The manager compensation
structure is a fixed amount plus a claim to a bonus payment which is based on terminal
asset values. The option type compensation is similar to that of a hedge fund but
relies on terminal wealth, not on returns. Another difference is the existence of debt
- a corporate feature - and the cap on risk. An argument could be made on trader
discipline, but empirical assessments might prove that moot. In addition, risk is not
separated to welcome upside and unwelcome downside, where each case justifies increases
or reductions. The dynamic setup is a bonus.
Danthine and Donaldson (2015) refer again to the difference in incentives between
owners and management, a theme that will also be encountered in the PhD in the
form of moral hazard. The corporate setup leaves little space for direct comparisons,
but the discussion of the ”pay-for-luck” puzzle is relevant: large parts of managerial
compensation seem to relate to factors beyond his control, an effect that is stronger
when returns are positive. This is a clear allusion to exogenous shocks, or jumps in asset
prices, and managerial alphas. Standard incentive theory states that a manager should
be compensated only for what is entirely under his control. The aim of the paper is not
]to find a dynamic general equilibrium, which is not relevant to this chapter, but the
conclusion that the manager could be tied to the company in some way ensures that his
interests are more aligned to those of the shareholders.
Aivaliotis and Palczewski (2014) is the paper closest to the idea pursued in the
thesis, but with some very significant differences. A manager that applies mean-variance
optimisation on a continuous time process with constant mean and volatility is introduced.
The manager optimises the portfolio allocation according to the mean-variance criterion
which depends upon a random amount of compensation. With continuous monitoring of
performance, the manager’s compensation is proportional to the cumulative future value of
the difference between the portfolio return and the benchmark return. when performance
and compensation depend only on terminal wealth, the manager’s compensation is
proportional to the difference between the portfolio return and the benchmark return.
The main contribution of the paper is a method different than the discretisation and
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numerical solution of a Bellman equation, which leads to the conclusion that terminal-
based fees lead to more conservative behaviour and better performance compared to
constant monitoring. It is one of the very few pieces of research that discuss the behaviour
of a fund manager or provide a mathematical background. However, the context is
drastically different as there are no empirical links particularly for compensation schemes,
jumps are not considered and there is only one agent, the manager, with only one
criterion.
Bali et al. (2012) identify the importance of different constituents of systemic risk
in hedge fund returns and explicitly refer to tail risk. The methodology is, however,
regressions where the explanatory power of skewness and kurtosis is tested. Given the
modelling advancements in other areas of finance incorporated here, the approach is
severely limited and the conclusion that tail risk has small explanatory power does not
hold. Nevertheless, evidence is found that idiosyncratic risk plays an important role in
fund returns. In CAPM terms a hedge fund is not market neutral but is affected by the
manager’s attitude and skill, expressed by alpha. Morton et al. (2006) discuss downside
risk in funds-of-hedge-funds and establish non-normality in returns. Meligkotsidou and
Vrontos (2008) test for structural breaks but their dataset ends before the financial crisis,
so they rely on isolated cases and bubbles to replicate those breaks. The Bayesian method
they employ is able to track previously undetected breaks and provide some insight in
the differences across funds in terms of strategies and risk exposure.
Giannikis and Vrontos (2011) expand on non-linear exposures to various risk factors,
finding that those exposures are asymmetric and that ignoring certain thresholds may
lead to misinterpreting alpha. Fung and Hsieh (2011) report that ”empirical analysis
finds persistent net exposures to the spread between small vs large cap stocks in addition
to the overall market [for long/short hedge funds]. Together, these factors account for
more than 80% of return variation. Additional factors are price momentum and market
activity”. Downside risk and rare events are absent from the reasoning of the paper.
For managerial incentives, there is a break in the literature where very positive
attitudes towards managerial skill in early ’00, driven by strong hedge fund performance,
are substituted by more sceptical work particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Early work includes Carpenter (2000), who discuss the implications of the option-type fees
structure. The paper considers Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion utility in particular
where the manager is given a call option on assets under management. Its value is
found to end up either deep in or deep out of the money. As the asset value goes to
zero, volatility goes to infinity. Risk attitude is not as straightforward, as sometimes the
95
CHAPTER 6. INVESTOR AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES TO IGNORE
JUMPS
manager’s optimal choice of risk is lower than if we was individually trading. Bollen and
Whaley (2009) bring manager authority to the forefront and how strategy is dictated.
The focus is on exposures to risk which are perceived as constant when they are in fact
time-varying, a disparity that may lead to incorrect measures and abnormal returns.
When the related parameters change significantly, the constant alphas are a misleading
indicator of performance.
Patton and Ramadorai (2013) make a modelling contribution based on conditional
parameters, where returns follow a CAPM formulation but the beta is stochastic. Various
time effects are discussed and high responsiveness to market signals and seasonality in
the behaviour of parameters is found. Agarwal et al. (2009) are more specific in the
link between incentives and discretion. For incentives they use a mixture of option-type
compensation structures, ownership and performance thresholds (watermarks) and find
that administrative and managerial liberties and provisions play an important role in
performance. The nonlinearity of those incentives, who are typically expressed by alpha,
creates a nexus of endogenous incentives that affect both leverage and performance
measures. This acts as another verification of the need to look beyond returns, fees
structures and standard risk exposures in order to have a better understanding of
managerial decision making in hedge funds. When high watermarks are combined with
incentives (measured by delta), performance is better. Lim et al. (2016) provide a
useful introduction to a mechanism that is used in this chapter, that of capital inflows
and outflows that affect both the amount of future fees and the attitude of managers.
The importance of a wider array of factors is verified again, but the importance is the
link between performance monitoring and immediate reward (punishment) via capital
movement, the connection between the labour market and this monitoring and how this
scrutiny alters the behaviour of the managers. There is a clear link to signaling and
incentives literature but this goes somewhat beyond the scope of the thesis.
Yin (2016) refers the important area of conflict of interest between management
and investors. While the same disparity has been well documented in the corporate
finance literature, similar effects are found when the size of the hedge fund is taken into
consideration. Since fees are a percentage of wealth, a manager has the incentive to
increase assets under management even at the expense of performance. This creates a
different kind of conflict that is not based on compensation schemes per se.
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6.1.2 Current prospects according to the industry
Although there is agreement on the structure of hedge fund fees, the standard ”2+20”
scheme has started to change in recent years.
Fortado (2016) reports considerations from fund managers that ”2+20” is no longer
sustainable, in light of both lower returns and higher flexibility. Only the biggest funds
are now able to maintain these levels, with others offering discounts on rates after
a period or amount, more choices on fee schemes or straight reductions. Long-term
funds are willing to reduce the flat administration fee, while funds that use algorithm
trading provide reductions on both management and performance fees. On average, for
established funds the structure is 1.65 + 18% while for new ones it is 1.5 + 17.5%. Apart
from competition and low performance across the industry, another reason is a shift in
more passive strategies, which challenges the willingness and need for a performance fee.
The effect on managerial stance is apparent, with a recorded shift towards transparency
and promotion of unique skill and investment strategy.
Further information on the subject has been published in reports from Barclays and
Prequin. The Preqin (2017) Hedge Fund Management Outlook (March 2017) contains
a sample of 276 hedge fund managers who state a recent improvement of their fees
which they would like to see continued, although they also record investor demand for
lower fees as both being very high and the second most important business challenge,
after performance. Hedge funds are expected to attract less capital in 2017, which
would normally increase pressure, yet the industry outlook remains positive. With
respect to fee levels, the majority now charges administration (management) fees of
1.50− 1.99% (41%) contrary to 2% (35%) and the trend is increasing. The industry
mean is at 1.56%, where new funds charging 2% have reduced to 30%. A similar pattern
is detected in the performance fee, but 20% remains popular as 73% of all funds charge
it. The number of funds that apply lower commissions than the older staples has been
increasing over the last 3 years. According to the report, the challenge is on how that
level of performance fees is implemented and justified, rather than negotiating its height.
Ways to compensate or reassure investors include hurdle rates, high watermarks and
clawback terms. The first tool is used by 4 out of 5 managers while the third option
by only 1 out of 10, with an additional 1 considering it. Some research on the terms
and conditions of major hedge funds shows that they still charge 2+20 (e.g. Aberdeen),
with one exception being Winton who reduced fees from 1+20 to 0.90+16 for its major
funds. Based on market reports, smaller funds are unable to maintain those levels. For
the needs of the PhD, this calls for alternative structures which are described in the
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remainder of this chapter.
The Barclays (2017) Global Hedge Fund Industry Outlook and Trends (February)
holds similar conclusions. 2016 has been the first year of net outflows since the financial
crisis, and the trend since 2011 of underperformance compared long-only indices still
carries on, with a reduced gap. The premium over LIBOR has been 3.5% for Long-Term
funds since 2010. Low industry performance lead to the majority of funds missing their
annual targets, where high investor expected returns were combined with average realised
volatility being lower than average target volatility. The best performing were those more
diversified and with low management clutter (e.g. few acting managers). Smaller funds
performed better than large ones and investors generally paid lower fees, with differences
between funds and strategies. Equities have been the most pressured, where the report
cites reduced demand and an ”investor’s market” as reason. The most resilient were
Quant Equity, Fixed Income Relative Value, and Multi-Strategy hedge funds, due to
capacity constraints, higher costs and market dynamics. Larger investors, and those
with sufficiently large positions in a fund, are more able to get concessions in the form
of reduced fees and preferential terms. Banks and family offices, on the contrary, are
much less likely to provide discounts than hedge funds. This attitude is not limited
to large funds, but increasingly to small funds as well. Reduced fees for longer locks
and/ or larger tickets are the most ordinary forms of discounts but hurdles and limits on
pass-through expenses have become more common.
6.1.3 Summary
Important observations can be made in the aftermath of the review. From a technical
point of view, continuous time specifications are rare in the hedge and mutual fund
literature. The research aims in the area are served by different models and when there
is a stochastic element it is not necessarily translated to a diffusion, let alone a jump
diffusion. This leaves space for a contribution in that particular field just by employing the
SVCJ model. It is noteworthy that no study was found where jump diffusion parameters
(MCMC based or otherwise) were used or estimated in a hedge and mutual fund context.
Given that multi-asset setups are present in the literature, there is an important gap to
be covered on modelling grounds.
As a conclusion, managerial incentives and risk factors play a central role in the
hedge and mutual fund literature. It was underlined that the option-type compensation
creates an environment where the manager is prone to optimise his personal payoff at the
expense of the investor. This in turn affects the performance and structure of the fund,
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especially if further discretion of the manager are considered. The main interpretative
variable is a manager’s alpha and how it affects returns and reputation. This is an
important foundation for the research question examined in this chapter, since the direct
link between risk taking and managers’ attitudes does not discuss jumps. The exposures
to risk factors, linear or not and time-varying or not, ignores rare events and the extent
to which they pose a serious consideration for the manager. Rare events are not modelled,
used or regarded as an important factor in decision making. This is the gap that the PhD
intends to cover, and in a multi-faceted way. Compared to the fields discussed in the
previous chapters, hedge fund research uses different (and, when comparable, simpler)
tools what do not consider leverage effects or heteroskedasticity, does not often employ
stochastic models and looks into risk-taking from a practical, managerial perspective
rather than linked to portfolio allocation and asset pricing literature. This is not a
deficiency per se but leaves much ground to be covered on how certain factors are
introduced.
Thus, the contribution of this chapter is, first, to bring the results and intuition of
MCMC estimation in an SVCJ model to fund management, second, connect jump risk
to manager payoff and third, establish whether there is an incentive to undertake excess
risk and potentially cause moral hazard issues.
6.2 General setup
It is useful to establish a methodology before the simulations are introduced. The process
will be two-fold, first focusing on the investor and his incentive to ignore jumps and
afterwards on the manager. In the previous chapter it was established that there is an
important difference in optimal portfolio weights with and without jumps. The aim
now it to show that this difference creates an informed reason to take on additional risk
in the hope that a severe negative outcome will not be realised before the end of the
investment. In the case of the investor this is stated as comparing the performance of an
investor that takes jumps into account to one who does not, under different measures of
performance. The case of the manager is more complex. Both he and the investor have
the same power utility function, but the manager receives utility from fees measured at
regular intervals while the investor from the terminal wealth of the investment. Given
the lack of data, an assumption based on corporate grounds is made: both managerial
and trader (employee) payments follow the same scheme, which is a flat administrative
fee plus a performance fee when the portfolio returns exceed a threshold. This is the
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same as the publicly announced fee paid by the investor. The corporate argument is
uniformity in payment schemes for discipline, equity and comparison purposes. The
manager, in essence, is given two possible choices of portfolio weights from the investor,
or equivalently he performs the same maximisation exercise as in the previous chapter
on behalf of his client (it must be noted that his fees are not part of the maximisation).
6.3 Jumps and the investor
The simulation for the investor is arranged as follows. A time series of daily log returns
is generated by using the SVCJ model and daily percentage parameters. Total returns
on the risky asset are then used to calculate portfolio returns of a portfolio consisting of
a share and a risk-free asset with return r = 2% annually. Jumps are thus present in the
path of the risky asset and the portfolio, a fact that is known to the investor. In the first
case the portfolio uses the optimal weight from the SVCJ model, wJ , thus taking jumps
into account. In the second case, the investor knowingly chooses to ignore them and uses
the weight from the SV model, w. The measures of win in the horse race are terminal
wealth, average terminal utility and number of wins for each investor. The length of the
investment period is 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 24 and 30 years, risk aversion γ takes values 2, 3, 4, 5,
starting wealth is W0 = 100 and the utility function is U(W ) =
W 1−γ
1−γ . For a simulation
length of 5.000 the results are accurate, since tests up to 100.000 runs led to the same
results.
Tables D.1.1 - D.1.4 contain the simulation outcomes for the two types of investors.
The result is that the no-jumps investor always wins in terms of wealth but always loses
in terms of utility. This is calculated by taking the difference between average terminal
wealth (utility) for both investors and looking at the sign. The result is persistent across
investment horizons and degrees of risk aversion. The metrics are the number of times
the wealth (utility) of the no-jumps investor is greater than that of the jumps investor
and the difference between the average terminal wealth (utility) of the no-jumps and
the jumps-investor The percentage of wins ranges from 62% to 80% in favour of the
No-Jumps investor as the investment horizon ranges from 2 to 30 years, and is the same
across all values of γ. The percentage of wealth and utility wins is the same because
wealth is calculated at the end of the investment and used to calculate terminal utility.
Thus, an investor who is interested in terminal wealth only has a major motive to ignore
jumps in portfolio allocation. An investor who is interested in utility has, on the other
hand, a motive to take jumps into consideration when allocating wealth.
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6.4 Jumps and the manager
The structure for the manager is more complicated. As stated before, the manager
knows that jumps exist and decides whether to ignore them or not in order to achieve
higher fees. The fee structure consists of a flat administration fee and a performance
fee whenever portfolio returns exceed 10%. The administration fee is calculated on
annual portfolio wealth (value) and, after it is deducted, the potential performance fee is
calculated on portfolio profits and deducted as well. To avoid complexities with average
portfolio wealth during the course of each year, only initial and terminal wealth values
are used. The remaining wealth is the starting wealth of each period until the end of
the investment. Each year’s fee is used to calculate the utility of the manager, who
uses exactly the same function as the investor. This ensures that any results cannot be
attributed to differences in preferences, risk aversion or the shape of utility. Simulations
where average portfolio wealth during each year was used provided very similar results
that had only a marginal effect on numerical values so the simpler method was adopted.
The scheme of managerial compensation is 2 + 20 and 1 + 10 in percentage terms.
Fees between or beyond these limits, such as 1 + 20 or 0.5 + 10 exhibit similar patterns as
the fees of choice because the flat administration fee increases compensation horizontally
while the performance fee scales smoothly between 10 and 20%. A fee such as 1+15 will,
therefore, be slightly higher than 1+10 and a fee of 2+10 will be slightly lower than
2+20. A set of preliminary simulations was run to establish that conclusion. Since the
results were very similar and to avoid repetition, no full results for intermediate schemes
are presented, as they are adequately represented by Tables D.2 - D.5. The traditional
choice is 2% administration fee + 20% performance fee, which has been the industry
staple for years. As the literature review has shown, during the last years there has
been a reduction in fees and 2+20 is maintained only by the largest hedge funds. The
combinations used are able to accommodate both observed structures and averages across
industry as well as fees close to mutual funds. These include funds that have selected to
charge low administration fees but maintain a relatively high performance fee, and vice
versa. In addition, portfolio wealth is now affected by negative results. When investors
face losses, some of them may select to move to a fund that has performed better. On
technical grounds this is a way to enhance the trivial result obtained by a straightforward
introduction of managerial fees. The manager does not get penalised in a way and will
always receive his administration fee, so the differentiating criterion is how many times
the fund will exceed the threshold. When portfolio weights that ignore jumps are used,
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the exposure to the risky asset is greater and, trivially, the jumps manager will exceed the
threshold more times than the no jumps manager. When wealth transfer is introduced,
there is a flow of capital from the ”losing”, worse-performing fund to the ”winning”,
better performing one. One fund’s loss is the other fund’s gain, which is calculated on
annual performance.
This calls for the definition of a wealth transfer function that determines the amount
of wealth to change funds. This is
f(x) =

−10 f(x) ≤ 0
−exp(−δ1x) + 1 x ≤ 0
exp(δ2x)− 1 x ≥ 0
10 f(x) ≥ 10
where x is the relative performance of the funds and is defined as rNJ − rJ , where
rNJ,J is the percentage return of the each portfolio. The function f(x) demonstrates
positive inflow/ negative outflow from the no-jumps fund into the jumps fund. δ1, 2
is a parameter that defines the curvature of the function and its economic meaning is
the sensitivity of wealth transfers to differences in fund performance. For a symmetric
function, δ = δ1 = δ2 and for the needs of the thesis it is arbitrarily set equal to 0.25,
while in the case of asymmetry δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.25. This makes investors on the no-jumps
fund to be more sensitive to relative bad performance than to good performance. The
function is barred at 10% and −10% to prevent extreme changes of value. For the
asymmetric case, the upper bound remains the same but the lower bound is set to −15%.
This produces a stronger reaction when relative losses are observed. Another possible
candidate would be a sigmoid function such as the logistic function f(x) = 1
1+e−x , but
properly adapted. A form which would yield a similar shape with different curvature
properties would be
f(x) = α(
1
1 + e−δx
− 0.5)
for α = 20, δ = 0.5. The function passes from 0, is asymptotic or at least very slowly
increasing, but also symmetric - for asymmetries to be introduced a piecewise sigmoid
for different δs is needed. In practice the result is the same. The plots can be found in
the Appendix (Figure D.1 - D.3).
The setup of the managerial simulations is as follows. Two funds are considered,
one where the manager has chosen to use the SVCJ portfolio weights and one where
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the manager uses the SV ones. Since the weights are time invariant, the strategy is
buy-and-hold until the end of the investment. The portfolio consists of a risky and a
risk-free asset with return r = 2%. A path of daily log returns is simulated by using
the SVCJ parameters (since the existence of jumps is known to both managers) and
then split into annual segments. End-of-year wealth, profits, fees and transfer of wealth
are calculated in that order, which determines the starting wealth of next period. The
measures are average total fees for each manager, average aggregate total terminal utility
for each investor and average total terminal utility for each manager.
The simulation outcome can be found in the collected Tables D.2,D.3,D.4,D.5. Tables
D.2.1 - D.2.4 present the results for γ = 5, Tables D.3.1 - D.3.4 for γ = 4, Tables D.4.1 -
D.4.4 for γ = 3 and Tables D.5.1 - D.5.4 for γ = 2. Odd-numbered tables refer to the
2+20 scheme and even-numbered tables to the 1+10 scheme. The first two tables have a
symmetric wealth transfer function, while the last two an asymmetric one. The winner
for each horizon is marked by blue. For γ = 5 and for all other levels of risk aversion, the
manager that does not take jumps into account always wins. The measure of winning in
that case is the total amount of fees amassed by the end of the investment, and at face
value the no-jumps manager can be seen as having an incentive to go after higher total
fees. For the same level of risk aversion, and for all others as well, the investor that takes
jumps into account always wins. The measure of winning is the average total terminal
utility of the investor, which is based on portfolio wealth. This is true for every table
between D.2.1 and D.5.4 regardless of considering a symmetric or asymmetric wealth
transfer function, a different level of γ or the length of the investment horizon. This
result is the same as in the previous section.
Tables D.2.1 and D.2.2 show that the manager that does not consider jumps and uses
the SV weights wins on average for the 2- and 3-year investment horizons but loses in
all subsequent ones. The measure of winning is, again, the average total annual utility
for the manager, which is based on fees. Tables D.2.3 and D.2.4, where an asymmetric
wealth transfer function is used, show that the manager that ignores jumps never wins
on average. For the 5.000 simulations, the manager that considers jumps wins only
36% of the runs for the 2-year horizon under the 2+20 scheme, with the percentage
slightly increasing up to 39.6% for the 30-year horizon. The result is much different
in the asymmetric case of Tables D.2.3 - D.2.4, where the same manager wins 37% of
the runs for the 2-year horizon but gradually increases the rate up to 72− 75% for the
30-year horizon. In Tables D.3.1 - D.3.2 the winning horizons for the manager that
ignores jumps are the 2- and 3-year ones, with the percentage of wins for the manager
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that considers jumps being 33− 36% across the tables. Tables D.3.3 and D.3.4 show the
same pattern as Tables D.2.3 and D.3.4, only now the manager that ignores jumps wins
the shortest horizon on average. The patters are largely the same, with slightly reduced
win percentages, for tables D.4.1 - D.4.4. Tables D.5.1 - D.5.4, for the lowest value of
γ, show the longest winning horizons for the manager that ignores jumps in both the
symmetric (2 to 10 years) and the asymmetric case (2 to 5 years), as well as the lowest
winning percentages for the manager that considers jumps.
The results show a clear incentive for the manager to ignore jumps in terms of fees.
Across the same horizons, fee levels, wealth transfer patterns and risk aversion levels as
before, the no-jumps manager always amasses a higher amount of fees on average. The
investor, on the other hand, follows the same pattern as before, with a clear and constant
win of the no-jumps investor in terms of wealth but a loss in terms of utility. The results
are consistent across the board. Managerial utility is more complicated. For all levels
of γ the No Jumps manager wins for short horizons and loses for longer horizons. For
decreasing risk aversion and the same wealth transfer function, the winning period ranges
from 2 to 10 years. For the same level of risk aversion, a change in the fees structure has
no effect on the winning period. However, when the symmetric and asymmetric wealth
transfer functions are compared, the winning horizon is shorter for the asymmetric case
given the same γ.
The situation is reversed when the number of wins is considered. Here, the no-jumps
manager has a significant chance to win across the table for every investment horizon.
Although he loses on average terms in the symmetric case across all tables, the probability
of winning a single run (measured as the number of wins for the entire set of simulations)
ranges between 60% − 70%, depending on risk aversion. This means that, even if his
expected outcome is in favour of taking jumps into account, he still has a very high
probability of receiving more benefit for a single run. The reason for this discrepancy lies
at the tails of the distribution of terminal utility. Histograms D.4 and D.5 compare the
Jumps and the No Jumps utility samples and show that the vast majority of realisations
are concentrated close to zero but the long tail dominates. It contains very low values
that cannot be covered by the more frequent realisations. The tail exists for all γs and
does not depend on the level of initial wealth. Simulations conducted with W=1 led to
the same results and the same distribution for managerial utility. Also, the tail is quite
pronounced under the modest 1+10 scheme for a long investment horizon and symmetric
wealth transfer function. The shape persists across the various combinations of T, γ and
fee schemes. When the wealth transfer function is asymmetric, the probability of the
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no-jumps manager to win starts off at 60% − 70% for a horizon of 2 years, gradually
diminishes and is reversed for longer horizons, where the jumps-investor wins both on
average and more frequently. The result is, again, consistent across levels of risk aversion
and shows how for longer horizons the No Jumps manager loses both on average and in
percentage.
A further result is the effect of assuming a symmetric or asymmetric wealth transfer
function and its economic meaning. It appears to have a more significant effect on the
manager’s outcome than risk aversion, investment horizons and fee structures. For the
same structure and risk aversion, fees make no difference. For the same fees and risk
aversion, the manager has a much stronger incentive under symmetric wealth transfer.
As risk aversion decreases, the manager has an incentive to ignore jumps for horizons
from 2 to 5 years as opposed to the 10-year limit under symmetry. The outcome that the
shorter the horizon the greater the motivation is valid, but different fee structures do not
appear to magnify or dampen down its strength. What does is how investors react to
positive or negative results. Asymmetry in that context implies more violent movements
in bad results, which in the case of the no-jumps manager implies greater exposure to
risk. Investors with symmetric reactions weigh wins and losses equally, while asymmetric
reactions mean higher downside risk aversion (the relevant literature has been discussed
in the appropriate chapter of the thesis). This is obvious across all tables D.2 − D.5
but particularly for γ = 2 (Table D.5), which is combined with the longest horizon and
managerial incentive.
6.5 Conclusion and summary of results
The findings show a clear incentive for both the investor and the manager to take excess
risk. If the investor is concerned about terminal wealth, he is bound to win more often
and on average compared to the more conservative investor that does not ignore jumps.
On the other hand, if utility is the measure of win, the jumps-investor always wins on
average. The technical reason for that is that the optimisation process was conducted on
utility basis, so the weights of the SV model are suboptimal when the time series contains
jumps. The economic intuition is that, no matter how long the investment horizon,
the investor is always worse-off in terms of utility but may choose, either deliberately
or because of myopic decision making, to focus on wealth instead. In any case the
motivation is there, and the result holds across all levels of risk aversion, initial wealth
and investment horizons.
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When a more complex structure and a fund manager is introduced, the same intuition
holds for the investor. Here, however, the portfolio allocation decision belongs to the
manager who makes a choice based on his fees and utility. Total fees are always in
favour of the no-jumps manager, a fact that poses a clear incentive from many sides -
absolute compensation, reputation, performance measures etc. The manager’s utility is
more ambiguous. While in the short run the no-jumps manager wins both in terms of
income and utility, in the mid-to-long run the jumps catch up to him leading to worse
performance compared to the more disciplined jumps manager. A manager that focuses
on the short-run for a short-term investment has a very clear motivation to act against
the investor’s interests and take a more aggressive position. For longer term investments,
the manager will choose the same if he only considers the short-run, and even if he takes
utility into account he still has roughly 60% chance to achieve a good result. The policy
implication is that short-term goals and perspective reduce both individual and client
welfare in the long-run. The results are, again, homogeneous across time horizons, risk
aversion, initial wealth and, this time, managerial compensation schemes.
The differentiating element is, thus, how wealth transfers between the two funds each
time. If investor reaction is symmetrical between wins and losses, the jumps-manager
wins fewer times on average and the winning horizon for the no-jumps manager is longer
than when investor reaction is asymmetrical. As risk aversion increases, the winning
horizon shrinks for both cases and is eliminated in the asymmetric case for γ = 5. High
risk aversion coupled with more severe swings of wealth at losses eliminate any advantages
in utility for the no-jumps manager. Unavoidably, this poses the question of what leads
an investor to have a more severe reaction for downside risk than upside risk, and what
policy suggestions that entails. A first factor is information - an ill-informed or naive
investor will have no reason to assess negative outcomes different than positive ones.
Also, a symmetric function implies that this assessment will lead to identical reactions,
while research focusing on downside risk often finds that investors have stronger reactions
for losses than for wins (flight to quality).
A first policy suggestion is, thus, transparency on behalf of the fund and publishing
sufficient and factual information on investment strategies, portfolio allocation, exposures
to risk factor, products, assets and markets where the fund is currently investing. This
information will allow the investor to monitor fund performance more effectively and
not solely rely on realised profits, as well as plan future movements better. A form of
transparency already applied (Preqin (2017)) is providing investors with a managed
account structure that allows them to track the fund manager’s decisions. Expanding
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similar tools would align investor and managerial attitudes and help the regulator monitor
and supervise the entire industry. Therefore, any policy that makes investors more aware
to the actual risk they are facing in an investment will cause them to withdraw in the
case of increased losses, limiting assets under management for the fund and reducing the
incentive of the manager to undertake and/ or conceal such risk.
Such knowledge is directly related to investor protection (e.g clawbacks) and infor-
mation on the structure of the risky portfolio, and by consequence exposure to risk
factors. The wealth transfer function is a way to import a penalising loss of wealth for
the losing fund, a loss that can be seen not only as a flight of investors but as paybacks
and penalties paid by the fund. A second policy suggestion, supported by the empirical
section of this chapter’s literature review Barclays (2017), is a more thorough integration
and embodiment in legislative procedures of investor protection, such as clawbacks, pref-
erential terms, lock-up periods for fees, fee stratas and discounts, and contract terms in
general. Although fees do play a role in creating an incentive for the manager, the flipside
for the investor is related to preferential terms and cover beyond costs. An investor is
inclined to welcome positive shocks and be more averse to negative shocks. When the
information he receives is such that he is bound to treat those two elements equally,
his reaction will be symmetric. Anything that may cause him to have an asymmetric
reaction will also reduce the incentive for the manager. This penalty, translated here
as movement of wealth, may take various forms (payment buffers, clawbacks, capital
cover etc, regulatory penalties, paybacks) which are tied to regulatory responsibilities
and overall market transparency.
From a regulator’s point of view, direct intervention on compensation schemes is
unlikely to eliminate the incentive for excess risk and align managers and investors. This
includes predetermined quotas or enforced schemes. The effect of such a policy would be
to reduce the total compensation of the manager (which can be seen as a way to reduce his
incentive) but the winning horizon for which that incentive persists is unchanged. Direct
intervention of the policymaker that caps managerial returns is a third policy suggestion,
but its scope is very specific. If the goal is to limit excessive fees in the industry to
protect the investor and limit the absolute amount of managerial compensation, then
there is a reason to apply quotas. If, however, the goal is to remove the moral hazard
issue and eliminate the circumstances in which such a motive exists, then the policy will
be ineffective and probably distorting. Better monitoring, data collection and stricter
obligations on behalf of the fund to provide details on its investment strategies and
allocation will be more efficient. In that way, the regulating authority will be in a better
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position to identify excess risk in the industry and sources of increased risk (or even
a ”piling up” of disaster probabilities), which will in turn enable it to take corrective
measures and inform investors. Investors, in their turn, will adjust their expectations
and attitude accordingly and plan their reactions, thus defining the properties of the
wealth transfer function.
On the other hand, wealth transfers can be seen as penalising the manager because
they reduce portfolio wealth and, therefore, fee margins. Such penalties, like clawbacks,
are more likely to have effects because they are applied directly at a wealth level which
touches upon fund profits. The main issue lies at reducing the moral hazard problem
arising between the aims of the investor and the aims of the manager. For mid- and
long-term investments they are aligned on average, according to terminal utilities. The
strongest incentive manifests when high fees and low risk aversion are combined and the
weakest under low fees and high risk aversion.
More transparency in the terms, in the portfolio structure and more disclosure on
exposure in risky investments (e.g. uncovered derivative positions) will play a crucial role
in reducing excess risk. Also, better communication between the regulatory authority, the
fund and the investors will help in the assessment of the actual risks involved. Another
area of improvement is the regulatory framework and investor protection, as well as the
application of preferential terms and clauses. The first important result of the chapter is
that jump risk was successfully isolated from other sources of risk. It is very important
to highlight that the differences between the investor and the manager are not due to
differences in utility or preferences, since they both use the same function and parameter.
The difference is that the investor’s utility relies on portfolio wealth while the manager’s
on fees. Event risk was found to have a clear, strong effect on managerial appetite for
risk and it was found to provide a motive to ignore rare events in favour of short-term
profits. As the investment horizon lengthens, the incentive vanishes on expected terms
but is retained in percentage terms if investors react the same at wins and losses. If
investors react more intensely at relative losses, the winning horizon for the risky manager
is shorter both on average and in percentage terms. The managerial incentive is, thus,
short- to mid-term and is enhanced by low risk aversion. The crucial factor that causes
differentiation is how investors treat relative losses and how they decide to switch funds.
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Conclusion and further extensions
7.0.1 Results
The thesis is in the pleasant position to report a series of new results from both a technical
and an empirical point of view.
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed to what extent jumps are a necessary technicality for
the research question at hand. Chapter 3 focused on whether fat-tailed distributions
for asset prices were enough to make a difference in decision making on behalf of the
investor. If the investor considered a distribution different than the real one, would there
be a difference in expected utility? The answer was no, both in a single state and a
Markov-state setup with a ”good” and a ”bad state”. The advantage of the investor using
the correct distribution in his decision making was marginal and statistically insignificant.
Therefore, tail risk alone was not enough of a factor to create an incentive to select
a riskier position. The limitations of the setup (singe period optimisation and CARA
utility) were discussed and do play a role in the outcome. Another contribution was
the timing of the jump in a compounding exercise. It was shown that an early jump
would cause terminal wealth to be slightly lower than a mid- or end- period jump. The
result was that even a jump right before the end of the investment would not be enough
to make the investor worse-off, compared to the same jump happening earlier. This
demonstrates the ability of an investment to recover over time.
Having established that tail risk alone does not pose a sufficient motive for the investor
to undertake excess risk, the attention in chapter 4 turned to stochastic volatility. The
goal was to see to what extent jumps and tail risk could be represented by an SV model
and how stylised facts of asset prices could be replicated. The model proved unable to
match excess kurtosis and outliers in the samples, both for the pre-crisis and the crisis
period. Parameter accuracy was smaller in the crisis period but the only significantly
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different estimate was the standard deviation of volatility errors. This is tied to higher
variance in volatility and has also led to higher kurtosis. This kurtosis was still much
lower than the sample kurtosis, and the comparison of absolute returns and smoothed
volatility states revealed that outliers and frequent mid-range jumps were not represented
by volatility. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce jumps explicitly in a stochastic
volatility framework.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the estimation results on the SVCJ model that includes
leverage effects, stochastic volatility and simultaneous jumps in both volatility and
returns. The main results are based on S&P500 daily data from 1980 to 2016 and
secondary results on 2007 - 2017 S&P500 daily data and 1872 - 2016 S&P500 monthly
data. The comparison with two papers estimating the same model with the same time
series at different time spans showed that the model tends to trade volatility with jump
frequency when the financial crisis is introduced in the sample, that leverage effects
become stronger and estimation accuracy is slightly affected. A major result is the very
accurate estimation of the jump size correlation parameter, ρj, to be 0. Other literature
either provides an estimate with very high standard deviation or drops the parameter
altogether claiming estimation problems. The thesis provides a practical reason to drop
the assumption of correlated jump sizes and not rely simply on convenience. Another,
ambiguous, result was that jumps are also present in low-frequency data as well, with
one jump every 5 years on average. The next result is the derivation of closed-form
portfolio weights for this class of models and compare the manipulations to that of
existing solutions. There was a thorough discussion on how stochastic arrival intensity
for jumps is a convenient choice because it leads to tractable closed-form solutions.
Nevertheless, this feat comes with great deficiencies in parameter estimation, MCMC in
particular. Literature that discusses portfolio weights uses stochastic arrival intensity
but literature discussing model fit uses constant intensity, like the PhD. The gap was
bridged by setting volatility equal to its long-run average, a fact that turned an ODE to
a Riccatti equation which, in sequence, has a tractable solution. Although a similar idea
was used in parallel by other papers to transform parameters, this is the first time it was
used for portfolio weights. The optimal allocations for the SVCJ (jumps) and SV (no
jumps) models were very different and therefore not very sensitive to small changes in
the parameters. An investor using the SV model would put a significantly larger part of
his wealth on the risky asset for any level of risk aversion.
Chapter 6 discussed how jumps create incentives for the investor and the manager of
a fund to disregard rare events risk and bet that a jump will not take place before the
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end of the investment, harming their wealth and utility. The data generating process
contained jumps and two types of investor and manager were considered: one who uses
the correct SVCJ weights and one who deliberately uses the SV weights. The same utility
function for both the manager and the investor was used so that any outcome would not
be attributed to individual differences between the two. The manager derives utility from
fees while the investor from portfolio wealth. The measures of win were average terminal
wealth, average terminal utility, percentage number of wins and total amount of fees. In
the first, investor-only simulations, the no-jumps investor would always win in terms of
wealth but always lose in terms of utility, both on average (expected) and on percentage
terms. In the second, investor and manager only simulations, a movement of wealth at
the end of each year from the losing to the winning fund was introduced. The results for
the investor remained the same. The no-jumps manager was found to always have an
incentive in terms of absolute fees to ignore jumps and a short-to-mid-term incentive
in terms of expected utility. The effect was observed across all levels of risk aversion
and fee structures for horizons from 2 to 30 years. Altering γ would reduce or increase
the winning horizon but never eliminate the incentive. The other strong factor was the
pattern of wealth movements (symmetric or asymmetric). If wealth movement to and
from the fund is the same for positive and negative relative returns, then the incentive is
greater. If wealth movement is more severe (a steeper function with a lower cap), then
the winning horizon is visibly reduced. This effect is traced for the same level of risk
aversion as well as different levels. On the other hand, manager compensation schemes
had no interplay with either risk aversion or wealth transfer - for both 2 + 20% and
1 + 10% the winning horizon was the same. Therefore, the incentive for the manager to
ignore jumps is affected by his (and the investor’s) risk aversion and how investors react
to losses, and is clearly present in the short and mid-run as opposed to the long-run. In
the long-run, jumps tend to catch up and harm managerial utility. The issue is directly
linked to investor information around how the manager allocates portfolio wealth, how
his actions are monitored and what provisions or penalising clauses are set either by
the regulator or the investment contract. The list of policy recommendations includes
better monitoring of fund management, extensive disclosure of fund structure and trading
strategies followed, wider application and legislation on clawbacks, penalties and investor
protection and employment of monitoring tools such as investment accounts.
In that way, the research question of the thesis have received a clear answer in all
three parts. The present work can be extended in a number of ways discussed in the
next section.
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7.0.2 Further extensions
The first area of improvement is technical. The modelling of jumps has received a lot of
attention and is always an area of advancement. The Poisson structure is a sufficient
and tested way to replicate jumps but, in certain frameworks, can be seen as inaccurate.
Levy processes (Li et al. (2006)) have been found to provide a more accurate replication
of time series features. A more fruitful way is the use of a Hawkes process, as in Ficˇura
and Witzany (2015). This stochastic process introduces a self-exciting component in
the jump that allows the monitoring of sequential jumps as well as the dissipation or
possible build-up of jump effects. This replaces the need for a stochastic arrival intensity
in the style of Liu et al. (2004) and makes up for a more modern and efficient tool.
There is also plenty of ground to be covered by using novel estimation methods, such
as particle filtering. Pitt et al. (2014) provides an application on a model with leverage
and jumps in returns only, while a thorough discussion can be found in Andrieu et al.
(2010) and Andrieu et al. (2003). Particle filtering is superior in terms of efficiency and
convergence to MCMC, as shown in the above literature. In addition, an application
with jumps in both returns and volatility is currently missing, so there is space for a
contribution.
Moving away from the technical aspect, an area where the present results can be
greatly expanded is in the wealth transfer function. The form used here is illustrative
and serves a specific mechanical purpose, but the idea can be expanded and get much
deeper foundations. There is a direct link to herding, the amplification of anxiety and
contagion. An asymmetric curve implies asymmetric reactions to a source of risk but
also that investors are relatively more hesitant to run towards already realised wins than
run away from realised losses: an investor will leave an underperforming fund easier than
he will join a winning fund. In addition, jumps are not restricted to being negative -
positive jumps can, and do exist. The estimate on returns jump size, however, implies
a negative starting point or, alternatively, a negative average size. Linking jumps to
negative returns and having investors react viciously when they occur is, therefore, not
unjustified. This calls for a better linkage of the wealth transfer function to investor
behaviour and patterns, either at an individual or a collective level.
Another possible area of improvement is the use of a different trading strategy.
Time invariable jumps may be a mathematical outcome as well as the depiction of a
buy-and-hold strategy, but it is interesting to test how incentives would be affected
by (time-)varying jumps. The technical obstacles are identified to the nature of the
Bellman equation solution, that relies on a very specific power utility function. Any
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alterations in either the methodology or the utility function may lead to a solution being
unfeasible. Abandoning the properties used in the thesis is not so much of an issue, but
the framework is tight and not very prone to manipulation. Time variation in portfolio
weights can also be linked to considerations by Korn and Kraft (2004) about the stability
of solutions for SV, SVJ and SVCJ models.
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Figure A.1. Normal distribution terminal wealth for the same series when the
jump occurs in different times
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Figure A.2. Gamma distribution terminal wealth for the same series when the
jump occurs in different times
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Figure A.3. Inverse Gaussian distribution terminal wealth for the same series
when the jump occurs in different times
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Figure A.4. Normal distribution - pdf plot for N(0,1)
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Figure A.5. Gamma distribution - pdf plots for different parameters
120
Figure A.6. Inverse Gaussian distribution - pdf plots for different parameters
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B.1 Tables and Figures
Table B.1: MCMC parameters for the SV model for different horizons and data sets.
µ φ ση Kurtosis
Hautsch & Ou -9.471 0.99 0.087 4.3884
(0,171) (0.003) 0.01
Replication -9.62584 0.987623 0.127236 5.79317
(0.169997) (0.00307) (0.0098449)
Corrected -9.58047 0.987518 0.127635 5.78506
sample (0.175654) (0.00336461) (0.0108075)
2005− 2015 -9.59566 0.984292 0.175091 8.02188
(0.264911) (0.0236879) (0.0189727)
Table B.2: Summary statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Kurtosis Sample Length
Hautsch & Ou 0.00036 0.009 8.276 4231
Corrected sample 0.0003808 0.0097773 7.99061 4079
2005− 2015 0.0001873 0.0116215 14.1445 2656
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Figure B.1. Markov chains for µ, φ, σ2 (top - bottom), not corrected sample,
1991 - 2007
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Figure B.2. Markov chains for µ, φ, σ2 (top - bottom), corrected sample, 1991
- 2007
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Figure B.3. Smoothed volatility states (top) and absolute returns (bottom),
not corrected sample , 1991 - 2007
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Figure B.4. Smoothed volatility states (top) and absolute returns (bottom),
corrected sample , 1991 - 2007
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Figure B.5. Smoothed volatility states (top) and absolute returns (bottom),
2005 - 2015
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Figure B.6. Markov Chains (µ, φ, σ2) (top - bottom), 2005 - 2015
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C.1 n-dimensional Ito’s lemma in the Bellman
equation
The formula for the n-dimensional Ito’s lemma is
dZt =
∂f
∂t
(t,Xt)dt+
∑ ∂f
∂xi
(t,Xt)dX
i
t +
1
2
∑ ∂2f
∂xi∂xj
(t,Xt)dX
i
tdX
j
t (C.1)
The example is merely illustrative and is based on diffusions, so it does not contain
jump terms. Here, f is the indirect utility function and corresponds to Ft, X
i,j
t are
the processes for Wt and Vt respectively, dXi is the mean times dt in each process and
dX itdX
j
t is the product of the two correlated Brownian motions, which according to
stochastic calculus yields the product of their standard deviation terms, the correlation
and dt. (C.1) is applied to processes (4.7) and (4.2) with an additional jumps term
generated. Subscript t is dropped for convenience. The result is
L(F ) = (r + φEP )WFW + κ(θ − V )FV + 1
2
φ2W 2V FWW +
1
2
σ2V V FV V + σV φWV ρFWV
+λE[F (W (1 + φE(ξY )), V + E(ξV ), t)− F ] (C.2)
The last term comes from the Ito’s lemma ability to break jump-diffusion down to
its components. Simply put, the expected effect of simultaneous jumps in returns and
volatility on indirect utility is the difference between F(W,V,t) and F times the arrival
intensity of the Poisson. In other words, W and V in F(W,V,t) are placeholders and
represent the increase in wealth and volatility by the expected jump size. Some simple
algebra around the Poisson function provides the final result.
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C.2 Algebra of the Bellman equation
The solution method is to conjecture and then verify that F (Wt, Vt, t) is of a certain
form, namely
F (Wt, Vt, t) =
W 1−γ
1− γ exp(A(t) +B(t)V ) (C.3)
where A(t), B(t) depend only upon t but not W and V. This leads to the following
partial derivatives.
FW = W
−γexp(A(t) +B(t)V ) (C.4)
FWW = −γW−1−γexp(A(t) +B(t)V ) (C.5)
Ft =
W 1−γ
1− γ (A
′(t)+B′(t)V )exp(A(t) +B(t)V ) (C.6)
FV =
W 1−γ
1− γ B(t)exp(A(t) +B(t)V ) (C.7)
FWV = B(t)W
−γexp(A(t) +B(t)V ) (C.8)
FV V =
W 1−γ
1− γ B
2(t)exp(A(t) +B(t)V ) (C.9)
For the jumps related term in (C.2)
F (W (1 + φE(ξY )), V +E(ξV ), t) =
W 1−γ(1 + φE(ξY ))1−γ
1− γ exp(A(t) +B(t)(V +E(ξ
V )))
which, after differentiating, yields
∂F (...)
∂φ
= E(ξY )W 1−γ(1 + φE(ξY )γexp(A(t) +B(t)V +B(t)E(ξV )) = K (C.10)
Substituting (C.2) into the Bellmann equation 0 = Ft +maxφ[L(F )] (4.8) and differenti-
ating with respect to φ instantly removes some expressions. What remains is
EP ∗WFW + φW 2V JWW + ρσVWV JWV + λK = 0 (C.11)
and with the appropriate substitutions from (C.4 - C.10) into (C.11)
EP∗W∗W−γexp(A(t)+B(t)V )−φW 2V γW−1−γexp(A(t)+B(t)V )+ρσVWVB(t)W−γexp(A(t)+
B(t)V ) + λE(ξY )W 1−γ(1 + φE(ξY )−γexp(A(t) +B(t)V +B(t)E(ξV )) = 0⇔
EP∗W 1−γ−φγVW 1−γ+ρσVW 1−γV B(t)+λE(ξY )W 1−γ(1−φE(ξY ))−γexp(B(t)E(ξV )) = 0⇔
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EP − V φγ + ρσV V B(t) + λE(ξY )(1− φE(ξY ))−γexp(B(t)E(ξV )) = 0⇔
EP
γV
+
ρσVB(t)
γ
+
λE(ξY )(1− φE(ξY ))−γ
γV
exp(B(t)E(ξV )) = φ
The last expression is equation (4.9) for the optimal portfolio weight.
The final step is to derive the ordinary differential equations for B(t) and A(t) for
which the assumed form of the indirect utility function is indeed a solution. In order for
that assumption to hold, the solution for φ needs to validate the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation and set it equal to zero. After substituting φ (4.9) and F (C.3)) into (5.8), it is
possible to eliminate W
1−γ
1−γ exp(A(t) + V B(t)) from all terms. This allows us to separate
the terms that contain V from those who do not. The general form is thus D+H*V=0
where both D and H need to be 0, or else
H = B′(t)− 1
2
γφ2(1− γ) + 1
2
σ2VB
2(t) + (σV φρ(1− γ)− κ)B(t) = 0
and the expression for A(t) is omitted as is does not affect the system of equations.
It must be noted that the expression for A(t) contains the jump term.
To sum up, the optimal weight φ is the solution to the following system.
φ =
EP
γV
+
ρσVB(t)
γ
+
λE(ξY )(1− φE(ξY ))−γ
γV
exp(B(t)E(ξV ))
where B(t) solves the differential equation
B′(t)− 1
2
γφ2(1− γ) + 1
2
σ2VB
2(t) + (σV φρ(1− γ)− κ)B(t) = 0
with initial conditions
A(T ) = 0, B(T ) = 0
C.3 SVCJ posteriors
The discretised version of the SVCJ model described by (4.1 - 4.2) is
Yt = µ+
√
Vt−1Yt + ξ
Y
t Jt (C.12)
∆Vt = Vt − Vt−1 = α + βVt−1 +
√
Vt−1σV Vt + ξ
V
t Jt (C.13)
where α = κθ, β = −κ, Y , V ∼ N(0, 1) with correlation ρ, log returns Yt =
log(St/St−1), Jt ∼ Ber(λ), ξV ∼ exp(µv), ξY ∼ N(µY + ρjξV , σ2Y ) jump sizes with
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correlation ρj. The model can be discretised with either α = κθ and β = −κ or directly
κ, θ. Here the first method is used. In this form, Metropolis - Hastings sampling is
needed for Vt, ρ, σV . If the volatility error term is rewritten as 
V
t = ρ ∗ Yt +
√
1− ρ2 ∗ ζt,
where ζt ∼ N(0, 1) independent of Yt , and ω = σ2V (1− ρ2), φ = σV ∗ ρ are defined, then
they can be sampled directly from the resulting posteriors due to conjugacy and get
ρ = φ
σV
, σ2V = ω + φ
2.
The parameters to be sampled are θ = (µ, α, β, ρ, ρj, σ
2
V , µY , µV , σ
2
Y ), the vectors
(sets) to be sampled are (Vt, Jt, ξ
Y
t , ξ
V
t ) and the notation (...) denotes all other quantities.
It is useful to write down the model likelihood function. It is a bivariate normal
distribution of Yt, Vt. Swapping sides at the discretised model, (A.12) becomes
Yt − µ− ξYt Jt =
√
Vt−1Yt
and let the LHS = At .
Vt − Vt−1 − α− βVt−1 − ξVt Jt = σV
√
Vt−1Vt
Similarly for the volatility process (C.13), let the LHS =Bt. These consist a bivariate
normal
p(Yt,∆Vt|Vt−1, ...) =
1
2piσV Vt−1
√
1− ρ2 ∗ Exp[−
1
2(1− ρ2)(
A2t
Vt−1
+
B2t
σ2V Vt−1
− 2ρAtBt
σV Vt−1
)] (C.14)
The methodology for conditioning has been explained in Chapter 3 and will not be
repeated here. The constant term outside the exponent will always be ignored.
Volatility yields the most complex posterior.
p(Vt|Vt−1, Vt+1, Yt, ...) ∝
1
Vt
∗ Exp[− 1
2(1− ρ2)(
σ2VA
2
t +B
2
t − 2ρσVAtBt
σ2V Vt−1
+
σ2VA
2
t+1 +B
2
t+1 − 2ρσVAt+1Bt+1
σ2V Vt
)]
for the neighbouring values Vt−1, Vt+1 of Vt where the Markov property is again exploited.
After expanding the squares, conditioning and factoring, the most compact analytical
form is
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∝ 1
Vt
∗ Exp[−1
2
(
V 2t − 2Vt(α + βVt−1 + JtξVt + 2ρσVAt)
(1− ρ2)σ2V Vt−1
+
(Bt+1 − ρσVAt+1)2
σ2V (1− ρ2)Vt
+
A2t+1
Vt
)] (C.15)
Due to proportionality, any other formulation would suffice but this one is the neatest.
This creates a cursoring over the existing volatility vector that keeps or substitutes the
current value according to a Metropolis - Hastings step. The proposal is a random walk e
that follows N(0, σ2) centered on the previous value, so Nprop = Vold+e. Setting σ = 0.05
works well in practice. It has the advantage of being completely agnostic and with a
pace σ that can be easily calibrated. Li et al. (2006) provide an insightful comment on
the performance of different sampling techniques, which were validated by the thesis.
The construction of an appropriate proposal for Accept - Reject is very difficult, Kalman
filtering cannot be applied due to non-normality and ARMS is at least comparable in
performance to random walk Metropolis - Hastings. A difference in performance was
noted without a significant gain in precision, and the random walk approach was selected.
The posteriors for ρ, σ2v are non-standard. For ρ it is almost identical to the likelihood
function (C.14) and a sound Metropolis - Hastings sampler would entail a U(1−, 1)
or truncated N(0, 1) proposal. For σ, the form is very similar to an Inverse Gamma
distribution. The transformation ω = σ2V (1 − ρ2), φ = σV ∗ ρ allows the elimina-
tion of those terms and separate direct sampling due to conjugacy for N(0, 1
2
ω) for
φ and IG(2,200) for ω as priors. Formally, p(φ|Vt, ω, ...) ∝ p(Yt, Vt|Vt−1, ...)p(φ|ω) and
p(ω|Vt, φ, ...) ∝ p(Yt, Vt|Vt−1, φ, ...)p(ω). The results are an Inverse Gamma posterior for
ω with parameters IG(D,C)
D =
T
2
+ 2
C =
∑ 1
2
(Vt − Vt−1 − α− βVt−1 − JtξVt )2
Vt−1
+
1
200
−
(
∑
1
Vt−1
(Yt − µ− JtξYt )(Vt − Vt−1 − α− βVt−1 − JtξVt ))2
2
∑
1
Vt−1
(Yt − µ− JtξYt )2 + 2
and a Normal (Z,X) posterior for φ with mean
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Z =
∑
1
Vt−1
(Yt − µ− JtξYt )(Vt − Vt−1 − α− βVt−1 − JtξVt )∑
1
Vt−1
(Yt − µ− JtξYt )2 + 2
and variance
X =
ω∑
1
Vt−1
(Yt − µ− JtξYt )2 + 2
For completeness, the non-conjugate posteriors for ρ, σ2 are noted.
p(ρ|Vt, ...) ∝ ( 1√
1− ρ2 )
TExp[− 1
2(1− ρ2)(
A2
Vt−1
+
B2
σ2V Vt−1
− 2ρAtBt
σV Vt−1
)]
p(σ2V |Vt, ...) = (
1
σ2V
)T/2Exp[− 1
σ2V
(
∑ B2t − 2ρσVAtBt
2(1− ρ2)Vt−1 )] ∗ p(σ
2
V )
This is almost inverse Gamma with parameters α = T/2− 1 and β=the sum term,
but the σV in 2ρAtBtσV negates conjugacy. Jeffrey’s prior or Inverse Gamma priors such
as IG(c,C) have no effect. Therefore Independence or Metropolis - Hastings sampling
must be used for a suitable proposal. That would be a Uniform or an Inverse Gamma if
the problematic σ was ignored, causing the terms to be
IG(c+ T/2, C + 1
2
∑
(Vt − Vt−1 − α− βVt−1 − JtξVt )2
This, however, does not work because the posterior proves to be extremely peaked so
a proposal with a very calibrated step needs to be used. Raggi (2005) proposes ARMS
while Ashgarian and Bengtsson (2006) the approach above.
(
1
σ2V
)T/2Exp[
1
2
∑
B2t ] ∗ (
1
σ2
)c+1Exp[− C
σ2V
]
(
1
σ2V
)T/2+c+1Exp[
1
2
∑
B2t + C]
The posterior for Jt produces a vector and is one not encountered before. The prior
is a Bernoulli Ber(λ) and the two possible states of J are 0 and 1. Therefore,
P (1) = P (J = 1|Yt, Vt, ...) = λ ∗ p(Vt, Yt|J = 1, ...)
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P (0) = P (J = 0|Yt, Vt, ...) = (1− λ) ∗ p(Vt, Yt|J = 0, ...)
and the resulting posterior is p(Jt|Vt, Yt, ...) ∝ Ber(q), where
q =
P (1)
P (1) + P (0)
The remaining posteriors are mostly Normal or Inverse Gamma and have been dis-
cussed extensively, so only their final parameters will be mentioned. With lax notation
of X,Z corresponding to N(mean, variance) and IG(shape, scale)
p(µ|Vt, ...) ∼ N(X,Z)
with prior N(k = 2, K = 40) for mean and variance, and
Z = (
∑ 1
(1− ρ)2Vt−1 +
1
K
)−1
and
X = (
∑ Yt − JtξYt − ρσV (Vt−1+α+βVt−1+JtξVt )
(1− ρ)2Vt−1 +
k
K
) ∗ Z
For α and β, Eraker et al. (2003) and Asgharian and Bengtsson (2006) suggest joint
sampling from a bivariate normal distribution due to high correlation. However, it is
straightforward to derive separate conditional posteriors . Both of them are conjugate
normals, truncated in (−∞, 0] for β and (0,∞] for α. The result proves to be identical
in practice and it is easier to set up individual samplers. In the case of joint sampling,
the posterior is N(b∗, B∗) where
b∗ = (B−1b+
1
(1− ρ2)σ2V
W ′Q) ∗B
B∗ = (B−1 +
1
(1− ρ2)σ2V
W ′W )−1
b is a vector of ones and B is the identity matrix, both of appropriate dimension, and
are the hyper-parameters of the prior. The expressions for Q and W are
Q =

V1−V0−J1ξV1 −ρσV (Y1−µ−ξ1J1)√
V0
V2−V1−J2ξV2 −ρσV (Y2−µ−ξ2J2)√
V1
...
until T

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W =

1√
V0
√
V0
1√
V1
√
V1
... ...
until T

The posteriors used in the thesis are the separate ones. For α, p(α|Vt, ...) ∝ (N,Z) where
X = (
∑ Vt − (1 + β)Vt−1 − JtξVt − ρσV (Yt − µ− JtξYt )
σ2V (1− ρ2)
) ∗ Z
and
Z =
∑ 1
σ2V (1− ρ2)Vt−1
For β, p(β|Vt, ...) ∝ (N,Z) where
X = (
∑ Vt − Vt−1 − α− JtξVt − ρσV (Yt − µ− JtξYt )
Vt−1σ2V (1− ρ2)
) ∗ Z
and
Z =
∑
Vt−1
σ2V (1− ρ2)
+ 1
For λ the prior is a Beta (k,K), so λ ∼ Beta(X,Z) with parameters
X∗ = k +
∑
Jt
Z∗ = K + T −
∑
Jt
For σ2Y , p(σ
2
Y |Vt, ...) ∝ p(ξYt |...)p(σ2Y )
∝ IG(1
2
T + e,
1
2
∑
(ξYt − ρJξVt − µY )2 + E)
with IG(e = 10, E = 40) as prior.
For µY , p(µY |Vt, ...) ∝ p(ξYt |...)p(µY )
with prior N(z = 0, 100) , which yields Normal distribution N(X,Z) with variance
Z = (
T
σ2Y
+
1
100
)−1
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and
X = (
∑
(ξYt − ρJξVt )
σ2Y
+
z
100
) ∗ Z
For µV , the pdf of an exponential distribution with mean µV is
1
µV
Exp[− ξ
V
t
µV
]
since the general form is λExp[−λx] and mean λ−1
With an Inverse Gamma (d=10,D=20) as prior and ignoring constants, p(µV |...) ∝
p(ξVt )p(µV )
∝ ( 1
µV
)TExp[−
∑
ξVt
µV
](µV )
−d−1Exp[− D
µV
]
∝ IG(T + d,
∑
ξVt +D)
For ξYt , the posterior is
p(ξY |∆Vt, Y, J = 1, ...) ∝ p(Yt,∆Vt|ξY , J = 1, ...)p(ξYt ) which leads to a Normal (X,Z)
with
Z = (
1
(1− ρ2)Vt−1 +
1
σ2Y
)−1
and
X = (
Yt − µ− ρσV Bt
(1− ρ2)Vt−1 +
µY − ρJξVt
σ2Y
) ∗ Z
When J=0, the drawing of ξY cones from the unconditional distribution ξY ∼
N(µY + ρjξ
V , σ2Y )
For ξVt , the posterior is again standard.
p(ξVt |∆Vt, YT , J = 1...) ∝ p(Yt,∆Vt|ξVt , J = 1)p(ξYt |ξVt , ...)p(ξVT ). Ignoring the con-
stants, this can be written as
∝ Exp[− 1
2(1− ρ2)(
σ2VA
2
t +B
2
t − 2ρσVAtBt
σ2V Vt−1
)]Exp[−(ξ
Y
t − µY − ρJξVt )2
2σ2Y
]Exp[− ξ
V
t
µV
]
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leading to N(X,Z) where
Z = (
1
σ2V (1− ρ2)Vt−1
+
ρ2J
σ2Y
)−1
and
X = (
(Vt − Vt−1 − α− βVt−1)− ρσV (Yt − µ− ξYt )
σ2V (1− ρ2)Vt−1
+
ρJ(ξ
Y
t − µY )
σ2Y
− 1
µV
) ∗ Z
When J=0, the drawing of ξV ∼ exp(µv) which is again the unconditional distribution.
For ρJ the posterior is a Normal distribution with and the prior is N(0,4)
p(ρJ |ξYt , ...) ∝ p(ξYt |ξVt , ...)p(ρJ)
which yields N(X,Z)
Z = (
∑
ξ2V,t
σ2Y
+
1
4
)−1
and
X =
∑
ξVt (ξ
Y
t − µY )
σ2Y
∗ Z
C.4 SV posteriors
The easiest way to get the posteriors for the SV model is to take the SVCJ expressions and
set the missing parameters equal to 0. This yields exactly the same result as conditioning
from the beginning. As a word of caution, this holds only for the model at hand and
should not be used in general. In order to verify, the posteriors were properly derived
and then compared to the SVCJ formulas when setting the missing parameters equal to
0. They are much simpler than their SVCJ counterparts so to save space this explanation
is sufficient.
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C.5 Figures and tables
Table C.1: MCMC parameters for the SVCJ model. Values reported as daily percentages
and annual decimals compared to the values of Eraker et al (2003) and Brooks and
Prokopszuk (2012). Where necessary, the parameters are converted as described in
Chapter 4.
1980-2016 1872-2017 2007-2016 EJP (1980-1999) Br. & Pr. (1985 - 2010)
Daily % An. Dec. Monthly % An. Dec. Daily % An. Dec. Daily % An. Dec. Daily % An. Dec.
λ 0.0055 1.3919 0.0174 0.2091 0.0053 1.3266 0.0066 1.6632 0.0041 1.0332
(0.0013) (0.0094) (0.0029) (0.002) (0.0012)
ρJ 0.0030 0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.6008 -0.2384 0.0519 0.0206
(0.0329) (0.0674) (0.0578) (0.9918) (0.2012)
σY 2.6554 0.0266 2.3308 0.02331 4.4246 0.0442 2.8864 0.0289 2.2486 0.0225
(0.3902) (0.4342) (1.3707) (0.5679) (0.5251)
µV 1.0080 0.0254 1.0088 0.0012 1.0555 0.0266 1.4832 0.0374 2.7594 0.0695
(0.1265) (0.1534) (0.3722) (0.3404) (0.7914)
µY -2.9251 -0.0293 -10.9183 -0.1092 -1.9020 -0.0190 -1.7533 -0.0175 -4.4478 -0.0445
(0.6197) (2.1911) (1.0701) (1.5566) (0.9100)
µ 0.0340 0.0858 0.617 0.074 0.0396 0.0997 0.0554 0.1396 0.0421 0.1061
(0.0081) (0.0868) (0.0248) (0.0112) (0.0100)
ρ -0.6757 -0.6757 -0.3739 -0.3739 -0.6875 -0.6875 -0.4838 -0.4838 -0.5831 -0.5831
(0.0259) (0.05299) (0.0504) (0.0623) (0.0395)
σV 0.1429 0.3601 0.6587 0.0791 0.2895 0.7295 0.0790 0.1991 0.1264 0.3185
(0.0055) (0.0635) (0.0385) (0.0074) (0.0098)
α(= κ ∗ θ) 0.0211 0.1337 0,6178 0.0089 0.0517 0.3284 0.0140 0.0888 0.0177 0.1125
(0.0018) (0.1279) (0.0065)
κ(= −β) 0.0252 6.3561 0.05 -0.6 0.0380 9.5838 0.0260 6.5520 0.0225 5.6700
(0.0021) (0.0105) (0.0061) (0.0041) (0.0041)
θ 0.8347 0.0210 12.3554 0.0148 1.3598 0.0343 0.5376 0.0135 0.7874 0.0198
(0.0539) (0.0787)
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Table C.2: MCMC parameters for the SV model. Values reported as daily percentages
and annual decimals compared to the values of Eraker et al (2003) Where necessary, the
parameters are converted as described in Chapter 4.
1980-2016 1872-2016 EJP
Daily Annualised Monthly Annualised Daily Annualised
µ 0.0289 0.07288 0.5505 0.0661 0.0444 0.111888
(0.008) 0.0645 (0.011)
ρ -0.6096 -0.6096 -0.203 -0.203 -0.3974 -0.3974
(0.0244) 0.04847 (0.0516)
σV 0.1691 0.42617 0.7663 0.092 0.1434 0.361368
(0.00857) 0.0199 (0.00128)
α(= κθ) 0.0265 0.0273 1.2924 0.01861 0.0209 0.1328
(0.0018) 0.1078
κ(= −β) 0.0245 6.1662 0.1471 1.7647 0.0231 5.8212
(0.00264) 0.0144 (0.0068)
θ 1.0815 0.0273 8.7887 0.0106 0.9052 0.02281
(0.1077)
Table C.3: Sample Summary Statistics
1980− 2016 2007− 2016 1872− 2017
Mean 0.000322652 0.000149161 0.36
SD 0.0112694 0.0137424 4.1
Length 9132 2253 1745
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Table C.4: Optimal portfolio weights for the SVCJ and SV models (1980 - 2016) for
r = 2% compared to the weights corresponding to the EJP parameters (r = 4.5%) and
the Liu, Longstaff and Pan (2003) replicated parameters. The LLP weights refer to
S%P500 options data between 1-1-1987 and 31-12-1996, for which the methodology,
frequency and parameter estimation is incomparable. They are referred here only as a
successful replication of an existing result
1980-2016 EJP LLP
γ SVCJ SV SVCJ SV SVCJ SV
5 0.211 0.41 0.57 0.7139 0.901 0.952
4 0.2634 0.52 0.7119 0.89 1.107 1.183
3 0.3505 0.686 0.9459 1.1813 1.432 1.564
2 0.5235 1.022 1.4096 1.757 2.01 2.305
Table C.5: Replication of existing results in the literature. Branger and Hansis (2012,
2015) transform the EJP parameters from percentage log returns to annual decimals
that correspond to the LLP formulation that includes volatility and jumps premia in the
returns prosses and stochastic arrival intensity. λEJP = λLLPV , V = θ + µV λ/κ, ERP
= Equity Risk Premium. Common parameters are in Table 1 and only the additional
parameters of the LLP version are reported here.
κ′ θ′ λLLP λEJP ERP V ERP/V
SV CJ 6.552 0.0135 72.2018 1.6632 0.0732 (6%) 0.0154 (0.023) 4.7532
SV 5.8212 0.0228 0.0783 0.0228 3.4342
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Figure C.1. SVCJ Portfolio weight plot for γ = 5, T = 5 and T = 9.000
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Figure C.2. MCMC Chains - (Left, top to bottom) λ, ρj, σ
2
Y , µV , µY , (Right,
top to bottom) µ, ρ, σ2V , α, β
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Appendix for Chapter 6
D.1 Tables 1.1 - 1.4
Investor simulations for γ = 2, 3, 4, 5. NJW: terminal Wealth for the No Jumps investor NJU:
terminal Utility for the No Jumps investor WDiff : difference in average terminal wealths
UDiff : difference in average terminal utilities
Table D.1.1: γ=5
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
NJW Wins 61.74% 62.04% 64.06% 67.62% 71.86% 76.04% 79.84%
NJU Wins 61.74% 62.04% 64.06% 67.62% 71.86% 76.04% 79.84%
WDiff (NJ - J) 0.02336 0.03261 0.05820 0.13719 0.24676 0.51911 0.82088
UDiff (NJ - J) -0.00845 -0.01474 -0.02382 -0.03262 -0.03430 -0.02898 -0.02189
Table D.1.2: γ=4
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
NJW Wins 60.96% 62.18% 66.26% 69.54% 71.8% 75.52% 77.82%
NJU Wins 60.96% 62.18% 66.26% 69.54% 71.8% 75.52% 77.82%
WDiff (NJ - J) 0.02888 0.04526 0.08565 0.19736 0.34603 0.74951 1.13564
UDiff (NJ - J) -0.01094 -0.01823 -0.01690 -0.03164 -0.04352 -0.03739 -0.02718
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Table D.1.3: γ=3
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
NJW Wins 62.12% 62.38% 65.28% 70.38% 71.96% 75.84% 79%
NJU Wins 62.12% 62.38% 65.28% 70.38% 71.96% 75.84% 79%
WDiff (NJ - J) 0.04603 0.06728 0.12651 0.31298 0.55600 1.2535 2.05842
UDiff (NJ - J) -0.00895 -0.01798 -0.02238 -0.03723 -0.05784 -0.05601 -0.08726
Table D.1.4: γ=2
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
NJW Wins 60.2% 62.88% 64.62% 69.1% 72.58% 75.5% 77.76%
NJU Wins 60.2% 62.88% 64.62% 69.1% 72.58% 75.5% 77.76%
WDiff (NJ - J) 0.07282 0.12097 0.22944 0.63438 1.20383 3.12372 5.57252
UDiff (NJ - J) -0.01033 -0.00729 -0.00731 -0.01200 -0.01747 -0.02143 -0.03203
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D.2 Tables 2.1 - 2.4
Investor and Manager simulations for γ = 2, 3, 4, 5. TFJ: Total Fees of Manager (Jumps
case) TFNJ: Total Fees of Manager (No Jumps case) TUJ: Average Investor terminal Utility
(Jumps case) TUNJ: Average Investor terminal Utility (No Jumps case) TFUJ: Average Total
Annual Utility of Manager from Fees (Jumps case) TFUNJ: Average Total Annual Utility of
Manager from Fees (No Jumps case). Blue denotes the winning manager
Table D.2.1: γ=5, 2+20% fees, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 4.1134 6.18493 10.2783 20.483 30.7218 49.204 61.5978
TFNJ 5.12877 7.93911 13.1283 26.991 41.9317 71.1001 91.9276
TUJ (∗10−9) -2.4962 -2.49619 -2.55146 -2.62194 -2.64366 -2.68481 -78.9905
TUNJ (∗10−9) -2.93103 -3.0467 -4.27311 -6.71655 -10.0262 -15.5008 -351.281
TFUJ -0.287002 -0.0430744 -0.07235 -0.146331 -0.204301 -0.362212 -0.453511
TFUNJ -0.0280683 -0.0429121 -0.0838553 -0.216396 -0.351235 -0.956448 -1,74013
UJ wins (%) 35.96 33.68 33.42 35.54 37.28 39.54 39.6
Table D.2.2: γ=5, 1+10%, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.07236 3.1236 5.25193 10.7397 16.5157 27.7563 35.8835
TFNJ 2.65585 4.03675 6.92637 14.6369 23.4346 41.8983 56.3048
TUJ (∗10−9) -4.67885 -6.92864 -11.1408 -20.5021 -28.2178 -38.8733 -44.2656
TUNJ (∗10−9) -5.07058 -7.8992 -14.2545 -32.729 -58.7133 -121.347 -165.869
TFUJ -0.447582 -0.662913 -1.06606 -1.96226 -2.70095 -3.71829 -4.23515
TFUNJ -0.42267 -0.659745 -1.18098 -2.71481 -4.3265 -10.0045 -13.819
UJ wins (%) 34.56 33.92 34.08 36.18 35.72 36.88 38.2
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Table D.2.3: γ=5, 2+20, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 4.14593 6.25992 10.5541 21.7746 33.6008 56.2138 72.4294
TFNJ 5.14174 7.66955 12.7947 25.6348 38.5557 61.7916 78.3366
TUJ (∗10−9) -4.85957 -7.13135 -11.3973 -20.551 -28.06 -39.1346 -44.9392
TUNJ (∗10−9) -5.9979 -10.159 -22.4123 -96.3665 -239.355 -1199.59 -2492.14
TFUJ -0.0279114 -0.0409538 -0.0654901 -0.117992 -0.161075 -0.224718 -0.258033
TFUNJ -0.0299182 -0.050489 -0.111401 -0.484775 -1.19765 -5.88703 -12.0652
UJ wins (%) 37.36 38.62 45.72 56.3 62.04 71.38 75.44
Table D.2.4: γ=5, 1+10%, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.08434 3.16859 5.39279 11.4248 18.1162 32.0474 42.6871
TFNJ 2.62285 3.98125 6.68629 13.8526 21.5614 36.4705 47.2148
TUJ (∗10−9) -4.57695 -6.57994 -10.1233 -16.7618 -21.1954 -25.8865 -27.8397
TUNJ (∗10−9) -5.57901 -9.19852 -19.2604 -62.4251 -177.527 -822.461 -707.623
TFUJ -0.438135 -0.629298 -0.969264 -1.60384 -2.02792 -2.47643 -2.66441
TFUNJ -0.465278 -0.761525 -1.59883 -5.1783 -14.5959 -64.1319 -57.3833
UJ wins (%) 37.1 38.76 45.46 54.6 59.78 66.04 72.16
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Table D.3.1: γ=4, 2+20%, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 4.18007 6.27453 10.4326 20.6916 30.8373 48.8754 61.1235
TFNJ 5.56988 8.59343 14.6642 30.3255 47.1842 79.7479 104.394
TUJ (∗10−7) -6.70446 -10.0977 -16.989 -35.1197 -54.0623 -90.8233 -114.948
TUNJ (∗10−7) -7.47128 -11.6441 -20.3202 -53.5636 -98.6655 -229.147 -439.285
TFUJ -0.0775296 -0.11669 -0.196224 -0.405401 -0.624017 -1.0484 -1.3266
TFUNJ -0.0727639 -0.111609 -0.194751 -0.518134 -0.937875 -2.19226 -4.0686
UJ wins (%) 35.36 31.56 30.42 33.62 34.46 35.88 36.22
Table D.3.2: γ=4, 1+10%, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.11209 3.18399 5.33871 10.8649 16.6332 27.8655 35.8588
TFNJ 2.91586 4.47321 7.69121 16.5574 26.4013 48.9598 65.7202
TUJ (∗10−7) -6.38149 -9.48521 -15.5041 -29.63 -42.2345 -60.9076 -72.0084
TUNJ (∗10−7) -6.94923 -10.7075 -18.8891 -42.2087 -71.793 -120 -187.89
TFUJ -0.608113 -0.902803 -1.47662 -2.82229 -4.02278 -5.79576 -6.85519
TFUNJ -0.553296 -0.851483 -1.49367 -3.33377 -5.66446 -9.51762 -14.7887
UJ wins (%) 33.66 31.34 30.64 32.94 34.02 32.84 34.44
151
APPENDIX D. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 6
Table D.3.3: γ=4, 2+20%, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 4.22939 6.36439 10.7598 22.1103 33.9866 56.6911 72.8306
TFNJ 5.64367 8.42136 14.186 28.7358 43.1255 70.2579 88.4408
TUJ (∗10−7) -6.53198 -9.68427 -15.6483 -29.3506 -41.2985 -60.4752 -71.8269
TUNJ (∗10−7) -7.68938 -12.8496 -26.0689 -86.7467 -217.077 -701.23 -147.271
TFUJ -0.0754435 -0.111959 -0.180631 -0.338323 -0.476715 -0.697944 -0.82926
TFUNJ -0.0737118 -0.123464 -0.249759 -0.830699 -2.08 -6.64889 -14.4653
UJ wins (%) 35.5 37.4 43.04 52.62 58.42 67 70.92
Table D.3.4: γ=4, 1+10%, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.12956 3.23453 5.49658 11.6244 16.6495 32.4886 43.277
TFNJ 2.90262 4.37038 7.39661 15.461 26.4926 41.8518 54.8552
TUJ (∗10−7) -6.24131 -9.07638 -14.3224 -24.9325 -42.171 -42.8639 -47.8045
TUNJ (∗10−9) -7.40022 -12.0177 -24.1981 -72.0204 -79.6234 -441.52 -625.165
TFUJ -0.595002 -0.864363 -1.36527 -2.37389 -4.01629 -4.08013 -4.55016
TFUNJ -0.590602 -0.95773 -1.92217 -5.7049 -6.43929 -33.7565 -49.557
UJ wins (%) 35.14 37.34 42.26 51.24 55.08 63.62 67.54
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Table D.4.1: γ=3, 2+20, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 4.43229 6.66134 11.003 21.6151 31.9249 50.102 62.082
TFNJ 6.42132 9.89045 16.7194 35.6563 56.2634 96.3445 126.559
TUJ (∗10−4) -1.00753 -1.52654 -2.5972 -5.40292 -8.4649 -14.4265 -18.8818
TUNJ (∗10−4) -1.08821 -1.69373 -3.07705 -7.72644 -12.9465 -26.4833 -53.9419
TFUJ -0.228987 -0.345256 -0.587302 -1.22274 -1.91448 -3.264 -4.26746
TFUNJ -0.204424 -0.316268 -0.566061 -2.36253 -3.44285 -6.89118 -9.2923
UJ wins (%) 33.12 29.52 30.22 31.76 31.98 31.76 32.8
Table D.4.2: γ=3, 1+10, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.25439 3.40396 5.68203 11.4715 17.4741 28.8977 37.208
TFNJ 3.37101 5.13221 8.8745 19.7625 32.4317 60.3262 83.1845
TUJ (∗10−4) -0.974 -1.46171 -2.43214 -4.8063 -7.06255 -10.8066 -13.1058
TUNJ (∗10−4) -1.0335 -1.61482 -2.84692 -9.93096 -21.4017 -17.3573 -25.516
TFUJ -0.900758 -1.3465 -2.24105 -4.42816 -6.50014 -9.96095 -12.0838
TFUNJ -0.788421 -1.23233 -2.17239 -5.07936 -7.57461 -13.2926 -19.6939
UJ wins (%) 32.24 29.98 30.24 31.74 34.02 30.54 30.34
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Table D.4.3: γ=3, 2+20, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 4.5004 6.7658 11.3664 23.2004 35.4803 58.4252 74.7063
TFNJ 6.46885 9.71291 16.3168 33.6029 50.6063 84.202 107.171
TUJ (∗10−4) -0.9935 -1.47956 -2.43891 -4.74168 -6.93773 -10.894 -13.4015
TUNJ (∗10−4) -1.14786 -1.82251 -3.52386 -9.85826 -19.8829 -62.8707 -89.0543
TFUJ -0.224589 -0.334953 -0.551765 -1.07156 -1.56872 -2.46355 -3.03007
TFUNJ -0.215742 -0.346441 -0.655305 -1.83772 -3.68977 -10.3489 -15.1948
UJ wins (%) 33.74 36.62 38.98 47.76 53.92 60.54 63.56
Table D.4.4: γ=3, 1+10, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.28253 3.45927 5.88035 12.3192 19.4406 34.0733 45.5048
TFNJ 3.34766 5.05551 8.66882 18.4966 29.2669 51.7951 70.6413
TUJ (∗10−4) -0.959283 -1.41777 -2.28526 -4.21887 -5.86146 -8.29972 -9.59786
TUNJ (∗10−4) -1.0859 -1.79289 -3.30339 -9.2767 -15.2494 -32.072 -47.7016
TFUJ -0.884331 -1.30641 -2.10438 -3.88808 -5.40095 -7.65295 -8.84317
TFUNJ -0.831653 -1.36319 -2.52766 -7.12084 -11.6281 -24.5588 -35.3786
UJ wins (%) 32.58 35.82 38.94 45.58 50.76 57.38 60.26
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Table D.5.1: γ=2, 2+20, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 5.13 7.64079 12.5097 24.532 35.3789 55.2502 68.652
TFNJ 7.96 12.1517 20.7963 46.4978 71.0843 126.556 170.177
TUJ -0.02018 -0.030532 -0.0518497 -0.107621 -0.169138 -0.286295 -0.368799
TUNJ -0.02154 -0.0327491 -0.0567569 -0.13538 -0.196885 -0.350078 -0.543816
TFUJ -0.886234 -1.34045 -2.2789 -4.70585 -7.4273 -12.5276 -16.1619
TFUNJ -0.825752 -1.24604 -2.15916 -4.67734 -7.664 -13.3141 -17.2303
UJ wins (%) 32.2 29.28 31.2 32.5 32.44 33.02 32.44
Table D.5.2: γ=2, 1+10, Symmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.63216 3.93694 6.57586 13.0963 19.7262 33.0206 42.4538
TFNJ 4.14923 6.39352 11.328 25.2517 42.1472 83.0288 115.962
TUJ -0.0198272 -0.0297701 -0.0498897 -0.10088 -0.152576 -0.241554 -0.302799
TUNJ -0.0207063 -0.0317069 -0.0544408 -0.129646 -0.2346 -0.335995 -0.466738
TFUJ -1.75337 -2.6356 -4.40347 -8.90528 -13.4808 -21.3047 -26.7362
TFUNJ -1.59606 -2.42907 -4.16246 -8.83907 -14.6472 -23.1686 -29.9736
UJ wins (%) 31.7 29.92 28.4 31.58 32.02 30.68 32.14
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Table D.5.3: γ=2, 2+20, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 5.17882 7.73102 13.0149 26.2194 39.5972 64.8932 67.7002
TFNJ 7.9661 11.9224 20.3747 42.7863 66.4353 114.479 166.869
TUJ -0.0200331 -0.0300701 -0.0502091 -0.100975 -0.151911 -0.247061 -0.376239
TUNJ -0.0221937 -0.0341252 -0.065115 -0.155308 -0.276896 -0.568278 -0.634142
TFUJ -0.879143 -1.32388 -2.20046 -4.41868 -6.65744 -10.8331 -16.51
TFUNJ -0.849764 -1.30251 -1.91565 -5.63092 -9.54508 -19.4324 -22.0555
UJ wins (%) 33.06 34.54 38.02 49.24 49.6 53.38 58.2
Table D.5.4: γ=2, 1+10, Asymmetric wealth transfer function
Years 2 3 5 10 15 24 30
TFJ 2.64558 4.00474 6.81424 14.0961 22.2627 39.2663 51.8685
TFNJ 4.06353 6.24395 10.9436 23.6876 39.7276 73.3717 97.8292
TUJ -0.0197031 -0.0293917 -0.0483121 -0.09429 -0.137079 -0.209287 -0.258568
TUNJ -0.0210771 -0.033172 -0.0552787 -0.157428 -0.237725 -0.428447 -0.604689
TFUJ -1.74298 -2.59914 -4.26063 -8.33399 -12.0921 -18.4602 -22.831
TFUNJ -1.62273 -2.5499 -4.22108 -11.0368 -15.7816 -29.1205 -40.1853
UJ wins (%) 34.12 34.94 37.36 43.14 46.28 50.74 55.76
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Figure D.1. Symmetric wealth transfer function, cap at ±10%, δ = 0.25
Figure D.2. Asymmetric wealth transfer function, upper cap at 10% lower cap
at −15%, δ = 0.25, τ = 0.5
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APPENDIX D. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 6
Figure D.3. Sigmoid wealth transfer function, δ = 0.5
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D.5. TABLE 5.1 - 5.4
Figure D.4. TFUJ histogram, γ = 3, T = 24, 1 + 10% fees, symmetric
Figure D.5. TFUNJ histogram, γ = 3, T = 24, 1 + 10% fees, symmetric
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